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ARTICLES
FISH AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS:
DEBUNKING STATE SUPREMACY
BY
MARTIN NIE,* CHRISTOPHER BARNS,** JONATHAN HABER,*** JULIE JOLY,****
KENNETH PITT***** & SANDRA ZELLMER******
This Article reviews the authority offederal and state governments
to manage wildlife on federal lands It first describes the most common
asserions made by state governments regarding state powers over
wildlife and then analyzes the relevant powers and linitations of the
United States Constitution and federal land laws, regulations, and
polies. Wildlife-specific provisions applcable within the National
Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Forest System,
Bureau of Land Management, the special case of Alaska, and the
National Wilderness Preservation System are covered, as is the
Endangered Species Act. We reviewed an extensive collection of cases
of confdict between federal and state agencies in wildlife management
on federal land These cases show how federal land laws, regulations,
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and polcies are frequently apphed by federal agencies in an
inconsistent and sometimes even unlawful fashion. They also
demonstrate how commonalities found in state wildlife governance,
such as sources offunding and adherence to the North American Model
of Wildlife Conservation, often exacerbate confict over wildlife
management on federal lands.
Federal land management agencies have an oblgation, and not
just the discretion, to manage and conserve fish and wildlife on federal
lands. We debunk the myth that "the states manage wildlife and federal
land agencies only manage wildlife habitat" The myth is not only
wrong from a legal standpoint, but it leads to fragmented approaches to
wildlife conservation, unproductive battles over agency turf and an
abdication of federal responsibility over wildlife. Another problem
exposed is how the states assert wildlife ownership to challenge the
constitutional powers, federal land laws, and supremacy of the United
States. While the states do have a responsibility to manage wildlife as a
sovereign trust for the benefit of their citizens, most states have not
addressed the conservation obligations inherent in trust management;
rather, states wish to use the notion of sovereign ownershp as a one-
way ratchet-a source of unilateral power but not of public
responsibility. Furthermore, the states' trust responsibilities for wildlife
are subordinate to the federal government's statutory and trust
obligations over federal lands and their integral resources
The Article finishes by reviewing the ample opportunities that
already exist in federal land laws for constructive intergovernmental
cooperation in wildlife management. Unfortunately, many of these
processes are not used to their full potential, and states sometimes use
them solely as a means of challenging federal authority rather than a
means of solving common problems. Intergovernmental cooperation
must be a mutual and reciprocal process, meaning that state agencies
need to constructively participate in existing federal processes, and
federal agencies should be provided meaningful opportunities to
participate in, and influence, state decision making affecting federal
lands and wildlife.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most significant cases in the development of federal lands
and resources law revolve around questions pertaining to federalism and
wildlife management. At stake are weighty issues related to constitutional
law, sovereignty, and ownership. Complicating matters is the enduring
tension between federal and state governments that is built into American
politics, the opaque language sometimes found in federal lands law, and the
interjurisdictional nature of wildlife conservation. And, of course, there is
the politics of it all, as these cases force federal and state agencies to
consider their sources of power and authority, their organizational values
and biases, and other deeply polarizing and confrontational issues.
To begin, consider some of the following questions that were decided
long ago by the courts: Does the United States Forest Service (USFS) have
the authority to kill over-browsing deer deemed to be causing harm to the
Kaibab National Forest and to do so in violation of state game laws?
Similarly, does the National Park Service (NPS) have the authority to kill
deer within Carlsbad Caverns National Park for research purposes without
obtaining a state permit? Does Congress have the power to protect wild
horses and burros on federal lands when those species compete with
ranchers and their cattle for forage? And can the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) refuse to permit the State of Wyoming to vaccinate
elk on the National Elk Refuge?
20171 801
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The courts answered these questions, all in the affirmative,' but
standoffs between federal and state governments have nonetheless
intensified in recent years. We examined several of these conflicts to help
guide our research so that we could address the key arguments made by
state and federal governments, and focus our analysis on the most relevant
provisions related to wildlife as found in federal law, regulation, and policy.
Included in our review were cases receiving national attention, such as the
recent decision by NPS and FWS to preempt those hunting regulations of the
State of Alaska that are in conflict with National Park and Refuge laws.
These are rare cases where federal agencies pushed back against state
interests. In other high profile cases, federal agencies acquiesced to the
states, such as Grand Teton National Park's refusal to apply federal
regulations to private inholdings within the boundaries of the Park, thus
effectively ceding wildlife management authority to the State of Wyoming on
roughly 2,300 acres of land within the Park. Other problematic cases include
the management of wolves in federally designated wilderness areas, such as
the decision made by USFS to permit the State of Idaho to land helicopters
in the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness in order to track and
collar wolves, and to not take action to regulate the State of Idaho's plan to
hire a professional trapper to kill two packs of wolves living within the
Wilderness for the purpose of increasing the area's elk population. We also
investigated cases receiving far less national attention, such as an annual
predator killing contest on federal lands in Idaho managed by USFS and the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the State of Utah's introduction of
non-native mountain goats to establish a population on national forest lands.
In cases like these, the states frequently claim that federal land agencies
have limited authority over wildlife management, especially on. multiple-use
lands managed by USFS and BLM. In making this argument, states
commonly assert that they own wildlife and manage it as a trust resource. As
they see it, their power and authority over wildlife on federal lands reign
supreme, and as the argument goes, neither federal land laws nor the courts
have done much to change this historical arrangement. The states often
justify their positions and actions by reference to the "North American
Model of Wildlife Conservation" (the Model), which is a set of principles to
guide state management of wildlife.
In comparison to the states, the federal government responds in a more
varied and often inconsistent fashion. Rare is the situation where a federal
agency challenges state interests, such as the case with NPS and FWS in
Alaska. More common is a federal agency sending mixed messages about its
authority over wildlife on federal lands, sometimes flexing its muscle,
sometimes acquiescing to the states, and sometimes doing everything it can
to watch from the sideline. This inconsistency may be why questions about
wildlife management on federal lands have resurfaced with such force in
recent years.
1 See infra notes 136-153, 382 and accompanying text.
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This Article sets the record straight by providing a comprehensive
examination of the authority of federal agencies to manage wildlife on
federal lands, with the goal of providing a more common understanding
amongst federal and state agencies. To help ground the research and make it
usable to decision makers and federal land and wildlife managers, the
research team consists of three academics (Zellmer, Joly, and Nie) and three
consultants (all retired federal employees) having decades of experience
working for the United States Department of Agriculture's Office of the
General Counsel (Pitt), USFS (Haber, a former planning specialist for the
agency), and BLM (Barns, a former wilderness specialist at the Arthur
Carhart National Wilderness Training Center).
The Article comes in three parts. Part II begins by providing the context
of state wildlife governance. It highlights the core claims and arguments
most often made by the states and their representative institutions in
conflicts like those described above. It reviews the common assertion that
states own wildlife and manage it as a trust resource. From there, the. Part
reviews common themes in state wildlife laws, decision-making processes,
and sources of funding. The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation
is then described insofar as it relates to federal lands and conflict over
wildlife management. The Model was invoked frequently in the cases we
examined, and we explain its relevance in Part II and what we view as its
shortcomings in Part IV. Part II closes by summarizing some of the most
common complaints and recommendations made by the states, through the
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (AFWA), regarding the
management of wildlife on federal lands. We do so because of the role
played by AFWA in negotiating agreements with federal land agencies.
Part III begins by providing the legal context of wildlife management on
federal lands. The constitutional setting comes first, with a review of the
United States Constitution's Property Clause, Treaty Clause, Commerce
Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. The first Subpart closes by reviewing the
doctrine of federal preemption and the use of savings clauses in federal land
law. It shows that while states have well-established historical authority over
wildlife within their borders, this authority is neither exclusive nor
necessarily dominant. As found repeatedly by the courts, the Constitution
grants the federal government the authority to manage its lands and
resources, fulfill its treaty obligations, and control interstate commerce,
even when the states object.
Part III then reviews the federal land laws, regulations, and policies of
most significance to the management of wildlife on federal lands. Provisions
governing the management of endangered and threatened species, the
National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Forest
System, public lands administered by BLM, the special case of Alaska, and
the National Wilderness Preservation System are covered in this Subpart.
Extra attention is provided to the latter because of the disproportionate
amount of conflict and controversy generated by wildlife management in
federally designated wilderness. The Subpart shows that federal land
agencies have considerable powers and statutory duties to manage wildlife
2017] . 03
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on federal lands, even if they have chosen not to exercise those powers
consistently in the past. Also reviewed in each are agency-specific savings
clauses and provisions related to intergovernmental cooperation. Though
each statute differs in important ways, all provide the states with meaningful
and privileged opportunities to participate in decisions regarding the
management of wildlife on federal lands. The savings clauses demonstrate
Congress's desire to acknowledge some level of state responsibility over
wildlife management, but in no way should these clauses be interpreted to
diminish the federal government's vast constitutional and statutory authority
to manage its own lands and resources, even when objected to by a state.
Our conclusions, analysis, and recommendations come in Part IV. We
begin by explaining that federal land management agencies have an
oblgation, and not just the discretion, to manage and conserve fish and
wildlife on federal lands, contrary to the. myth that "the states manage
wildlife, federal land agencies only manage wildlife habitat." We found this
mantra repeated throughout our study, and it was commonly made by state
and federal agencies in multiple cases and contexts. We explain the origins
of this myth and explain why it is wrong from a legal standpoint and limited
from a biological one. The myth must be debunked, not only because it is
legally deficient, but also because federal lands are significant reservoirs of
biodiversity and will become even more significant in the future due to the
rapid pace of development on nonfederal lands.
We next address the common claim that states own wildlife and that
such ownership necessarily limits the authority of federal land agencies to
manage and make decisions concerning wildlife. We conclude that the
states' assertion that they own wildlife-full stop-is incomplete,
misleading, and needlessly deepens divisions between federal and state
governments. It is especially problematic when states assert ownership as a
basis to challenge or undermine federal authority over wildlife on federal
lands. The states are on solid footing when declaring a "sovereign
ownership" of wildlife that must be managed as a public trust resource. But,
invoking the public trust as a source of authority is simply not credible
without its mirror-image, which is the conservation responsibility for trust
resources.
We also explain in Part IV why it is important for the federal
government to respond to state assertions of trust ownership by
emphasizing that it too has statutory and trust obligations over federal lands,
which often encompass the conservation of wildlife. This Subpart concludes
by discussing how the all too often adversarial relationship between federal
and state governments might be addressed in the future by embracing a
more cooperative form of "co-trusteeship" between federal, state, and tribal
governments. In moving forward, we also recommend a reexamination of
how wildlife is managed and funded at the state level, such as finding a more
secure and predictable source of funding for nongame management. We also
suggest that advocates of the Model consider the significant role played by
federal lands in the conservation of wildlife.
[Vol. 47:797804
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Addressed next are two issues of a more technical nature, both of
which figured prominently in the cases reviewed for this research. The first
is the United States Department of the Interior's policy statement on federal-
state relations in wildlife policy. Some of the provisions found in the policy
sow confusion amongst federal and state agencies. Most problematic is how
the policy proclaims that states have "primary authority" for management of
fish and wildlife on federal lands. We take issue with this misinterpretation
of the law, the process used to write it, and explain how it can lead to
unnecessary confusion and conflict between federal and state governments.
We then discuss the issue of what happens when federal agencies
refuse to take action to protect wildlife on federal lands. This scenario
played out in several of the cases reviewed as part of this project, with the
distinction being between when the agency has a duty to act and when the
agency has the authority to act but the action is discretionary. When a
federal agency has a duty to act under a statute, regulation, or other legal
requirement, the failure to do so through permit issuance or otherwise
warrants an injunction of the non-permitted and non-federal activity.
The issue of wildlife management in the National Wilderness
Preservation System is also addressed again in Part IV. We review the
Wilderness Acte and its unambiguous affirmative obligation to preserve
wilderness character, which includes fish and wildlife species within
wilderness areas, and discuss problematic trends where federal agencies
have skirted legal obligations in order to accommodate more political
demands, often from state interests advancing a view of management that is
antithetical to the Wilderness Act.
Part IV concludes by discussing the importance of intergovernmental
cooperation in the management of wildlife on federal lands. Multiple
opportunities for cooperation already exist in federal decision-making and
planning processes, but they are not used to their full potential. We found
that states too often view such opportunities not as a way to meaningfully
inform federal decision making, but as a political platform to challenge
federal authority. As we see it, intergovernmental cooperation is a two-way
street, and while federal agencies must provide opportunities for state
participation in federal planning processes, the states should reciprocate by
providing opportunities for federal entities to participate meaningfully in
state wildlife management decision making and, in appropriate cases, to
influence the resolution of issues related to wildlife conservation.
To make the research accessible to those who need it most, the Article
is accompanied by a set of frequently asked questions that will be available
online. This resource enables users to find succinct answers to their
questions with linkages to the most relevant parts of the Article for
additional information.
2 16U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136(2012).
3 Federal Lands & Wildlife, U. MoNT., httpi//www.cfc.umt.edulbolle/federal-lands-wildlife
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (FAQs currently under construction).
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II. STATE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT AND STATE PERSPECTIVES ON MANAGING
WILDLIFE ON FEDERAL LANDS
This Part provides some initial background on state wildlife law and
governance. Common state perspectives on wildlife ownership, the wildlife
trust, state wildlife commissions, funding, and the North American Model of
Wildlife Conservation are reviewed insofar as they pertain to
intergovernmental conflict. These issues emerged frequently in several of
the disputes we examined. The Part reviews some of the most common
claims and arguments made by state wildlife agencies and their
representative institutions. Of course, there is no singular state wildlife
agency perspective, and readers should appreciate the diversity found
amongst the states. To simplify, we emphasize the views and position of
AFWA. AFWA represents North America's state fish and wildlife agencies
and is a principle actor in the debate over wildlife management on federal
lands.4 Particular emphasis is placed on AFWA because of its role in
negotiating agreements with federal land agencies. We take issue with some
of the positions. and arguments, as explained below in this Part, and we
return to some of the more substantive issues in subsequent Parts of the
Article.
A. State Ownersido and the Wildlife Trust
Forty-eight states claim sovereign ownership of wildlife.' Sovereign
ownership differs from proprietary ownership in that it is constrained by the
public interest with the requirement that wildlife be managed for the greater
good and the benefit of the public.6 Most often referenced by the states in
this context is Geer v. Connecticu4' in which the Supreme Court of the
United States recognized the common state ownership of wildlife and that
this power is to be exercised "as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not
as a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the
people, or for the benefit or private individuals as distinguished from the
public good."8 As we discuss in Part llI.A, the Supreme Court subsequently
overruled Geer in Hughes v. Oklahoma, but did so in the context of federal
laws preempting state laws (based on claims of state ownership).9 States, in
4 See About: Overview, ASS'N FISH & WILDLFE AGENCIES, https://perma.cc/A2ZW-GQSP
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
5 Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 6 UTAH L. REV. 1437,
1462, 1488-1504 (2013).
6 Id. at 1466-67.
7 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled byHughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
8 Id. at 529. AFWA considers Geer as "provid[ing] the single strongest statement of state
public trust ownership of fish and wildlife in the Court's jurisprudence." Brief for Ass'n of Fish
& Wildlife Agencies as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11, Wisconsin v. Lac Courte
Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis., 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015) (No. 14-792),
2015 WL 527525, at *11. Geertraces the idea to Martin v Waddefls Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367
(1842). Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.
9 Hughes, 441 U.S. 325-26. The erosion of Geer began with Missouri v. Holand, 252 U.S.
416 (1920). There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and
806 [Vol. 47:797
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other words, cannot discriminate against interstate commerce based on
claims of state ownership of wildlife." The general rule adopted in Hughes
"makes ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the
Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and
protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state
ownership.""
Assertions of sovereign ownership provide the basis for states claiming
a "public trust" in wildlife. In their analysis, Blumm and Paulsen find that
"courts and legislatures in at least twenty-two states have expressly
employed the words 'trust' or 'trustee' when discussing state management of
wildlife" and that "courts and legislatures of at least twenty-two other states
use trust-like language ... in proclaiming state ownership of wildlife."" The
public trust in wildlife is most often invoked by states when declaring broad
power and authority to regulate fish and wildlife resources. Less clear is
what affirmative conservation duties go along with this trust responsibility.
In other words, what must states do, and not do, in order to meet the
responsibilities of the wildlife trust?" There is relatively little case law on
this matter, and states have generally done little to fill in the details. As is
the case with the public trust doctrine more broadly, there are many
unanswered questions about the exact parameters and possible applications
of a "wildlife trust," if the term is to be taken literally.6 But for purposes
rejected state claims of "exclusive authority" to manage wildlife under the state ownership
doctrine. Id at 434. As eloquently stated by the Court: "the state may regulate the killing and
sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To
put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed." Id.; see infra notes 187-190
and accompanying text.
10 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
11 Id. at 335-36.
12 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1471, 1473. "Of the fifty states, only Nevada and Utah
have yet to make some acknowledgement of the public trust in wildlife." Id. at 1477. Similarly,
AFWA emphasizes that "[sitates, as public trustees, hold wildlife in trust for their citizens." Brief
for Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 8, at
10.
13 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1466, 1471-73.
14 See generally Susan Morath Homer, Embryo, Not Fossil Breathing Life Into the Public
Trust in'Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REv. 23, 24 (2000) ("[P]ractitioners have not been left with
any clear authority either as to the resources to which the doctrine should apply, or its
necessary features."); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust
Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 733 (1989) ("Professor Stone's
proposal focuses on the practical aspects of such a change, namely'that natural objects would
be recognized at law, could institute-through a guardian-legal action to prevent or redress
harm to the natural objects, and receive direct injunctive or monetary relief."); Patrick
Redmond, The Public Trust in Wildlife. Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, 49 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 249, 253 (2009) ("This distinction between proscriptive authority and affirmative
duties has evoked numerous subtle philosophical and ethical discussions of the difference
between a purely regulatory relationship between the state and its natural resources and a more
trust-oriented relationship based on a stewardship ethic or 'duty-based environmentalism.'").
15 See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1471; Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust
Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past and Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 678
(2012); see also discussion infra Part I.B. 1.
16 Homer, supra note 14, at 25.
2017] 07
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here, it is enough to note how the open-ended nature and ambiguity of the
wildlife trust doctrine is used by the states to assert jurisdictional powers
and control over wildlife. We return to the important issues of wildlife
ownership and trust management in Part VA.2.
B. State Wildlife Laws, Decision Making, and Funding
State wildlife agencies implement their wildlife trust duties through an
array of state wildlife laws and regulations. Some of the most common
categories found in state codes pertain to protected species, hunting, fishing
and trapping, animal damage control, habitat protection, tribal provisions,
law enforcement, and hunter-harassment interference.r Twenty-one states
also have "right to hunt" constitutional provisions. 8 These vary in terms of
substance and effect.'9
Some simply recognize a hunting heritage in a state20 and the
opportunity to harvest wild fish and game subject to state law and
regulation,2 ' while others create more explicit rights that are nonetheless
subject to state management." All but one of these amendments (Vermont's)
passed since the mid-1990s, and collectively, they reflect some fear that state
hunting traditions are under threat." As we discuss below, they also signify
the importance of hunting to state wildlife management.
While state fish and wildlife agencies are structured in numerous ways,
a commonalty that most share is that the director or head of the agency is
responsible to some sort of politically appointed fish and wildlife
commission, board, or advisory council.A The. powers granted to state
wildlife commissions vary, from setting fish and game seasons and bag limits
17 See RUTH S. MUSGRAVE & MARY ANNE STEIN, CTR. FOR WILDFE LAW, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS
HANDBOOK 14, 18 (1993); see also Animal Legal and Historical Center Web Site, MICH. ST. U.,
https://perma.cc/4EUV-D9VX (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (providing searchable database of
hunter harassment and interference laws).
18 See State Constitutional Right to Hunt and lish, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 20,
2017), https://perma.cc/W53PJ3QQ.
19 See generally Stacey L. Gordon, A Solution in Search of a Problem: The Difficulty with
State Constitutional "Right to Hunt"Amendments, 35 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 3 (2014)
(discussing the different state constitutions that guarantee a right to hunt.).
20 See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 7 ("The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game
animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of the state and
does not create a right to trespass on private property or diminution of other private rights.").
21 See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. I, § 39 ("The opportunity to fish, hunt and trap wildlife is a
heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of the state, subject to
regulation as prescribed by law, and does not create a right to trespass on private property,
diminish other private rights or alter the duty of the state to manage wildlife.").
22 See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 ( "The people have a right to hunt, fish, and harvest game,
subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe by general
law").
23 State Constitutional Right to Hunt and Fish, supra note 18.
24 See Martin Nie, State Wildlife Policy and Management The Scope and Bias of Political
Condict 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 221, 222 (2004).
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to charting broader management goals and objectives for the states.
Members are typically appointed by the governor and subject to state
legislative approval." Most states also have requirements for commission
membership, such as a general knowledge of wildlife issues, political and
geographic balance, or requiring that they hold a sporting license." The
commission framework stems from sport hunters and conservationists
wanting to secure their hard-fought protections for fish and game; thus,
commissions were created so that sport hunters had a voice in preventing a
return of widespread market hunting.2 More recently, however, state
wildlife commissions have been criticized, mostly because some interests
believe that their memberships do not adequately represent the diverse
values and interests of those people who do not hunt, fish, or trap.
Funding for state wildlife management generally comes from the sale of
hunting, fishing, and trapping licenses at the state level and from federal
funds generated through targeted excise taxes." The result is that hunting,
fishing, and trapping-derived revenue "comprise between 60 and 90 percent
of the typical state fish and wildlife agency budget."' This arrangement is
often referred to as a "user-pay, user-benefit" funding model because states
apply most of these funds to the management of sport fish and game
species. 32 This funding mechanism serves to reinforce the complaint of non-
hunters that their values and interests are not adequately considered in
management decisions.3 As we discuss below, this funding model helps us
better understand the position of states in some intergovernmental disputes,
as decisions made by federal land agencies can have implications for state
wildlife agency budgets that are so dependent on fish and game-generated
revenue.
Another initial observation is that the "user-pay, user-benefit" moniker
is more complicated than generally stated. A case can be made, for example,
that taxpayers, including the non-hunting and non-fishing public, do indeed
pay for wildlife conservation through the acquisition and management of
wildlife habita, both public and private.' This takes the form of funding for
federal lands, state lands, and contributions to private land conservation."
25 See, e.g., ERIN SEILER, OR. LEGISLATIVE COMM. SERVS., ExEcuTrvE APPOINTIENTS
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW (2016), https://perma.cc/FKC9-VUJJ.
26 See, e.g, id
27 See, e.g, id.
2 See JOHN F. REIGER, AMERICAN SPORTSMEN AND THE ORIGINS OF CONSERVATION 80 (3d ed.
2001).
29 Nie, supra note 24, at 223.
0 Id
31 J.F. ORGAN ET AL, THE NORTH AMERICAN MODEL OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: TECHNICAL
REVIEW 12-04, at 9 (Theodore A. Bookhout ed., 2012), https://perma.cc/68VB-FJ7F.
32 See id.
3 See Nie, supra note 24, at 223-24.
34 See ORGAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 10 (providing examples of federal agency influence
on funding).
3 See id. at 27 (explaining contributions of public and private land management to habitat
conservation).
3 See id.
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But in more precise terms of funding wildlife management and state wildlife
agencies, the user-pay, user-benefit model is less disputed.
The history of the user-pay, user-benefit funding model illustrates the
cooperative relationship between federal and state governments in the
management of wildlife. Prior to 1937, many states regularly diverted game
license revenue to general governmental purposes, other than fish and
wildlife management." The Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act,3
more commonly known as the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, put
an end to this practice.' The program put in place by the Act provides
federal assistance to states for wildlife restoration projects and plans and
hunter education." In order to secure a more certain and predictable stream
of funding for wildlife, the Act (and subsequent amendments to it) created a
fund from taxes imposed on firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment."
However, in order to receive federal funding, the law requires states to
prohibit "the diversion of license fees paid by hunters for any other purpose
than the administration of [the] State fish and game department."" In other
words, the law conditions federal funding on states using state game license
revenue for wildlife management and conservation.
A similar program focused on fisheries emerged from Congress in 1950.
The Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish Restoration Act,' also referred to as the
Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act, funds sport fish restoration through
excise taxes on fishing equipment, motorboat/small engine fuel, and baits.4
It similarly includes a predicate for federal funding: states receiving Dingell-
Johnson money must apply it to the administration of state fish and game
departments .4  Funding is used for fish restoration and management
projects, defined in the law as "the restoration and management of all
species of fish which have material value in connection with sport or
recreation in the marine and/or fresh waters of the United States."
The Pittman-Robertson and Dingell-Johnson Acts primarily focus on
sport fish and game species. State funding for nongame species has not fared
as well. Congress addressed this issue in passing the Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Act of 1980." Frequently referred to as the "Non-Game Act,"
this law recognizes that the traditional focus on "recreationally and
37 See Hal Herring, In Current Rush to Buy Guns and Ammo, IYttman-Robertson Fnds
BreakAliRecords, FIELD & STREAM (May 9, 2013), https://permacc/DV5X-889Y.
38 16 U.S.C. §§ 669-669i (2012).
39 See id § 669.
40 Id. §§ 669b, 669c, 669h-1.
41 See M. LYNNE CORN & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42992, GUNs, EXCISE
TAXES, AND WILDLIFE RESTORATION 2 fig.1 (2013) (providing yearly data of Pittman-Robertson
receipts and distributions).
42 16 U.S.C. §669.
43 Id §§ 777-777m.
44 Digest ofFederal Resource Laws ofInterest to the US. Fish and Wildlife Service Federal
Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://permacc/UG7W-QUMS
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
45 16 U.S.C. § 777(a).
46 Id. § 777a(1).
47 Id §§ 2901-2912.
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commercially important species" and "traditional financing mechanisms are
neither adequate nor fully appropriate to meet the conservation needs of
nongame fish and wildlife."' The purpose of the Act is to fix this problem by
providing "financial and technical assistance to the States for the
development, revision, and implementation of conservation plans and
programs for nongame fish and wildlife." 9 Promise notwithstanding, this law
never achieved its stated purpose because unlike the Pittman-Robertson and
Dingell-Johnson Acts, it does not include an independent and more secure
funding mechanism." Instead, the law relied on funding from general
congressional appropriations, which to date, Congress never provided to the
program."
Several initiatives have been waged in the past, at both national" and
state" levels, to deal with the lack of funding for nongame species
management, and a related campaign is currently underway.5 AFWA is part
of a broad coalition seeking a solution to the problem of nongame funding."
We return to this issue in Part IV, as we believe it is imperative that states
have the capacity and incentives to manage nongame species. Providing
these resources will build trust and capacity at the state level, and help
harmonize federal-state responsibilities over wildlife on federal lands.
C The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation
The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation figures
prominently in state claims and positions regarding wildlife management on
federal lands. The Model was formally adopted by AFWA in 2002, and it
views the Model (along with the public trust doctrine) as "the basis for state
wildlife law." While the Model has no independent legal authority, it is
referenced extensively in AFWA's legal and educational materials, and is
48 Id. § 2901(a)(4).
49 Id. § 2901(b)(1).
50 Removing Regulations Implementing the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 75 Fed.
Reg. 51,420, 51,420-21 (Aug. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 83).
51 See id. at 51,420 (removing regulations that implement the Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Act because "funds never became available to carry out the Act").
52 One of the more memorable campaigns was the unsuccessful effort in passing the
Conservation and Reinvestment Act (CARA) of 2000. H.R. 701, 106th Cong. (2000).
53 See Cindy McKinney et al., Investing in Wildlife: State Wildlife Funding Campaigns 20
fig.1 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Michigan), https://perma.cc/NSG4-
TPD2.
54 See generally AsS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, SUSTAINING AND CONNECTING PEOPLE
TO FISH AND WILDLIFE: A LOOMING CRISIS CAN BE AVOIDED, https://permacc/BH9H-Z4NN (last
visited Nov. 11, 2017) (discussing incomplete fish and wildlife funding).
55 Id
56 AsS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY: THE STATE
AGENCIES' PERSPECTIVE 13 (2014), https://permacc/CR2T-U8A2 [hereinafter AFWA TASK FORCE
REPORT]; About: North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, Ass'N FISH & WILDLIFE
AGENCIES, https://permacc/NE8Q-38ZM (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
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also invoked frequently by state wildlife agencies and other institutions."
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a thorough accounting
and analysis of the Model, it plays a significant role in how states frequently
frame issues and view their political and legal authority over wildlife." We
discuss the Model again in Part IV.B.2 by explaining how it can exacerbate
conflict between federal and state governments.
First articulated by University of Calgary biologist Valerius Geist in the
mid-1990s, the Model is a set of seven broadly stated principles, which
include the following: 1) wildlife resources are a public trust; 2) markets for
game are eliminated; 3) allocation of wildlife is by law; 4) wildlife can be
killed only for a legitimate purpose; 5) wildlife is considered an international
resource; 6) science is the proper tool to discharge wildlife policy; and 7)
democracy of hunting is standard.'
Embedded within each principle is a descriptive-historical accounting
of wildlife conservation and a more normative-prescriptive component. The
Model places extraordinary emphasis on the role played by hunters in
American wildlife conservation, while paying relatively little regard to the
preservation movement or the role played by federal lands and federal
environmental law more generally" Conspicuously missing from the Model,
for example, is a principle focused on wildlife habitat, of which federal lands
would be of obvious significance.
The normative and prescriptive part of the Model is more difficult to
assess because of how differently actors interpret and use it. Some
proponents of the Model, for example, claim that it "has often been
interpreted to be more than its original articulators' intention to describe key
components of the philosophy and approach to wildlife conservation that
developed in North America.""' Critics of the Model, by contrast, see it as
more than just a description of the past but rather as a narrow set of guiding
principles for future wildlife conservation.62 This is because most references
57 See, e.g., ARIZ. GAME & FISH DEP'T, NORTH AMERICAN MODEL OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION,
https://perma.cc/Z2XW-X2X3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) ("The North American Model of
Wildlife Conservation is the world's most successful."); WILDLIFE SOC'Y, STANDING POSITION: THE
NORTH AMERICAN MODEL OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, https://permacc/R4U9-6LBV (last visited
Nov. 11, 2017) (explaining that the policy of The Wildlife Society is to "[piromote and support
adherence to the seven core components [of the Model], identified by the Society, as the
bedrock of the Model, by state, provincial, and federal governments").
58 See generally David Willms & Anne Alexander, The North Amezican Model of Wildlife
Conservation in Wyoming: UndezstandLng 14 Preserving 14 and Fnding Its Fture, 14 WYO. L.
REV. 659 (2014).
59 Valerius Geist et al., Why Hunting Has Defined the North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE 66TH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
CONFERENCE 175, 176-80 (2001), https://perma.cc/C53S-CTCS (citing earlier references and
antecedents to the Model).
60 See id
61 John F. Organ et al., Public Tust Principles and Trust Administration Functions in the
North American Model of Wildlife Conservation: Contributions ofHuman Dimensions Research,
19 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 407, 408 (2014).
62 See Susan G. Clark & Christina Milloy, The North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation: An Analysis of Challenges and Adaptive Options, in LARGE CARNIVORE
CONSERVATION: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLICY IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST 289, 301 (Susan
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to the Model, as discussed further below, go beyond description and use it to
justify various positions or decisions made by state wildlife agencies.63 Clark
and Milloy summarize: "Functionally, the model's doctrine (principles) and
formula (rules to implement the doctrine) guide current decision making
about wildlife; they dictate how decisions are made, by whom, and for what
purposes."' What is striking to us about the Model is how little academic
and professional scrutiny has been applied to it, as it is clearly but one
possible accounting of wildlife conservation-past, present, and future.
Whatever might be its strengths and limitations, the Model clearly has
political and policy influence, and helps us understand state positions on
wildlife management, though often indirectly. Of most relevance here is the
Model's emphasis on the public trust doctrine, state primacy, and the
importance of hunting to wildlife conservation. The public trust doctrine, as
applied to wildlife, is regarded as the Model's cornerstone." Asserting that
public trust principles relating to wildlife are most clearly found in state law,
AFWA references the Model to "[a]dvocate for the primacy of state
management authority for resident wildlife."66 Again, AFWA's emphasis is
that states have authority to manage fish and wildlife resources through a
public trust and that it "assigns trustee ownership of fish and wildlife to the
states."" Access to public resources is commonly asserted in public trust
cases (e.g., to oysters, tidelands, or streams), and state wildlife agencies and
AFWA make similar linkages between states owning wildlife in trust, which
necessitates providing public access to fish and wildlife." We return to the
public trust in wildlife issue in Part IV.A.2.
Also of relevance is the Model's emphasis on hunting. As explained by
the Model's originators, though other interest groups such as bird
enthusiasts played roles in the conservation movement, "[i]t is hunters,
however, or, more accurately, hunting, that led to development of the
[Model's principles and] form[s] the foundation for North American wildlife
G. Clark & Murray B. Rutherford eds., 2014) (questioning "whether the model is capable of
conserving wildlife and ecosystems into the future without major adaptations"); see also
Michael P. Nelson et al., An Inadequate Construct? North Amencan Model: What's Flawed,
What's Missing, What's Needed, WILDLIFE PROF., Summer 2011, at 58, 58 (arguing that "the rise
in the Model's popularity is worrisome in both its descriptive and prescriptive modes: One rests
upon an inadequate account of history and the other on an inadequate ethic").
6 See, e.g, infra note 66 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part I.D.
6 Clark & Milloy, supra note 62, at 312.
65 See Organ et al., supra note 61, at 408; see also WILILIFE Soc'Y, THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA 9 (2010), https://perma.cc/5N5W-KG2S.
6 M. CAROL BAMBERY & MARTIN BUSHMAN, AsS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, THE STATES:
TRUSTEES OF AMERICA'S WILDLIFE 13 (on file with authors).
67 Federal Interactons ith State Management of Fish and Wildlife: Hearing Before the
Subcomin. on Fisheies, Water, and Wildlife of the S Comm. on Environment and Publc Works,
114th Cong. 9 (2016) [hereinafter HearingL (statement of Ronald J. Regan, Executive Director,
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies).
6 See WILDLIFE SoC'Y, supra note 65, at 9 (emphasizing the importance of access to the
public trust doctrine, including fishing, hunting, trapping, and travel routes).
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conservation."" AFWA similarly states that "[hiunting and angling are the
cornerstones of the North American Model with sportsmen and women
serving as the foremost funders of conservation."" In this vein, proponents
of the Model often speak to the importance of sportsmen and women-
derived funds to state fish and wildlife agency budgets." This is not to
suggest, however, that all proponents of the Model are necessarily endorsing
an exclusive "user-pay, user-benefit" model of funding for the future. In fact,
some proponents are actively searching for ways to increase funding for
nongame species and want the Model applied to the conservation of
biodiversity more broadly. 2 However malleable the Model may prove itself
to be in the future, at this point, it is very much hunting-centric, and this
helps explain a common position of the states in various disputes, such as
when federal agencies make decisions to restrict types of hunter access or
when states advocate for more "active management" of wildlife on federal
lands. 3
D. The 2014 AFWA Task Force Report
In 2014, AFWA commissioned a task force to investigate how state
wildlife agency directors "perceive the relationship between state and
federal agencies, by determining the relationship's implications on states'
authority to manage wildlife, and by making recommendations to strengthen
the relationship between state and federal conservation agencies."" The
Task Force Report illuminates how several state directors view the
relationship between federal and state governments and the perceived legal
sources of tension. Furthermore, many of the recommendations made by the
Task Force are made by AFWA in other contexts, and the document was
approved by state membership.
The report begins by invoking the North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation, the wildlife trust doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment of the
69 Geist et al., supra note 59, at 179; see also James R. Heffelfinger et al., The Role of
Hunting in North American Wildlife Conservation, 70 INT'L J. ENVTL. STUD. 399, 399 (2013)
("Regulated hunting is the foundation of the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation.").
70 About North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, supra note 56.
71 See, e.g., AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 30; About: North American Model
of Wildlife Conservation, supra note 56.
72 See, e.g, Organ et al., supra note 61, at 408 (recommending that all wildlife be managed
under the principles of the Model and that it is not synonymous with the user-pay, user-benefit
funding model); Willms & Alexander, supra note 58, at 659-61 (recommending alternative
funding sources for wildlife management).
73 For example, AFWA states that the Model "is the world's most successful system of
policies and laws to restore and safeguard fish and wildlife and their habitats through sound
science and active management" About North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, supra
note 56 (emphasis added); see also Joanna Prukop & Ronald J. Regan, In My Opinion: The Value
of the North.Amencan Model of Wildlife Conservation-An International Association of Fish
4nd Wildlife Agencies Position, 33 WiLDunFE Soc'Y BULL. 374, 376 (2005) (linking the Model to
the importance of state primacy and the issue of access to wildlife resources).
74 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.
75 See Hearing, supra note 67, at 60-61 (statement of Executive Director Regan).
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U.S. Constitution, which it asserts, "relegates to the states the responsibility
of managing wildlife."" To make the Model work, says the report, "[a]
productive relationship between federal and state agencies" is necessary."
Unfortunately, the report finds that "[sItate wildlife agency leadership
harbors growing concern about the increasingly strained relationship
between state wildlife agencies and their federal partners" and that there is
"considerable and widespread frustration with the interface between federal
and state efforts to conserve wildlife."
Survey respondents were asked to identify specific laws, regulations, or
policies that they believed were successful or challenging.8 Most frequently
identified as a challenge to the states was the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), which is perceived by some state agency directors "as a vehicle for
federal overreach, or of inappropriate reallocation of states' wildlife
management duties into federal hands."81 Also standing out in the survey
were respondents citing the National Environmental Policy Acte (NEPA) as
a "hindrance to states' efforts to manage wildlife"a due to threats of NEPA-
based litigation and the "continued exclusion of states from meaningful
partnerships in planning, decision-making, and management, except in the
most cursory of consultative efforts."m
Of relevance to Part III.B of this Article are some state views on federal
land laws in general. Emphasized in the report are the perceived problems
associated with the open-ended nature of federal land laws that are believed
to be interpreted in a preservationist "hands-off' fashion that makes active
management of wildlife more difficult.u The task force report summarizes:
These laws leave room for loose interpretations of land management agency
authority. The ambiguity allows local land managers latitude in their decision-
making, and they often implement preservationist interpretations that
encroach on state authorities. These interpretations, often based on unwritten
values, drive agency decisions that are typically contrary to principles of
wildlife, fisheries, and habitat management critical for state management.
The Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) and the National
Forest Management Acte (NFMA) are discussed in this context, with both
76 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 5.
77 Id. at 2, 4.
78 Id. at 2.
79 Id. at 6.
80 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).81 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 2, 8.
82 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
8 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.
8 Id. at 11.
85 Id. at 9.
86 Id
87 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (2012).
8 National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 472a, 521b, 1600, 1611-1614 (2012)
(amending Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
378, 88 Stat. 476).
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laws often viewed as presenting obstacles to the management of "state trust
species."' These laws were not identified as inherently problematic, rather
respondents focused on the "subjective and inconsistent application of their
precepts.""
The AFWA Task Force makes a number of recommendations for
improving relations between federal and state governments, most of which
revolve around strengthening the position of state agencies in managing
wildlife on federal lands.9 ' It also initiated a "legal strategy" in 2013 to enable
state agencies "to act in concert to address challenges to their statutory
authority to manage wildlife."" In short, AFWA aims to clarify-in law,
regulation, policy, and public perception-what it sees as the rightful role of
the states in managing wildlife on federal lands. Some of these
recommendations are offered by AFWA and the Western Association of Fish
and Wildlife Agencies (WAFWA) in other contexts," such as recent
congressional testimony." For now, we simply summarize the core
recommendations of the Task Force and provide the requisite background in
other parts of the Article. We return and respond to AFWA's
recommendations in Part IV.
The AFWA Task Force begins by recommending training state and
federal line managers "on the historic, principled underpinnings of state-
federal authority and jurisdiction for managing fish and wildlife in the United
States."5 The proposed training initiative is to be implemented through a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)." A public affairs strategy "to market
and defend state wildlife authority interests" is also envisioned as part of
this educational effort.7 Establishing a mediation team to more
constructively resolve conflict between federal and state agencies is also
recommended."
Driving some of the Task Force's recommendations is a concern that
federal land agencies are evolving in a way that is inconsistent with their
organic legislation." According to the Task Force, "[a]s conservation
becomes more focused on landscape scale efforts, it is important that
federal agencies integrate their conservation programs with the state agency
89 AFWA TASK REPORT, supra note 56, at 9, 12.
90 Id. at 2.
91 See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.92 ASS'N OF FISH & WiLDUFE AGENCIES, PROTECTING STATE AUTHORITY FOR FISH AND WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/M3RG-8QEM (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
93 See, e.g, W. AsS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES COMM'RS' STATE AUTHS. SUBcoMM., WHITE
PAPER: WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT SuBSIDIARrrY 4 (2011) ("WAFWA recommends that Congress
adopt new provisions that clearly establish state fish and wildlife management authority and
direct that all federal regulations and policies be consistent with congressional intent.").
94 See Hearing, supra note 67, at 5-7 (statement of Executive Director Regan).
95 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 17.
96 Id
97 Id. at 29.
98 Id. at 28-29.
9 See, e.g, id at 21 ("The []FWS's shift in focus has changed from direct fish and wildlife
management with the protection and restoration of either single species or population to the
maintenance of ecosystems and biodiversity.").
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programs and not get out ahead of the states and the public we serve."' The
Task Force elaborates:
[W]e must remember that the foundation for our fish and wildlife programs
continues to be the people who enjoy our sports and continue to pay the lion's
share of the costs that provide these services. Many state fish and wildlife
programs across our nation do not receive either state or federal general
appropriations and as such must answer to a narrow constituency of
supporters. 0
This concern leads to the Task Force recommending more substantive
legislative changes. The first is to modify the Sikes Act'" so that
management by the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture comport
with the law's section pertaining to fish and wildlife. management on lands
administered by the Department of Defense." This law, often referred to as
the "Sikes Act Extension," requires the Secretaries of Interior and
Agriculture to "plan, develop, maintain, and coordinate programs for the
conservation and rehabilitation of wildlife, fish, and game.""4 The military
section of the Sikes Act requires the cooperative preparation of natural
resource management plans and that these plans "shall reflect the mutual
agreement of the [federal and state] parties concerning conservation,
protection, and management of fish and wildlife resources.""' There is no
such language in the law pertaining to "mutual agreement" in the sections
pertaining to the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture.o' The Task
Force would like the statute changed to include the following language: "The
conservation plans and resulting programs shall reflect the mutual
100 Id.
101 Id
102 16 U.S.C. §§ 670-670m (2012).
103 Id §§ 670f-670h; AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 22.
104 16 U.S.C. § 670g(a).
10 Id. § 670a(a)(2).
106 Instead, the Sikes Act makes clear.
Conservation and rehabilitation programs developed and implemented pursuant to this
subchapter shall be deemed as supplemental to wildlife, fish, and game-related programs
conducted by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to
other provisions of law. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as limiting the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture, as the case may
be, to manage the national forests or other public lands for wildlife and fish and other
purposes in accordance with the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 or other
applicable authority.
Id. § 670h(c)(1)(C) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Furthermore, any wildlife conservation
and rehabilitation plans prepared pursuant to the Sikes Act must be consistent with applicable
USFS or BLM land management plans. See id. § 670h(b); see also Michael J. Bean, The
Developing Law of Wildlife Conservation on the Natonal Forest and National Resource Lands,
4 J. CoNTEMp. L. 58, 65 (1977) (finding the Sikes Act Extension to offer "no resolution, indeed no
guidance for the resolution, of conflicts involving wildlife conservation and other uses of the
public lands" and that "it does nothing to narrow the broad discretion which the federal land
management agencies have traditionally exercised in fulfilling their multiple use mandates").
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agreement of the parties concerning conservation, protection, and
management of fish and wildlife resources. "107
As we explain later, federal land laws often include a "savings" clause
addressing the relationship between federal and state powers." AFWA
emphasizes the importance of these provisions and makes a
recommendation to "[s]trengthen existing Savings Clauses, expand new
Savings Clauses to new congressional legislation as opportunities arise, and
vigorously defend savings clauses to establish legal precedent.""
The Task Force expresses frustration in how the courts have viewed
wildlife savings clauses in the past, most notably in the case of managing
wildlife in the National Elk Refuge in Wyoming.no As AFWA sees it, these
savings clauses should be viewed as unambiguous and represent the clear
intention of Congress to "reserve" state power and authority over wildlife on
federal lands as "a necessary incident of state sovereignty.""' To fix this
problem, the Task Force recommends replacing existing savings provisions
with the following language:
Nothing in the Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to interfere with
the laws of the several states to regulate hunting and fishing or to supersede,
abrogate or otherwise impair the state's primary jurisdiction to manage or
control fish and resident wildlife in a manner not inconsistent with the purpose
of this Act. The Secretary, in carrying out this Act, shall proceed in conformity
with such applicable state laws, policies and management plans and shall
cooperate with the states and develop jointly agreed upon wildlife
management plans."2
This proposal is a fundamental reinterpretation of existing wildlife law, and
we explain why it should be rejected in Part IV. We discuss savings clauses
again in the context of federal preemption and in each section reviewing
federal land laws.
107 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 23.
108 See Robert L. Fischman & Angela M. King, Savings Clauses and Trends in Natural
Resources Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 145 (2007) (describing how
these provisions "delimit the degree to which a federal agency should pursue national
objectives at the expense of a state's different view" and can provide "a statement, and
sometimes a mechanism, for incorporating state interests notwithstanding a statute that seeks
to implement a uniform federal program").
109 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 17.
110 Id. at 17-18 (citing Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (2002)).
111 Brief of Amicus Curiae International Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellants & Reversal of the Decision Below at 8, Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.
2002) (No. 99-8089) (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510 (1896)).
112 AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 27.
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III. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS
A. Constitutional Context
The U.S. Constitution provides the framework for federal-state relations
and power-sharing arrangements, as well as individual obligations and
limitations on authority for each level of government. Key provisions include
the Property Clause,"' Treaty Clause, "4 Commerce Clause,"' Supremacy
Clause,"6 and the Tenth Amendment."' This Subpart explains the relevant
constitutional clauses and legal precedents regarding federal powers and
duties for wildlife management, and consequent implications for state
authority.
1. The Property Clause
The United States' vast landholdings are concentrated in the American
West and Alaska, but federal land can be found in all fifty states."' As a
landowner, the United States has proprietary interests over its lands and
resources; as a government, it also has sovereign powers over its lands and
resources."' This Section focuses on the proprietary nature of the federal
interest in public lands and wildlife.
a. The Nature and Scope of the Property Clause
The Property Clause gives Congress the "Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.""' Although the Supreme Court has found
that the "full scope of this paragraph has never been definitely settled," it has
held that "[p]rimarily, at least, it is a grant of power to the United States of
control over its property.""' In theory, this plenary power is tempered by
special duties regarding the administration of public lands and resources.
"Executive branch officials, while having wide latitude to make all needful
rules regarding the public lands, may have a countervailing trust-like
responsibility to protect those resources on behalf of the public.""' While the
113 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
114 Id art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
116 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
117 Id. amend. X.
118 CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP.
OVERVIEW AND DATA 7-9 tbl.1 (2017), https://perma.cc/FH94-GG8R.
19 See Concessions Co. v. Morris, 186 P. 655, 658, 660 (Wash. 1919) (discussing the holding
of Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885)).
120 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
121 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907).
122 Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the DetaiLs, and the Dawn of the 21st CentwyAdninistrative
State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1032 (2000); accord In re Steuart Transp. Co.,
495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) ("Under the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and
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Supreme Court and several other federal courts have alluded to a federal
trust responsibility for public lands and resources, the contours of such a
responsibility are ill-defined.1n The contours of the Property Clause power,
however, are relatively clear. "
United States v Grimaud" was one of the first tests of the Property
Clause power to protect federal public lands.'2 6 The Forest Reserve Act of
189721 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
the United States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in
natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from ownership of the resources but from
a duty owing to the people." (emphasis added)).
123 See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (identifying a duty "to protect the
public domain from trespass and unlawful appropriation" (quoting United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S.
338, 342 (1888))); W. Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 950-55
(4th Cir. 1975) (noting the historic role of USFS as "custodian and protector" of forest reserves);
High Country Citizens' All. v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1246 (D. Colo. 2006) (finding a duty to
assert federal reserved water rights for the Black Canyon of the Gunnison). In a series of cases
involving Redwood National Park, the trust doctrine was invoked to require affirmative action to
protect park resources from external threats posed by logging. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of the
Interior (Redwoods ), 398 F. Supp. 284, 293-94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modilied, Sierra Club v. Dep't of
the Interior (Redwoods bl), 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior
(Redwoodsl), 376 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
124 It is important to note that federal enclaves are distinct from federal public lands. Under
the Enclave Clause, "Congress may acquire derivative legislative power from a State ... by
consensual acquisition of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the state's cession
of authority over the land." Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 (1976) (citation omitted).
Specifically, the Clause gives Congress power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. In addition to
giving Congress exclusive authority over the seat of federal government (Washington, D.C.), the
Enclave Clause provides authority to purchase state land for a variety of federal purposes. See
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GuCKSMAN, PuBuc NATURAL RESOURCES LAw § 3:7 (2d
ed. 2017) (noting that "'Needful Buildings'. . . include[s] most federal purposes, including locks
and dams, national parks, and national forests" (footnotes omitted)). Congress's power over
federal enclaves is highly nuanced. See Spencer Driscoll, Utah ' Enabling Act and Congress's
Enclave Clause Authority Federalism Implicatons of a Renewed State Sovereignty Movement
2012 BYU L. REV. 999, 1000. If the state legislature expressly cedes jurisdiction over an enclave
purchased by the United States, the United States exercises all legislative powers over the
parcel to the exclusion of state authority. Ieppe, 426 U.S. at 542; Fort Leavenworth R.R Co.,
114 U.S. at 532, 537-38. Otherwise, the federal and state governments are free to make whatever
jurisdictional arrangements they choose regarding wildlife, transportation, and other civil and
criminal laws. See Fort Leavenworth R. Co., 114 U.S. at 533-42; see also IVeppe, 426 U.S. at
542 ("[Tlhe legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with
no residual state police power, to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which
may allow the State to exercise certain authority." (citation omitted)); United States v. Parker,
36 F. Supp. 3d 550, 575--76, 584-85 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that, where both the United States
and North Carolina had concurrent jurisdiction within a forest enclave, the federal court had
authority over a prosecution for the illegal taking of wildlife). Once agreed upon, states cannot
unilaterally amend or cancel cession agreements. United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055,
1061 (8th Cir. 1999).
125 220 U.S. 506(1911).
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make provisions for the protection against destruction by fire and
depredations upon the public forests and forest reservations ... and ... such
rules and regulations ... as will insure the objects of such reservations,
namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
thereon from destruction. 128
With this authority, the Secretary of Agriculturela issued rules requiring
ranchers to secure permits to graze livestock in forest reserves.' 30
The defendants were charged with grazing sheep in a forest reserve
without a permit.'3 ' They argued that the Act was unconstitutional insofar as
it delegated power to make regulations to the Secretary.1 n The Supreme
Court was unsympathetic. It held: "Each reservation had its peculiar and
special features," and Congress properly wielded the Property Clause to give
the Secretary power to consider local conditions and "to fill up the details"
of regulating "occupancy and use ... to preserve the forests from
destruction."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in a recent case involving rancher Wayne Hage, who
gained a good deal -of notoriety for his repeated trespasses on federal public
lands in Nevada.' 3' The court rejected Hage's argument that state-sanctioned
water rights entitled him to any additional easements or appurtenances to
graze livestock on federal lands'n
The Property Clause power to protect the public lands may also be used
to protect natural resources that are intimately associated with the public
lands, such as wildlife, water, and air.1n In Hunt v United States,mn the
Supreme Court held that the Property Clause included the power to thin
overpopulated herds of deer on federal lands in order to protect forest
126 Id. at 521-22; see Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress "Without Limitation" The
Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property 86 MINN. L. REv. 1, 58-62 (2001)
(discussing the Supreme Court's broad interpretations of congressional authority under the
Property Clause).
127 Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat 11 (1899).
18 Id., ch. 2, 30 Stat. at 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 551).
129 In 1905, the authority changed from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of
Agriculture. See Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628 (1905).
130 See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 509-10 (discussing, for example, Regulation 45).
131 Id at 509.
132 Id. at 510, 513-14.
133 Id. at 515-17, 522 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825)); accord
Ligft 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (enjoining grazing on a national forest without a permit and
stating that "[t]he United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property
may be used").
13 United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 716-18 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing, inter alia,
Lghtt 220 U.S. at 536); see Jason Dearen, Central 'Sagebrush Rebeion' Case Suffers Defeat
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2012), https://permacc/PNK5-UX85.
136 See Hage, 810 F.3d at 715, 717-18.
136 See Ileppe, 426 U.S. 529, 530 (1976) ("Congress' complete authority over the public lands
includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there.").
137 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
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resources, even if the federal action was contrary to state law.
1n The Court
subsequently construed Hunt quite broadly in Ieppe v. New Mexico, stating
that, while Hunt found that "damage to the land is a sufficient basis for
regulation; it contains no suggestion that it is a necessary one."
Ieppe upheld the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act,
1
" which
prohibited the capture and destruction of unclaimed horses and burros on
public lands."' When BLM invoked the Act to prevent New Mexico from
capturing and selling burros, the state asserted that BLM lacked authority
because the burros were neither moving in interstate commerce nor
damaging public land.142 The issue was whether, under the Property Clause,
BLM's jurisdiction over burros was a "needful" regulation "respecting" public
lands.1 43
The district court below had found that the Act was unconstitutional
and opined that the Property Clause authorized the regulation of wild
animals only if necessary to protect the public lands from damage.'" The
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Property Clause power
"necessarily" includes protection of wildlife "integral" to the public lands.n
The Court noted that in passing the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros
Act, "Congress deemed [these] animals 'an integral part of the natural
system of the public lands,' and found that federal management was
necessary 'for achievement of an ecological balance on the public lands.""
4
6
According to Congress, these animals, if preserved in their native habitats,
"contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the
lives of the American people."4 7
In reaching its conclusion, the Court explicitly rejected the district
court's rationale that federal power over wild horses and burros "conflicts
with ... the traditional doctrines concerning wild animals."" It explained
that, while "the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild
animals within their jurisdictions.. . , those powers exist only 'in so far as
[their] exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights
conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.'""
9 The Court
clarified the balance of power between the federal and state governments:
138 Id. at 100.
139 IGeppe, 426 U.S. at 537.
140 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2012).
141 Id. § 1338(a). See generally Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I. Williamson, The Story of
Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 123 (2011) (providing the legal history and political implications of this decision).
142 IGeppe, 426 U.S. at 533.
143 Id. at 536.
144 See id. at 534 (citing New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D.N.M. 1975)).
145 Id. at 535, 540-41, 546.
146 Id. at 535 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331; H.R. REP. No. 92-681, at 5 (1971) (Conf. Rep.)).
147 16 U.S.C. § 1331.
148 Ileppe, 426 U.S. at 534-35 (omission in original) (quoting Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1238).
149 Id. at 545 (alteration in original) (quoting Geer, 161 U.S. 519, 528 (1896), overruled by
Hughes, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)).
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"No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may
regulate the killing and sale of [wildlife], but it does not follow that its
authority is exclusive of paramount powers."... We hold today that the
Property Clause also gives Congress the power to protect wildlife on the public
lands, state lawnotwithstanding5
In Wyoming v. United States,"' Wyoming challenged the refusal of FWS
to permit the state to vaccinate elk on the National Elk Refuge (NER)."' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that the Property
Clause gives Congress the power to choose: "(1) to assume all management
authority over the [National Wildlife Refuge System], including the NER, (2)
to share management authority over those federal lands with the States, or
(3) to preserve to its fullest extent the States' historical role in the
management of wildlife within their respective borders.""' The court held
that federal law would preempt state management in the event of an actual
conflict "or where state management... stand[s] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment" of federal objectives."4
States often assert their police powers to regulate the public health and
welfare through measures that protect natural resources within the state,
such as game species, trees, and water."" Although there is no explicit
"Property Clause" authority in the U.S. Constitution extending to state
interests in wildlife, water, or other natural resources, states occasionally
assert an ownership interest as an additional source of their authority. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this theory, at least as it relates to
wildlife and migratory birds: "To put the claim of ... State [authority] upon
150 Id. at 545-46 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Missoui, 252 U.S. 416,
434 (1920)).
151 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
152 Id. at 1218.
15 Id at 1230.
154 See id. at 1234. According to the court, Congress "rejected complete preemption of state
wildlife regulation" in the National Wildlife Refuge System, but rather "intended ordinary
principles of conflict preemption to apply." Id. The United States District Court for the District
of California followed Wyomingin holding that a state ballot proposition that banned the use of
certain kinds of traps and poisons on federal lands was preempted by the Property Clause. Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1180-81 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part and
rev'din par4 307 F.3d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denialofreh', 312 F.3d 416, 418 (9th
Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit did not reach the Property Clause issue, instead holding that the
proposition was preempted by the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act. Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d at 854; accord Defs. of Wildlife v. Salazar, 651 F.3d 112,
118 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("tak[ing] the Secretary at his word that Wyoming has no veto over the
Secretary's duty to end a practice that is concededly at odds with the long-term health of the elk
and bison in the Refuge," while pointing out Wyoming's brief "agreeing that Wyoming does not
have a veto").
155 See, eg, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) ("[Each state] retains broad regulatory
authority to protect.. . the integrity of its natural resources" such as fisheries.); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1928) (upholding Virginia's decree to cut down infected cedars that were
fatal to nearby apple orchards).
156 See, e.g, Geer, 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896) (claiming that ownership of all wild game taken
within the state allowed the state to prohibit its removal from the state), overruled by Hughes,
441 U.S. 322 (1979)).
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title is to lean upon a slender reed." 5 7 Even absent title, states have "ample
allowance for preserving ... the legitimate state concerns for conservation
and protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of
state ownership,"'6 but as noted in Ieppe, Wyoming, and numerous other
cases, state law may not contravene federal law."'
b. Property Clause Power to Protect Federal Lands and Resources from
External Threats
Not only does the Property Cause supply authority to regulate activities
that occur on federal lands, but in certain cases, it also authorizes federal
regulation of activities outside of the federal boundaries where necessary to
protect the public lands and resources. In Canileld v. United States,160 the
owner of several sections of private land acquired from the Union.Pacific
Railroad fenced his land in a way that also enclosed about 20,000 acres of
public lands. 6' When the United States sought to remove the fence under the
Unlawful Enclosures Act of 1885,"2 Camfield argued that the United States
had no power to control private land use.u The Supreme Court upheld the
application of the Act to Camfield's property, explaining that under the
Property Clause, the federal government "doubtless has a power over its
own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the
extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the
exigencies of the particular case."164
The courts have consistently upheld "broad [federal] power to control
extraterritorial private activities that might adversely affect federal
property."' For instance, federal restrictions on businesses situated outside
of a national park have been upheld when those business enterprises
157 Missounr 252 U.S. 416,434 (1920); seealsoHughes, 441 U.S. at 332.
158 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
159 Ileppe, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976); Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227; see also, e.g, Hughes,
441 U.S. at 338-39.
160 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
161 Id. at 519.
162 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (2012).
163 Camfeld, 167 U.S. at 522.
164 Id. at 525; see Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 201 (1987) ("The
Property Clause grants Congress plenary power to regulate and dispose of land within the
Territories... ."); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 483 (1915) (upholding president's
decision to withdraw land to preserve oil reserves); Lght 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) ("The United
States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used."); see also
Organized Fisherman of Fla. v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that Florida law
provided no vested property right for commercial fishing in a national park); Organized Fisherman
of Fla. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of
federal regulations restricting fishing in a national park given Congress's "complete power" over
public lands which "necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living
there" (citing KIeppe, 426 U.S. at 540-41)).
165 Appel, supra note 126, at 77-78.
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affected neighboring parklands.'" Moreover, federal regulation of activities
on state-owned waters was upheld as a valid exercise of Property Clause
power to manage the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.167
Beyond the land itself, it is fair to ask how far federal authority over
wildlife and other migratory resources "integral" to the public lands goes
when those resources are found outside of the boundaries of the public
lands. In KIeppe, the contested issue involved the federal regulation of
nonfederal activity on federal land (i.e., the State of New Mexico captured
wild burros on a grazing allotment), and while the Act in question reached
nonfederal land as well, the Supreme Court was not required to address the
regulation of state or private activities on nonfederal land.1 ,
.Other than Ieppe, few cases touch upon the Property Clause power to
regulate "integral" wildlife outside of the boundaries of the federal lands,
perhaps because federal agencies and their employees tend to be reluctant
to exercise their power aggressively. "
2. The Treaty Clause
The Treaty Clause provides that: "[The President] shall have the
Power ... to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
166 See, e.g, Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[R]egulation requiring that
commercial tour boat operators obtain a permit before operating ... within [Voyageurs National
Park] is well within the authority of the NPS."); United States v. Richard, 636 F.2d 236, 240 (8th
Cir. 1980) ("[Flederal regulation may exceed federal boundaries when necessary for the
protection of human life or wildlife or government forest land or objectives.").
167 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Congress' power must
extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public land that would threaten the designated
purpose of federal lands."); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating
that "congressional power over federal lands ... include[s] the authority to regulate activities
on non-federal public waters in order to protect wildlife and visitors on the lands"); see also
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1269, 1272 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (an equally
divided court affirmed district court in that the federal government could regulate private
activities that occurred on the surface of a lake even if the surface was private property);
Organized Fsherman of la, 775 F.2d 1544, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding federal restrictions
on fishing on waters within Everglades National Park, some of which were presumably under state
jurisdiction); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the Property
Clause "grants to the United States power to regulate conduct on non-federal land when
reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property or navigable waters"); Grand Lake
Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Veneman, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167-69 (D. Colo. 2004) (holding
USFS could require special use permits on docks and marinas on Association's land if
reasonably necessary to protect the environment and water quality of Arapaho National
Recreation Area).
18 Ieppe, 426 U.S. at 546 ("We need not, and do not, decide whether the Property Clause
would sustain the Act in all of its conceivable applications.").
169 See generally Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its Neighbols:
A Study ofFederal Interagency Reladons, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 226, 260 (1987) (describing how
NPS's "distaste for confrontation makes it timid," and how "constrained by bureaucratic
prudence and timidity.... [NPS] is reluctant to use the law; highly deferential to the traditional
turf prerogatives of its neighbors; and hesitant to subject itself to criticism by speaking out
forcefully on transboundary issues").
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concur. n17o In recognition of the international nature of wildlife conservation,
the United States has entered into several landmark wildlife treaties within
the past century, which Congress has implemented through domestic
legislation."' With respect to the management of wildlife on federal lands,
the most notable of these include the Migratory Bird Treaty of 191672 and the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES).7 3 Other international provisions include the Agreement on
the Conservation of Polar Bears,'74 the Pacific Salmon Treaty,' the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Treaty,' 6 the Migratory Bird and Game
Mammal Treaty with Mexico,'" and the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling." These treaties are implemented through the Marine
Mammal Protection Act,' the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act,"s the Whaling Convention Act,'8' and other pieces of
domestic legislation.'" The next Section of the Article focuses on the
Migratory Bird Treaty's implementing legislation.
170 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
171 See, eg, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 ("Recognizing ... that international cooperation is essential
for the protection of . . .wild fauna and flora.").
172 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds-in the United States and Canada, Gr. Brit-U.S., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2012)).
173 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
supra note 171. CITES is implemented in the United States through the ESA, which, like CITES,
controls imports and exports of protected species. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4)(F); id
§ 1538(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), (c)-(d); see Safari Club Int'l v. Jewell, 960 F. Supp. 2d 17, 67-68
(D.D.C. 2013) (noting that conserving species within their ecosystems is one purpose of the
ESA, "but other purposes are 'to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a)[,]' including the CITES"
(alteration in original)). As such, the ESA finds its constitutional basis in part in the Treaty
Clause, though other provisions of the ESA are more firmly founded on the Commerce Clause.
See infra discussion Part M.A.3.c.
174 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918.
175 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Canada Concerning Pacific
Salmon, Can.-U.S., Jan. 28, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,091.
176 International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Jul. 3, 1950, 64 Stat. 1067,
1 U.S.T. 477 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 981-991)).
177 Convention Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the
Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Mex.-U.S, Mar. 10, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 260.
178 International Convention for the Regulation .of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849. For an assessment of wildlife and biodiversity related treaties that have not
yet been ratified by the United States, including the Convention on Biological Diversity, see
MARY JANE ANGELO ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER No. 1201, RECLAIMING
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP: WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RATIFY TEN PENDING
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES (2012), https://permacc/5NB3-6ZEE.
179 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h.
180 Id. H 1801-1891d.
181 Whaling Convention Act of 1949, id. §§ 916-9161
182 See ANGELO ET AL., supra note 178, at 2; David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation:
The Histoncal Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1075, 1313-15 (2000) (advocating a federalist approach to implementing domestic treaties).
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a. Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916
In 1916, the United States entered into a treaty with Great Britain (on
behalf of Canada) to ensure the preservation of "such migratory birds as are
either useful to man or harmless."'" The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918'"
(MBTA) ratified the treaty and imposed stringent prohibitions on the taking,
capturing, hunting, and killing of protected birds.' According to George
Cameron Coggins, "[tihe origins of modem federal wildlife law may be
traced back to the MBTA."'
Almost immediately after .ratification and enactment, the states
challenged the constitutionality of the treaty and the MBTA."' Today, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Missoui v. Holland remains a significant
benchmark for federal Treaty Clause authority.'" The case involved a suit
brought by the State of Missouri to enjoin a federal game warden from
enforcing the MBTA, which implements the 1916 treaty by prohibiting any
person from pursuing or killing migratory birds except as authorized by
regulations issued by the Secretary of Agriculture.'" More specifically, the
MBTA states that it is:
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take,
capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer
to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship,
183 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds in the United States and Canada, supra note 172, at 1702.
184 16 U.S.C. §§ 710-711.
185 Id. § 703(a).
188 George Cameron Coggins, Federal Wildlife LawAchieves Adolescence: Developments in
the 1970s, 1978 DuKE L.J. 753, 764; see also Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind
Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1179
(2008).
187 See, e.g., Missoun, 252 U.S. 416, 432-35 (1920) (holding that the MBTA is constitutional
under Congress's express and exclusive Constitutidnal authority to make and ratify treaties).
Prior to ratification and passage of the MBTA, an earlier version of a statute to protect
migratory birds had been invalidated as beyond constitutional authority. See United States v.
Shauver, 214 F. 154, 157-60 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (holding that the statute was unconstitutional for,
inter alia, its usurpation of the states' sovereign right to own all animals fers nature, which are
denominated as game, for the benefit of its citizens).
188 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432.
189 The MBTA's prohibitions apply broadly to state actors and others. 16 U.S.C § 703(a);
Missoun, 252 U.S. at 430-31. Courts, however, have since reached conflicting results on the
MBTA's ability to restrict federal actors. See Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d
882, 885-87 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that the MBTA applies to federal agencies and federal
actors, because the Act enforces a treaty binding upon the United States and, therefore, is
binding on the federal agencies); Audubon Soc'y of Portland v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No.
04-670-I, 2005 WL 1713086, at *4 (D. Or. July 21, 2005) (applying the MBTA to federal agencies,
but finding that they were not liable for habitat destruction); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177-78 (D.D.C. 2002) (applying the MBTA to the Department of
Defense and holding it in.violation), vacated as moot sub nom., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
England, Nos. 02-5163, 02-5180, 2003 WL 179848 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003). But see Sierra Club v.
Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that because federal agencies must
conserve birds under other statutes, the MBTA does not apply to federal agencies).
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export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be
carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any
migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether
or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any
such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof. I"
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held that the Treaty Clause
provided a viable avenue for federal regulation of wildlife, despite the state's
claim of a predominant interest in the wildlife in question."' Under Missouri
v. Holland, the test to determine a treaty's validity is two-fold: 1) Is the
matter involved of national interest? 2) Does the treaty contravene any
specific constitutional prohibition?1 92 If the first is answered in the
affirmative, and the second in the negative, the treaty is valid.1 9 3
With respect to the Migratory Bird Treaty, the answer to the first
question was a resounding "yes," according to the Supreme Court:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can
be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The
subject matter [i.e., migratory birds] is only transitorily within the State and
has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon
might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the
Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut
off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not
sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain.
As to the second question, the Court explicitly rejected the state's
argument that the Treaty contravened the Tenth Amendment, which
reserves power to the states if not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution." According to the Court, "[tlhe treaty in question does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution," nor is the
treaty "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the
Tenth Amendment."'9e Thus, the state's interest in managing migratory birds
covered by the MBTA, whether that interest rested upon some claim of
ownership (which the Court disregarded) or on traditional state police
190 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
191 Missouri 252 U.S. at 432-35.
192 Id. at 433.
193 See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power Its listory, Scope, and Limits, 98
CORNEIL L. REv. 239, 266, 279 (2013) (explaining that Treaty Powers are limited by "affirmative
guarantees [that] are set forth explicitly in the Bill of Rights' recognition and guarantee of
individual rights and in the Constitution's provisions prescribing the structure of the national
government... [including] the preservation of a continuing role for the states and maintenance
of certain areas of state authority and control," but concluding that invalidation is exceedingly
rare, so "the real protections against abuse of the treaty power derive from the structural,
political, and diplomatic checks on the exercise of the power").
194 Missouri 252 U.S. at 435.
195 Id. at 433-34.
196 Id
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powers, must give way."' It explained, "[v]alid treaties of course 'are as
binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere
throughout the dominion of the United States.'"'" In the end, the Court held
that the Treaty was lawful, and thus, the MBTA was lawful as well pursuant
to the Treaty Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
3. The Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
The Tenth Amendment often forms the basis of state claims of
exclusive jurisdiction over wildlife. The Tenth Amendment states: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." " The Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause seem to be
inextricably entwined in federal wildlife management discussions, so it is
necessary to discuss the interplay of both provisions together.
a. The Evolution of the Anti-Commandeeing Doctine
The Tenth Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791,2" and is
similar to an earlier provision of the Articles of Confederation which read:
"Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."2 0 ' Ultimately, the
word "expressly" did not appear in the Tenth Amendment as ratified.
Early in American history, the Supreme Court seemed to assume the
122Tenth Amendment was a strong and limiting power of the Constitution.
However, by the early 20th century the Court's view of the Tenth
Amendment shifted significantly. In Uzited States v Darby,20 3 the Court
stated:
197 Id. at 434.
198 Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887)).
199 U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
200 The Bill of Rights: A Transciption, NAT'L ARCHIVES, https://perma.ce/6WWG-KH2L (last
reviewed Nov. 11, 2017).
201 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (emphasis added); see Amendment X House
of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution, FOUNDERS' CONsT., https://perntcc/7U44-
AZQ3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (discussing James Madison objecting to a proposed version of
the Tenth Amendment).
202 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918) (invalidating federal child labor
laws, and remarking upon the "inherent" power of the states to regulate "purely internal
affairs"), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see also Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294-95 (1936) (invalidating federal regulation of coal production
and stating that the Framers "meant to carve from the general mass of legislative powers, then
possessed by the states, only such portions as it was thought wise to confer upon the federal
government ... with the result that what was not embraced by the enumeration remained
vested in the states without change or impairment").
203 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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The [Tenth A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that
it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new
national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
204
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Since Darby, it has become exceedingly uncommon for the Supreme
Court to invalidate federal laws under the -Tenth Amendment.205 The Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine arising from New York v. United Stated" is the
exception. There, the Court invalidated a portion of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy*Amendments Act of 198520 (RWPA).'" The RWPA
required states to take title to any undisposed low-level radioactive waste
within their borders and made each state liable for all damages directly
related to that waste.'" The Court ruled that the imposition of taking title
violated the Tenth Amendment, as the federal government could not directly
compel states to enforce federal regulations.21o
In Printz v. Uzited States,"' the Court, again utilizing the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine, found that provisions of the Brady Bill2 12 requiring
state and local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on
persons attempting to purchase handguns was a violation of the Tenth
Amendment, as the Bill forced participation of the state officials in the
administration of a federal program.213 Similarly, in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebeius,"' the Court held that the Affordable Care
Acte- (also known as Obamacare) coerced the states to expand Medicaid.2 1'
Although other provisions of the Act were upheld, the Court found that the
Medicaid provision effectively forced states to participate by conditioning
the continued provision of funds on their agreement to materially alter their
Medicaid eligibility criteria."
In the modem era, the Tenth Amendment's primary role in regulating
the balance of powers between the federal and state governments is
204 Id. at 124.
205 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
206 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
207 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (2012).
208 New York, 505 U.S. at 149.
209 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
210 New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77, 184.
211 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
212 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012).
213 Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-34 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
214 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
215 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). The Medicaid expansion is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
216 Sebelus, 567 U.S. at 588.
217 j.
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expressed through the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine.21 8 Commandeering
occurs when Congress "require[s] the States in their sovereign capacity to
regulate their own citizens," not when federal legislation with an
administrative and financial impact on state bureaucracy regulates public
and private conduct alike.219
b. The Tenth Amendment's Application to Wildlife Management
Prior to 1920, very little judicial activity occurred regarding the
interplay of the Tenth Amendment and federal wildlife control.220 One of the
first decisions on the scope of the Tenth Amendment regarding federal
wildlife control was Missouri v. Holland, which upheld the MBTA.2 ' As noted
above, the Supreme Court flatly rejected Missouri's argument that the MBTA
violated the Tenth Amendment, finding that there were no reserved state
powers that would stand in the way of federal enforcement of an act arising
under the Treaty power.2
It was not until Pala v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resource?2  that the courts again took up the issue of the Tenth
Amendment's implications for federal wildlife management.2 4 There, the
Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources maintained herds of feral
sheep and goats for sport-hunting purposes on state-owned lands.O These
herds were causing significant habitat modification and destruction within
the critical habitat of the Palila bird (Psittirostra baillew), a listed species
under the ESA."" Conservation groups sought declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring Hawaii to adopt a plan to eradicate the feral sheep and goat
218 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012)
("Supreme Court interpretations of the Tenth Amendment have varied over the years but those
in force today have struck down statutes only where Congress sought to commandeer state
governments or otherwise directly dictate the internal operations of state government").
219 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000); see Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that Congress's designation of a federally
owned site for a nuclear repository did not commandeer the state legislative process or
officials, but rather merely prescribed the use of federal property); United States v. Washington,
887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1101 (D. Mont. 2012) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to federal
prosecution of participants in state-authorized medical marijuana program).
220 Although it did not address the Tenth Amendment, in Geer v. Connecticut the Court held
that "the ownership of wild animals, so far as they are capable of ownership, is in the state, not
as a proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity, as a representative and for the benefit of all its
people in common." 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (quoting State v. Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099
(Minn. 1894)), overruledbyHughes, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
221 ASsoun, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
222 Id. at 432-33.
223 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd on other grounds, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
224 Id. at 995.
225 Id. at 989.
226 Id at 988-90; see Native Fish and Wildlife Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001, 4001
(Mar. 11, 1967).
2017] 31
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
herds from the Palila's critical habit. 2 7 Because Palila are only found in
Hawaii and because no federal lands or funds were involved, Hawaii argued
that the state retained exclusive sovereignty over the Palla's fate under the
Tenth Amendment.m The United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii held that the Tenth Amendment does not constrain enforcement of
the ESA given Congress's power "to enact legislation implementing valid
treaties and ... to regulate commerce.""" It explained:
[A] national program to protect and improve the natural habitats of endangered
species preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and
of interstate movement of persons ... who come to a state to observe and
study these species, that would otherwise be lost by state inaction.
In Gibbs v. Babbitt,"' individuals and several North Carolina counties
challenged a FWS regulation prohibiting the taking of red wolves on private
property as an infringement on traditional state power over wildlife. 32 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the
regulated activity did "not involve an 'area of traditional state concern,' one
to which 'States lay claim by right of history and expertise.'"233 It reasoned
that, while "States have important interests in regulating wildlife and natural
resources within their borders," state power over wildlife has long been
circumscribed by federal regulatory power.' The Gibbs court explained that
the regulated activity-the taking of wolves-"is not an area in which the
states may assert an exclusive and traditional prerogative in derogation of an
enumerated federal power," i.e., the Commerce Clause.236 The court also
took note of "the historic power of the federal government to preserve
scarce resources in one locality for the future benefit of all Americans."a
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to consider similar Tenth
Amendment arguments in Wyoming v. United States, where the State of
Wyoming tried to compel FWS to allow it to vaccinate elk against brucellosis
at the Jackson Hole National Elk Refuge (NER).23 ' In response to Wyoming's
227 Pal*ia, 471 F. Supp. at 987.
228 Id at 992.
229 See id at 995.
230 Id. For a detailed discussion of the Commerce Clause and the ESA, see infra Part
In.A.3.c.
231 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
232 Id. at 499; see 50 C.F.R § 17.84(c)(2) (2016).
233 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 486 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580, 583 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also id. at 501 ("[Tlhe federal government possesses a historic
interest in such regulation-an interest that has repeatedly been recognized by the federal
courts.").
234 Id at 499 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204
(1999)); see also id. at 501 ("[I]t is clear from our laws and precedent that federal regulation of
endangered wildlife does not trench impermissibly upon state powers.").
235 Id at 499.
236 Id. at 492. The portion of the court's opinion rejecting the Commerce Clause challenge is
discussed below. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
237 Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214,1218,1222 (10th Cir. 2002).
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argument that the Tenth Amendment reserved the sovereign authority to
manage wildlife to the states, the court explained that, while states have
historically had broad authority to regulate the wildlife within their borders,
that authority is not constitutionally derived2" Moreover, given the strength
and breadth of the federal Property Clause power, the court found it
"painfully apparent that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the State
of Wyoming the right to manage wildlife, or more specifically vaccinate elk,
on the NER, regardless of the circumstances."a
Subsequently, in Wyoming v US Department of the Interior,m the
State of Wyoming argued that federal regulation of wolves violated the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine.2 4 1 Wyoming objected to having only two choices:
1) to change state law to eliminate its predator classification for wolves and
commit to maintaining at least fifteen packs of wolves, or 2) to endure the
restrictions imposed by the continued protection of wolves under the ESA. 2
The court held that Wyoming had failed to show a violation of the Tenth
Amendment through commandeering or otherwise.243 It explained: "Wyoming
is under no mandate to regulate gray wolves.... If Wyoming chooses to
ignore the [federal requirement], the State simply will find itself perpetually
pre-empted from regulating the gray wolf."a2"
In sum, except for those rare instances when the Anti-Commandeering
Doctrine is successfully invoked, attempts to use the Tenth Amendment as a
basis for state sovereignty over federally protected wildlife have generally
failed, from lssouri v. Hollandto present.
c. The Commerce Clause and Federal Wildlife Management
The federal courts did not immediately support federal wildlife control
based on the Commerce Clause. In an early case, Geer v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court held that game killed within the state concerned internal
state commerce rather than interstate commerce.2 " In subsequent years,
several district court opinions followed suit.2 "
2-3 Id. at 1226-27 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2016)).
239 Id at 1227.
240 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Wyo. 2005), affd, 442 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2006).
241 Id at 1238.
242 Id at 1240.
243 Id at 1240, 1244.
244 Id. at 1240-41. But see N.M Dep't of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. CV 16-
00462 WJ/KBM, 2016 WL 4536465, at *9 (D.N.M. June 10, 2016) (distinguishing Wyoming and
noting that FWS's own regulation required FWS to release wolves in compliance with state
permit requirements), revd, 854 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017).
245 Geer, 161 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1896), overrledbyHughes, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
246 See, e.g., United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 292 (D. Kan. 1915) ("The power of the
states, by their laws in the protection of their trust title for the common good of all the
inhabitants of the state, to exclude wild bird and animal life lawfully reduced to the exclusive
possession of the individual from the operation of the commerce clause of the national
Constitution, as was held in Geer... , has been uniformly maintained by the courts of this
country."); Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (following Geer and setting aside an
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With the New Deal, however, the federal government's use of the
Commerce Clause power began to expand."' By the 1970s, it was clear that
Geer had lost favor. In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,4 the Supreme
Court struck down a Virginia statute prohibiting federally licensed vessels
owned by nonresidents of Virginia from fishing in Chesapeake Bay, and also
prohibiting ships owned by noncitizens to catch fish anywhere in Virginia.'
The Court stated:
While [Virginia] may be correct in arguing that at earlier times in our history
there was some doubt whether Congress had power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters, there can be no question
today that such power exists where there is some effect on interstate
250
commerce.
It concluded that the movement of fishing boats within and between states
and to processing plants "certainly" affects interstate commerce."
The following year, in Baldwin v. 1sh & Game Commission of
Montana," a Montana hunting guide sued the State of Montana for
discriminating against out of state hunters in the price it charged for elk
tags. The Supreme Court observed that, in recent years,
[t]he Court has recognized that the States' interest'in regulating and controlling
those things they claim to "own," including wildlife, is by no means absolute.
States may not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources, even
their wildlife, to their own people whenever such hoarding and .confinement
impedes interstate commerce.m
With this backdrop, it was not surprising when the Supreme Court
expressly overruled Geer in 1979 in Hughes v. Oklahomam In that case,
Hughes challenged his conviction for unlawfully transporting minnows that
had been procured within Oklahoma waters for sale outside the state." The
Court held that the state law, which forbade the out-of-state sale of
indictment for violation of a federal migratory bird protection act). Note, however, that the
courts upheld Congress's use of the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate trafficking of state-
protected wildlife under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). See, e.g., Rupert v. United States,
181 F. 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1910) (upholding the Lacey Act as a valid exercise of the commerce
power).
247 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding federal Commerce
Clause power over wheat grown for home consumption because of its aggregated effects on
wheat sold in interstate commerce). For a more recent case with similar reasoning, see
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (holding that growing marjuana for personal use affects
interstate commerce).
248 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
249 Id. at 268-69, 284-85.
250 Id. at 281-82 (footnote omitted).
251 Id. at 282.
252 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
253 Id at 385-86.
254 Hughes, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979), overruling Geer, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
255 See id. at 324-25.
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commercially significant numbers of minnows, was "repugnant to the
Commerce Clause."'6
The cases defining the scope of permissible *state regulation in areas of
congressional silence reflect an often controversial evolution of rules to
accommodate federal and state interests. Geer v Connecticut was decided
relatively early in that evolutionary process. We hold that time has revealed the
error of the early resolution reached in that case, and accordingly Geeris today
overruled. . .. "The 'ownership' language of cases such as those cited by
appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction
expressing 'the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve
and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.'"2
Although the Supreme Court began to establish limits on Congress's use
of the Commerce Clause in the 1990s, none of its opinions dilute the strength
of Hughes or related wildlife precedents. In Uhited States v. Lopez,28 the
federal Gun-Free School Zones Acte was struck down as "a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terrns." " Similarly, in
Uhited States v. Monrison,"' a provision of the Violence Against Women
Act262 was struck down because it attempted to regulate activities that did
not substantially affect interstate commerce!"
The federal courts that have addressed wildlife-related issues since
Lopez and Mornison have had no trouble finding federal Commerce Clause
power. In the Gibbs case discussed above, the court emphasized the direct
relationship between the removal of red wolves and negative effects to
interstate commerce, finding no need to "pile inference upon inference" to
reach that conclusion:
The taking of red wolves implicates a variety of commercial activities and is
closely connected to several interstate markets. The regulation in question is
also an integral part of the overall federal scheme to protect, preserve, and
rehabilitate endangered species, thereby conserving valuable wildlife
resources important to the welfare of our country. i
256 Id. at 338.
257 Id. at 326, 335 (footnote omitted) (quoting Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284
(1977)).
258 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
259 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844.
260 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
261 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
262 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.)
263 Morison, 529 U.S. at 617. Summarizing, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause
provides federal power over: 1) the channels of interstate commerce; 2) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and 3) activities that, in the
aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 609.
264 Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected a real estate developer's challenge to the
application of the ESA to the arroyo toad, stating that the focus of the
Commerce Clause inquiry must be on the regulated activity, not just the
toad."M When the regulated activity is commercial development, "both the
'actor,' a real estate company, and its 'conduct,' the construction of a
housing development, have a plainly commercial character. . . '[with] a plain
and substantial effect on interstate commerce.'""
It is now well settled that if the Commerce or Property Clauses are
successfully invoked by the federal government as the authority to regulate
wildlife, then by definition, inconsistent state law is preempted
notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment.
4. Federal Preemption and Savings Clauses
The doctrine of federal preemption, derived from the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, holds that state law must yield to federal law where
the two conflict.2 7 This can happen expressly, for instance, under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act where Congress stated: "No State may enforce ...
any State law or regulation related to the taking of any species . .. of marine
mammal." 2 68 Preemption can also be implied. The Supreme Court, in
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., M defined the concept of
implied preemption:
If Congress evidences intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling
within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to
comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'
Therefore, preemption can occur where Congress expressly preempts state
law, where Congress occupies a field of law, or where state law interferes
265 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
266 Id. at 1072-73 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)).
267 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); Ileppe, 426 U.S. 529,
543 (1976) (stating that "federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under
the Supremacy Clause"); Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) ("If Congress so
chooses, federal legislation, together with the policies and objectives encompassed therein,
necessarily override and preempt conflicting state laws, policies, and objectives. . .
268 16 U.S.C. § 1379(a) (2012).
269 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
270 Id. at 581 (citations omitted). The Court found that a state mining permit requirement
was not preempted because the federal land use and state environmental regulations in
question could be interpreted to avoid conflict. Id. at 594.
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with the implementation of federal law.2 7' Federal regulations have the same
preemptive effect.272
Federal law occupies a field of law (also known as field preemption)
where a federal statutory scheme is interpreted to be "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it."17 3 Because federal land management and wildlife laws often
contain savings clauses acknowledging some level of state authority, field
preemption rarely applies in these areas.2 74 Conflict preemption, on the other
hand, arises whenever "compliance with both federal and state regulations is
a physical impossibility." 27 5 Conflict preemption is also invoked where state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." 7 6 The conflict between federal and
state laws may be subtle and yet still trigger preemption, as where state law
discourages conduct that federal law attempts to encourage, or vice versa.2 7
For example, in National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Dai, 27 8 California law
banned the use of all leg-hold traps, even by federal officials in the course of
their duties.27 9 The Ninth Circuit found that, by eliminating a method of
predator control, the ban conflicted with the purposes of the ESA by
preventing agencies from protecting listed species.o Therefore, the state's
action prevented the federal law from receiving full effect and was
preempted."
Congress may negate or otherwise temper preemption by including a
"savings clause" in its legislation. Many federal public health, environmental,
271 Id. at 681; Nat' Audubon Socy, 307 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g,
312 F.3d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 2002).
272 Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. at 579-81, 591; see Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) ("We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted
by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.").
273 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 108-09 (1992) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (holding that state occupational health and
safety regulations were preempted by Occupations Safety and Health Administration, which
occupied that field of law).
274 See generally Fischman & King, supra note 108 (analyzing savings clauses, their uses and
trends, and how they incorporate state cooperation).
275 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). For a full
treatment of this issue, see Julie Lurman & Sanford P. Rabinowitch, Preemption of State
Wildlife Law in Alaska: Where, When, and Why, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 145 (2007), and Julie Lurman
Joly, National Wildlife Refuges and Intensive Management in Alaska: Another Case for
Preemption, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 27 (2010).
276 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
277 Lurman & Rabinowitch, supra note 275, at 161.
278 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial ofreh, 312 F.3d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 2002).
279 Id at 852.
2 Id. The court also found that the state's action was preempted by the National Wildlife
Refuge Systems Improvement Act because it conflicted with FWS's management authority
within national refuges. Id at 854.
281 Id at 852; see also North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 318 (1983) (stating state
statutes that are "plainly hostile to the interests of the United States" will not be applied);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) ("[T]he act of Congress ... is supreme; and
the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to
it.").
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and natural resources statutes include savings clauses intended to leave
room for state law to provide increased protection consistent with
congressional purposes and objectives.2 In public lands and natural
resources statutes, Congress has embraced the principle of cooperative
federalism through a variety of savings clauses that disclaim an intention to
displace state law related to wildlife, water, and other resources, so long as
state law does not conflict with or undermine federal prerogatives. These
statutory disclaimers are often quite vague, having been included as
compromise measures to ensure passage of a piece of legislation.2 As
Robert Fischman notes:
Judicial interpretation of a savings clause may elevate or undermine the
importance of state interests in federal natural resources programs. Largely, it
is the interpretive approach used by a court that determines whether an
ambiguous savings clause will compel special consideration not otherwise
required under federal law.m
Fischman adds that, "[a]lthough the judiciary places the interpretive fulcrum
establishing how much leverage states can expect in federal decision-
making, administrative policies have and will play the dominant role in
shaping cooperative federalism."as Other sections of this Article analyze the
specific language, agency implementation, and judicial review of savings
clauses related to wildlife management on federal lands.
In conclusion, states undoubtedly have well-established historical
responsibility over the wildlife within their borders. However, as this
Subpart demonstrates, that responsibility is not exclusive, nor dominant, nor
constitutionally derived. The U.S. Constitution grants the federal
government the authority to manage its own lands and resources, fulfill its
treaty obligations, and control interstate commerce, even in the face of
objections from the states. And while the Tenth Amendment prevents the
federal government from forcing state governments to carry out federal
regulatory schemes, it cannot prevent the federal government from
implementing those schemes itself.
B. Federal Land Laws and Regulations
This Subpart reviews the laws and regulations of most relevance to
wildlife management on federal lands. It begins by explaining how the ESA
fundamentally alters the management of all federal land systems. Next, it
282 Fischman & King, supra note 108, at 145.
283 Id. at 129-30. Congress has also peppered the organic acts of the federal land
management agencies with various directives to cooperate with states in planning and other
processes. Id. See generally Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 179 (2005) (discussing cooperation between state and the
federal government in the application of natural resource management).
284 Fischman & King, supra note 108, at 159-60.
285 Id. at 168.
286 Id
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reviews the laws and regulations governing wildlife management in the
National Park and National Wildlife Refuge Systems. This is followed by a
review of the more contentious management and planning frameworks of
USFS and BLM. A concise overview of the special case of Alaska is then
provided. The Subpart closes by reviewing wildlife management and the
National Wilderness Preservation System.
In Part IV, we return to many of the laws, regulations, and policies
introduced here to dispel some of the common myths surrounding wildlife
management on federal lands and to explain why federal land agencies have
an obligation, and not just the discretion, to manage and conserve fish and
wildlife on federal lands. The background provided here also shows that
multiple opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation already exist
within federal decision-making processes, but Part IV.F explains that they
are not generally used to their full potential.
1. The Endangered Species Act
Congress passed the ESA in 1973 "to provide a program for the
conservation of... endangered species and threatened species" and "to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered ... and
threatened species depend may be conserved."27 The ESA establishes an
affirmative obligation for the federal government to use "all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any [listed] species to the point at
which the measures provided in this [Act] are no longer necessary,"" and
states that "all federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve
endangered ... and threatened species."' In defining "conserve" and
"conservation," the ESA establishes an affirmative obligation to use "all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered ... or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided" by the
statute are no longer necessary.
A secondary indicator as to the goals of the statute can be found in
Congress's explicit recognition of the "esthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value" of rare species."' As Freyfogle
and Goble have argued, this list of recognized values suggests that the
statute is intended to do more than preserve a remnant population in a zoo
or at easily visited locations, though this might meet the needs for the
esthetic and recreational values.9 Instead, in order to preserve their
ecological and scientific values, species and their habitats must be preserved
in many natural locations, potentially including areas where they have been
extirpated.a
287 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
288 Id. § 1532(3). The goal of the statute is not to "list" species but to recover their
populations so that they can be "delisted."
289 Id. § 1531(c).
290 Id. § 1532(3).
291 Id § 1531(a)(3).
292 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDIFE LAw: A PRIMER 233-34 (1st ed. 2009).
293 Id
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To understand the role of the ESA in federal land and wildlife
management, three central pieces of the statute are most relevant: 1) the
listing determination,2M 2) the obligation for federal agencies to conserve
species and to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of the listed
species or destroying critical habitat,M and 3) the take prohibition.!" These
sections of the statute detail the government's responsibilities and sources
of authority. In addition, several provisions of the ESA address federal-state
relations with respect to the conservation and management of listed
species. Each of the relevant sections is addressed below.
a. Listing Determinations (Section 4)
Only those species listed as threatened or endangered are protected by
the ESAYm Listing a species as threatened or endangered is often the result
of a citizen petition requesting the listing, though listings may also stem from
direct agency initiative (either FWS or, for anadromous and ocean species,
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS))." In either case, the species
must meet the definition of either "threatened" or "endangered" in order to
secure the protections provided under the statute.m An "endangered"
species is one that is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range," and "threatened" species are "likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future."
The decision to list a species as either threatened or endangered must
be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available."' The data hurdles that must be surmounted are formidable, and
even if met, the agency may decide that the listing is "warranted but
precluded" by other more urgent species' needs given the agency's
historically tight funding."0 However, once species are listed they are
entitled to the full protections of the statute regardless of the economic
consequences.
Section 4 includes a number of factors to be considered in the listing
decision. One inquiry is to assess "the inadequacy of existing regulatory
294 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
295 Id. § 1536(a).
296 Id. § 1538.
297 See, e.g., id. § 1535 (cooperation with states); id. § 1533(b)(1) (listing criteria); id.
§ 1539(a)(2)(B) (incidental take permits).
298 See id § 1533(d).
299 Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A); see FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 236; Endangered Species
Act: Overvew, U.S. FiSH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/CTB5-GTZ5 (last updated Nov. 1,
2017).
300 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
301 Id § 1532(6), (20).
302 Id § 1533(b)(1)(A).
303 FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 248-49. These "candidate species" receive no
protection under the ESA, but the candidate status may provide an opportunity and an incentive
for state and private action to prevent listing. Id.
304 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
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mechanisms."m This means that state laws and regulations pertaining to
wildlife, or the lack thereof, -are assessed when making listing
determinations. Another factor is particularly relevant when it comes to
state involvement in ESA implementation: "[conservation] efforts, if any,
being made by any State.""' Accordingly, state efforts to conserve a species
may be deemed to offset other threats, such as habitat destruction, and
effectively bring the species below the threshold necessary to warrant a
federal listing.' FWS's Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When
Making Listing Decisions (PECE) allows FWS to consider conservation
efforts that have not yet been implemented so long as FWS evaluates the
certainty with which the efforts will be implemented and effective.3
However, courts have found that speculative future plans and voluntary
conservation efforts will not suffice to avoid listing."9
305 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
306 Id § 1533(b)(1)(A).
307 Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making Listing Decisions, 68 Fed.
Reg. 15,100, 15,113 (Mar. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. 4); see also Kevin Cassidy,
Endangered Species' Shppery Slope Back to the States: Existing Regulatory Mechanisms and
Ongoing Conservation Efforts Under the Endangered Species Ac4 32 ENVTL. L. 175, 178-79
(2002) (discussing instances where state and local conservation efforts were invoked to avoid
listing).
3 Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making Listing Decisions, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 15,114 (requiring a "high level of certainty that the effort will be implemented and/or
effective"); see also Permian Basin Petroleum Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 127 F. Supp. 3d 700,
712 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (invalidating FWS's decision to list the lesser prairie chicken as
inconsistent with PECE), appeal dismissed, No. 16-50453 (5th Cir. 2016).
3 See, e.g., Alaska v. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d 209, 219-20 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting
Alaska's claim that NMFS failed to consider the state's conservation efforts before listing the
beluga whale and concluding that "it is not enough for the State to identify conservation efforts
that maybe beneficial to a species' preservation"; instead, "the efforts must actually be in place
and have achieved some measure of success in order to count"); Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258
F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting FWS's reliance on a Conservation Agreement (CA) to
justify withdrawing a proposed listing because, in several areas designated as management
areas for the species, "the designation process was either incomplete or wholly unstarted" and
"[n]owhere d[id] the Secretary account for the effects of failure to implement the CA
immediately in those areas where delay was expected"); see also Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley,
6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1154-55 (D. Or. 1998) ("NMFS may only consider conservation efforts that
are currently operational"; NMFS cannot rely on voluntary measures to preclude listing because
"like those planned in the future, [they] are necessarily speculative."); Sw. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[FWS] cannot use promises of proposed
future actions as an excuse for not making a determination based on the existing record."). But
see Defs. of Wildlife v. Zinke, 849 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that FWS properly
relied on future implementation of a wolf management plan by the State of Wyoming because
the plan was not speculative but rather was "sufficiently certain to be implemented based on
the strength of the State's incentives"); Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, 70 F. Supp. 3d 183, 197-98
(D.D.C. 2014) (holding that FWS may consider state programs that are not yet fully
implemented, as "implementation and effectiveness are often assessed in relative rather than
absolute terms; when faced with regulatory uncertainty and risk to certain species, the Service
can still chart a course of action, provided it assesses and controls for that uncertainty and
risk"), aftfd, 815 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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b. Federal Obhgations (Section 7)
i Affirmative Duty to Conserve (Section 7(a)(1))
The ESA states that the Departments of Interior and Commerce must
utilize all of their programs to promote the statute's goals.310 The ESA also
mandates that allfederal agencies utilize their authority in the furtherance of
the purposes of the ESA.'" There are few reported cases directly on point,
but at least a handful of courts have found that section 7(a)(1) has
substantive "teeth."12 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, the advocacy group
argued that regulations for bird hunting at twilight failed to protect listed
species against misidentification by hunters.1 3 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, interpreting this section of the statute,
found that the ESA requires that the agency "do far more than merely avoid
the elimination of protected species," rather there is "an affirmative duty to
increase the population of protected species."
The court came to a similar decision in Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy District v. Watt.10 The cities of Reno and Sparks, Nevada
challenged the Department of the Interior's refusal to release greater
quantities of water from the Stampede Dam and Reservoir.3 16 The
Department of the Interior cited section 7(a)(1) to support its position that
the water levels in the reservoir must be maintained at higher levels in order
to preserve the spawning ability of two endangered fish (the cui-ui and the
Lahotan cutthroat trout).' Ultimately, the court agreed with the federal
government's argument that it had a duty "to replenish the species so that
they are no longer endangered or threatened with extinction," rather than
merely avoiding jeopardy.
By contrast, several courts have refused to mandate the implementation
of specific conservation measures, instead finding that the federal agencies
310 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). For convenience, we reference FWS throughout this Article, but
similar duties are imposed upon NMFS, an agency within the Department of Commerce.
311 Id
312 See Defs. of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 169-70 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding that the
ESA clearly implied that FWS must "use all methods necessary" to boost species populations
for their removal from the protective class); see also Tenn. ValleyAuth., 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978)
("One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer than
those in § 7 of the [ESA). Its very words affirmatively command all federal agencies 'to insure
that actions authonzed, funded, or carried about by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the destruction or modification of habitat of
such species.'" (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536)).
313 Andrus, 428 F. Supp. at 169.
314 Id at 170.
315 549 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Nev. 1982), affd sub nom., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy
.Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984).
316 Clark, 741 F.2d at 259; Watt 537 F. Supp. at 107-08.
317 Clark, 741 F.2d at 259, 261-62.
318 Watt 549 F. Supp. at 708-10; see also Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir.
1998) (finding that section 7(a)(1) required the United States Department of Agriculture to
develop its own conservation program for listed species dependent on the Edwards aquifer).
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have a great deal of discretion in the steps that they take to satisfy section
7(a)(1).` For example, in Defenders of Wildhfe v. US. Fsh & Wildlife,azo the
court rejected arguments that USFS should develop and implement its own
conservation program for the endangered Mexican wolf and deferred to the
agency's decision to act in cooperation with FWS's recommendations in
furtherance of previously established wolf reintroduction and recovery
goals."' Similarly, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt,2 the court held that
the federal agencies had not violated section 7(a)(1), even though they had
not implemented all possible measures for conservation of the endangered
Sonoran pronghorn, absent a showing that the agencies had failed entirely to
carry out conservation programs.3
To summarize, FWS and other federal agencies are obligated to prevent
jeopardy and authorized to proactively improve the circumstances of listed
species. Additionally, while the ESA creates a duty to increase populations
of protected species, it appears that courts are often unwilling to require the
implementation of specific conservation measures.
iA Prohibition Against Jeopardy (Section 7(a)(2))
Federal agencies must also ensure that their actions are "not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence" of listed species."' In Tennessee Valley
Authority v Hll,2 the Supreme Court established that, instead of balancing
interests between wildlife conservation and economic development, the ESA
demands that species conservation be elevated above other concerns, which
could include state interests in wildlife.3"
In order to ensure that federal actions do not jeopardize listed species,
federal agencies undertaking actions that could harm species must formally
consult with FWS.32 ' For purposes of section 7, "federal actions" include
projects that are funded, authorized, or constructed directly by any federal
agency, and projects with discretionary involvement or control by any
319 See, e.g, Leatherback Sea Turtle v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 9900152 DAE, 1999
WL 33594329, at *13-14 (D. Haw. Oct. 18, 1999) (finding that NMFS satisfied its section 7(a)(1)
duty by issuing conservation recommendations and biological opinions); Coal. for Sustainable
Res., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1306, 1315-16 (D. Wyo. 1999) (rejecting
plaintiffs argument that USFS should implement certain timber harvest and snow management
programs for the benefit of listed species), vacated forlack ofnpeness, 259 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.
2001).
320 797 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Ariz. 2011).
321 Id at 958-59.
322 130 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2001).
323 Id. at 135; see also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 898
F.2d 1410, 1417-19 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that section 7(a)(1) did not require the Navy to adopt
the "least burdensome alternative" to ensure the conservation of listed species; rather, the Navy
retained discretion in meeting the ESA's conservation mandate).
324 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
325 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
326 See id. at 184 (noting "ft]he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost").
327 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4).
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federal agency.3 28 If a listed species may be present within the project area,
the federal "action agency" must conduct a biological assessment (BA) to
identify any such species likely to be affected by the federal action and
evaluate the effects.2' In turn, through its biological opinion (BiOp), FWS
must determine whether the potential harm to the species violates section
7(a)(2) and, if so, devise less harmful alternatives or mitigation measures.3
FWS has interpreted the phrase "jeopardize the continued existence of
a species" as any action "that reasonably would be expected, directly or
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild.""" According to the Ninth Circuit in
National Wildlife Federation v. National Maine Fisheries Service,32 an
action that may jeopardize a species can be of any magnitude, slight or
severe, since the important factor is the degree of risk to the particular
species.n Furthermore, the court stated that jeopardy determinations must
consider the action's effect on species recovery, not simply species
survival?.' Therefore, even actions that pose only slight dangers may
"jeopardize" the species if the effect of that action poses a high degree of
risk to the species.
iiU Prohibition Against Adversely Modifying Critical Habitat
(Section 7(a)(2))
At the time a species is listed as endangered or threatened, FWS must
also designate its critical habitat.336 Critical habitat is an area where there are
"physical or biological features ... essential to the conservation of the
species and ... which may require special management considerations."336
Critical habitat designation is based on "the best scientific data available and
after taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on national
security, and any other relevant impact."337 By directing FWS to consider
economic impacts, the designation decision involves a much broader inquiry
than is required for the listing determinations.
Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from taking actions that may
"result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat."a
FWS regulations specify that:
328 Id. § 1536(a); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016); see Sierra Club v. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 786 F.3d
1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2015).
329 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c).
330 Id § 1536(b)(3).
331 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
332 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008).
333 See id. at 930.
SId. at 931.
335 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A), (b)(6)(C).
336 Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
337 Id. § 1533(b)(2).
338 Id § 1536(a)(2).
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Destruction or adverse modification means a direct or indirect alteration that
appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for [both the survival and
recovery] of a, listed species ... includ[ing] ... those that alter the physical or
biological features essential to the conservation of a species or that preclude
or significantly delay development of such features.m
In Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables,m the Tenth Circuit held that
critical habitat is adversely modified by any actions "that adversely affect a
species' recovery and the ultimate goal of delisting." 1 This interpretation
makes the critical habitat protection a significant prohibition.
c. Take Prohibition (Section 9)
The ESA prohibits the "take" of listed species.3 42 "Take" is defined by
Congress as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect."a This broad protection has been further enlarged by the
Supreme Court's determination that "harm" in this definition includes
habitat modification or degradation," though a showing that animals have
actually been killed or injured may be required to prove that harm has
occurred." A prohibited take can be either intentional (e.g., hunting and
trapping) or unintentional (e.g., poisoning and other contamination).3
Unlike the requirements of section 7, section 9 applies to all persons, not just
federal agencies. 7
While the take prohibition is unqualified for endangered species, it is up
to the agency to determine the breadth of its applicability for threatened
species." FWS can make the prohibitions of section 9 applicable, either in
whole or in part, to threatened species.3 49 However, FWS's discretion in this
area is not without limits. In Sierra Club v. Clark,m the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down FWS regulations that
permitted the hunting of threatened wolves because the ESA only empowers
FWS to issue regulations for the "conservation" of species, and regulated
taking is only permissible under "extraordinary" circumstances which were
not present in that case.m
3 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016) (emphasis omitted).
340 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007).
34 Id at 1322.
342 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C).
3 Id. § 1532(19).
34 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (citing
50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
34 Seeid at 696 n.7; FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 266.
346 FREYFoGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 236-37.
347 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
348 Id. § 1533(d).
349 Id
.30 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).
351 Id. at 610, 612-13; see 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
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i. Incidental Take Statements and Incidental Take Permits (Section
7(a)(2) and Section 10)
Federal activities covered by a "no jeopardy" BO may be shielded from
section 9 "take" liability if FWS has also issued an incidental take statement
(ITS) that excuses the actor from liability when a covered species is
incidentally taken during the course of an otherwise lawful activity. While
an ITS provides protection against federal prosecution, it also constitutes a
binding agreement with FWS that may include limitations and other
prohibitions for the shielded activity." In addition, section 10(a) allows
"take" by nonfederal actors under prescribed conditions in exchange for a
habitat conservation plan (HCP).3x To issue an incidental take permit (ITP)
under section 10(a), FWS must find that:
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and
mitigate the impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be
provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild; and
(v) the measures, if any, [that the Secretary may require as being necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan] will be met.
In recent years, FWS has utilized its ability to issue ITPs more
frequently, in part to alleviate the perceived harshness of the ESA's
prohibitions and in part to foster "creative partnerships between the private
sector and all levels of government in the interests of protected species and
habitat conservation."a For example, a court upheld an ITP that authorized
the State of Utah, Cedar City, and the Paiute Tribe to trap prairie dogs that
352 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(4); see Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 446 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that states did not violate the ESA when they issued fishing regulations allowing taking
of listed salmon without obtaining a section 10 permit where NMFS issued a section 7 incidental
take statement that clearly anticipated the states would promulgate fishing regulations in
accordance with its terms).
353 See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(2) (2016); see also Endangered Species Permits: HCPs -
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://permacc/Z3PV-WQFC (last
updated Apr. 14, 2015) (describing the binding legal obligations included in Habitat
Conservation Plans that are usually required when a party obtains an incidental take permit).
354 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
355 Id § 1539(a)(2)(B).
356 Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Polluton
Control Law Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 69, 75-76 (2002).
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were damaging private and tribal land, and relocate them to a parcel of land
covered by a conservation easement surrounded by BLM lands.?
States have avoided liability for a "take" under both ITSs and ITPs, and
both tools have the potential to be used to foster cooperation with states in
the interest of species conservation. If either an ITS or an ITP is issued
without adequate safeguards for the species, however, the ESA's
conservation objectives may be undermined.
d Cooperation with States (Section 6)
The ESA carves out a role for the states to assist in achieving the ESA's
protective purposes by providing that, in carrying out the statute, FWS "shall
cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States."as Through
this provision, Congress recognized the expertise of state agencies and
required FWS to solicit and consider relevant information from them, such
as preparing proposed and final rules to designate critical habitat."' In
addition, the ESA empowers FWS to "enter into agreements with [states] for
the administration and management of any area established for the
conservation of [listed] species."a FWS may also enter into cooperative
agreements with any state that establishes and maintains an "adequate and
active" program for the conservation of listed species.6' These programs are
enacted statutorily and are referred to as "state endangered species acts."a
In addition, the statutory savings clause states that the ESA should not
be construed "to void any State law or regulation which is intended to
conserve migratory, resident, or introduced fish or wildlife, or to permit or
prohibit sale of such fish or wildlife."a However, states may not take
measures to protect or enhance non-endangered resident wildlife if such
measures would take or otherwise endanger listed species."
FWS and NFMS also adopted an interagency policy to guide their work
with the states in ESA implementation. The policy begins by recognizing that
357 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 622 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159, 1168 (D.
Utah 2009).
358 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a).
359 See, e.g, Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974, 997 (D. Alaska 2013)
(discussing FWS and state's various joint efforts and ultimately finding that FWS complied with
§ 1535(a) in designating polar bear critical habitat).
360 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b).
361 Id. § 1535(c)(1). For details, see COGGINS & GucKSMAN, supra note 124, § 29:19.
362 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Endangered
Species Acts, 44 A.LR. 6th 325 (2009); see 16 U.S.C. § 1535.
363 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f).
364 See Nat'1 Audubon Soc', 307 F.3d 835, 853 (9th Cir.) (invalidating California's
prohibition on leghold traps), amended on denial ofreh'g, 312 F.3d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 2002). Cf
Animal Prot. Inst. v. Holsten, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080-1 (D. Minn. 2008) (finding that the
savings clause did not shield a state hunting program from judicial invalidation or protect the
state game agency from liability for violating the ESA's taking clause); United States v. Glenn-
Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("[T]o the extent that [a state's]
law on taking is less protective than the [ESA], it is preempted.").
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"States possess broad trustee and police powers over fish, wildlife and
plants and their habitats within their borders [and u]nless preempted by
Federal authority, States possess primary authority and responsibility for
protection and management of fish, wildlife and plants and their habitats."m
The policy specifies ways in which the states can help carry out the
purposes of the ESA, such as by taking prelisting conservation actions and
utilizing state expertise and information in the ESA recovery process.m
Section 6 and the interagency policy provisions encourage cooperative
federalism to effectuate the purposes of the ESA. Like many other federal
environmental statutes, the ESA provides a floor, not a ceiling, for species
protection."' The ESA clearly preempts inconsistent or less restrictive state
laws.m And most state-level endangered species acts are relatively limited in
comparison to the federal law, with most states having no mechanism for
recovery, consultation, critical habitat, or citizen enforcement.tm
2. The National Park System
a. The 1916 Organic Act
The National Park Service Organic Acte makes conservation of park
resources, including wildlife, a primary management goal:
[To] promote and regulate the use of the National Park System by means and
measures that conform to the fundamental purpose... to conserve the
scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System units and to
provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild
life in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.
Courts have construed this provision as a directive that, between the
competing goals of conservation of park resources and facilitating public
365 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative
Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg.
34,274, 34,725 (July 1, 1994).
366 Id.
367 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c), (f); see Robert L Fischman, Predictions and Presciptions for the
Endangered Species Act 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 462 (2004).
68 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) ("Any State law or regulation respecting the taking of an endangered
species or threatened species may be more restrictive than the exemptions or permits provided
for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter but not less restrictive
than the prohibitions so defined."); see, e.g., Nat? Audubon Soc', 307 F.3d at 851-53 (holding
that California's rule prohibiting use of leg-hold traps by federal employees was preempted by
the ESA); Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992); Glenn-Colusa
ingadon Dist, 788 F. Supp. at 1134.
369 Susan George & William J. Snape m, State Endangered Species Acts, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 345, 346 (Donald C. Baur & W.M. Robert Irvin eds.,
2d ed. 2010) (concluding that "most acts lack all but the most basic elements of a legislative
scheme to protect a state's imperiled species").
370 Ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified in scattered sections of 54 U.S.C.).
371 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (Supp. 112015) (emphasis added).
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enjoyment of park resources, conservation generally takes precedence. *
Notably, the Organic Act's phrase authorizing management for the
enjoyment of scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife is cabined by
the admonition that enjoyment may only occur "in such manner and by such
means as will leave them [i.e., park resources] unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations."" Absent an explicit contrary mandate in the relevant
individual park establishment act, in the event of a conflict, NPS must
prioritize conservation over public enjoyment.
b. National Park Service Management Poicy
NPS's own Management Policies recognize that conservation of park
resources is "predominant."" More specifically:
Congress, recognizing that the enjoyment by future generations of the national
parks can be ensured only if the superb quality of park resources and values is
left unimpaired, has provided that when there is a conflict between conserving
resources and values and providing for enjoyment of them, conservation is to
be predominant. This is how courts have consistently interpreted the Organic
Act.376
Issues related to wildlife management come squarely within the
purview of the conservation mandate. "Impairment" includes disruption of
372 See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192-93 (D.D.C.
2008) (invalidating NPS's Winter Use Plan because it violated the conservation mandate by
impairing Yellowstone's soundscape, wildlife, and air quality); Fund for Animals v. Norton, 512 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that NPS had articulated a satisfactory explanation
regarding limited use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone); Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d
92, 108 (D.D.C. 2003) (overturning decision to allow snowmobiles in Yellowstone because NPS had
not explained reversal of earlier conclusion that snowmobiles caused impairment); see also
Bicycle Trails of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the "overarching
concern" of the Organic Act is "resource protection"); Defs. of Wildlife v. Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d
1271, 1306-07 (M.D. Fla 2012) (remanding decision to increase off-road vehicle (ORV) use because
of failure to explain change in position as to ORV's adverse impacts to wildlife, soil, and
hydrology); Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 24-38 (D.D.C. 2010) (remanding
NPS's decision to allow jet skis in two national parks given the impacts to wildlife, water and air
quality, soundscapes, aquatic vegetation, and visitor experience); Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42
F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that the primary purpose of the Organic Act is
"conservation of wildlife resources"); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 909
(D.D.C. 1986) ("In the Organic Act, Congress speaks of but a single purpose, namely
conservation.").
373 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a).
374 Eric Biber & Elisabeth Long Esposito, The National Park SeMce Organic Act and Climate
Change, 56 NAT. RESOURcES J. 193, 223-24 (2016). But see Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, 46 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1278, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (applying an establishment act
that shuffles these priorities and finding that the establishment acts for Big Cypress Preserve and
Addition Lands mandate multiple uses, including ORV use on designated trails), affld, 835 F.3d
1377 (11th Cir. 2016).
375 NAT'L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT PoIcIEs 2006 § 1.4.3 (2006), https://permacc/3R3K-
EUP8 [hereinafter NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES].
376 Id
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natural abundance, diversity, and ecological integrity, and is not limited to
those impacts that "are so intense or sustained that they result in 'the
elimination of a native species or significant population declines in a native
species.'"s"
NPS's Management Policies direct NPS to "maintain as parts of the
natural ecosystems of parks all plants and animals native to park
ecosystems.""' Native species are "all species that have occurred, now
occur, or may occur as a result of natural processes on lands designated as
units of the national park system."" NPS commits itself to preserving,
maintaining, and restoring both populations of species and their habitats,
and to "minimizing human impacts on native plants, animals, populations,
communities, and ecosystems, and the processes that sustain them."so In
addition, the Management Policies state that NPS will cooperate and work
with state and tribal governments, federal agencies, and other land managers
to encourage the conservation of species populations and habitats
"whenever possible."8' Although the Policies are not judicially enforceable,
courts have not hesitated to find that deviations from the Policies are
arbitrary and capricious.m
c. Hunting and fshing
Courts have occasionally upheld NPS decisions that adversely impact
wildlife, including decisions to cull deer and other wildlife from parks where
the wildlife is undermining conservation goals by destroying vegetation or
harming other species.m As a general rule, however, hunting and other types
of consumptive resource utilization within units of the National Park System
are prohibited as contrary to the conservation ethic articulated in the
377 Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (rejecting NPS's interpretation of impairment
to allow mortality and other "regular" adverse effects to wildlife as a "draconian" definition that
was inconsistent the Organic Act).
378 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 375, § 4.4.1.
379 Id. § 4.4.1.3.
380 Id. § 4.4.1.
381 Id. § 4.4.1.1.
382 See, e.g, Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 20 n.13 ("While these Policies are not
judicially enforceable, they are 'relevant insofar as NPS puts forth the Policies as justification
for the decision under review.'" (citations omitted)).
383 See, e.g, Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 359-60 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding NPS plan to
cull deer); N.M. State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1969) (similar);
Grunewald v. Jarvis, 930 F. Supp. 2d 73, 84-86 (D.D.C. 2013) (similar), affd, 776 F.3d 893 (D.C.
Cir. 2015); Friends of Animals v. Caldwell, No. 2:09-cv-5349, 2010 WL 4259753, at *1, *7 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 27, 2010), affd, 434 F. App'x 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (similar); see also WildEarth Guardians v.
Nat'1 Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178, 1191-93 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding NPS plan to cull elk);
Wilkins v. Sec'y of Interior, 995 F.2d 850, 851 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court and
upholding NPS plan to remove wild horses); Intertribal Bison Coop. v. Babbitt, 25 F. Supp. 2d
1135, 1140-41 (D. Mont. 1998) (upholding NPS plan to manage Yellowstone bison), affd, 175
F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1999); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. 1435, 1445-46 (D.
Mont. 1996) (upholding NPS plan to authorize capture or killing of bison by state officials),
affld, 108 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Organic Act.m Specific establishment legislation for individual parks
authorizes limited subsistence or recreational hunting, trapping, or fishing
within approximately thirty-one NPS units.385 Those areas permitting hunting,
trapping, or fishing typically do so in conformance with applicable federal
and state laws.t m NPS regulations prohibit commercial fishing in the parks. 7
However, in Alaska Wildlfe Aliance v Jensen,m the Ninth Circuit held that
NPS has the discretion to permit commercial fishing in non-wilderness areas
of certain Alaska parks.m
3 The National Wildlife Refuge System
a. The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (1997)
The National Wildlife Refuge System is unique among federal land
conservation units in its explicit focus on wildlife and ecosystem
conservation as its dominant use.8 o FWS manages the Refuge System under
the auspices of the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act,8
which was amended in 1997 by the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act."" The agency also provides detailed explanations of its
statutory obligations in its regulations' and the FWS Manual.8 5
3 COGGINS & GucKsMAN, supra note 124, § 32:14; see United States v. Jarrell, 143 F. Supp.
2d 605, 605-06, 609 (W.D. Va. 2001) (upholding conviction for hunting in Shenandoah National
Park); OrganizedFsherman ofFla, 488 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (S.D. Fla, 1980) (denying a preliminary
injunction to enjoin enforcement of NPS regulations that restricted fishing practices in a national
park).
385 Jessica Almy, Student Article, TakingAim at Hunting on National Park Service Lands, 18
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 184, 185 (2010); see Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, 628 F. Supp. 903, 907 n.4 (D.D.C. 1986)
(finding express authorization for hunting in the enabling acts of thirty-one NPS properties).
386 36 C.F.R. § 2.2(b)(4) (2016); 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(f) (2016); Organlzed17shermen oflMa, 775
F.2d 1544, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that, despite Florida law, there was no right to engage
in commercial fishing in Everglades National Park); United States v. Knauer, 635 F. Supp. 2d
203, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that permission for commercial fishing or hunting in Gateway
National Park was left to NPS); see also Fund for Animals v. Mainella, 294 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48, 52
(D.D.C. 2003) (refusing to enjoin state's bear hunt in Delaware Gap National Recreation Area
since statutory language provided that federal regulation was required only when NPS
exercised its discretion to place limitations on hunting or to provide areas for intensive
management).
387 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.3(d)(4), 5.3; see S.F. Herring Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 13-cv-
01750-JST, 2014 WL 172232, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014) (finding that NPS had authority to
issue citations to commercial fishermen in San Francisco Bay near the Golden Gate
Recreational Area).
388 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997).
389 Id at 1067, 1074.
390 National Wildlife Refuge System ImprovementAct of 1997Pubiic Law 105-57 U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/S8FN-FHHT (last updated Aug. 19, 2009).
391 National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee
(2012); see The Refuge System and FWS, U.S. FISH & WILDLFE SERV., https://perma.cc/4N9R-
GDXQ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
392 National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat.
1252 (1997).
393 See 50 C.F.R. pts. 31-32 (2016).
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The Act authorizes the agency to permit the use of any area within the
system for any purpose as long as it is determined that the proposed use is
compatible with the "major purposes for which the areas were
established.""' The Act further clarifies that all actions on a refuge must be
compatible with both the mission of the refuge system and the purposes of
the relevant individual refuge (as determined by the establishment
legislation of that refuge).' Where the system mission and refuge purposes
conflict, refuge purposes should be given precedence, while still fulfilling the
system mission to the extent that is possible." The agency's discretion in
determining whether a use is compatible is further limited by the
requirement that compatibility be based on "sound professional judgment."M
Furthermore, agency regulations require compatibility determinations to: 1)
be written, 2) identify the proposed or existing use that the compatibility
determination applies to, and 3) state whether the proposed use is in fact a
compatible use based on "sound professional judgment.
The mission of the refuge system, as provided by the Act, "is to
administer a national network of lands and waters for the conservation,
management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and
plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of
present and future generations of Americans." In meeting the mission of
the system, the statute lays out explicit obligations for the agency.a 1 Three of
these statutory requirements are particularly relevant to this discussion and
are elaborated upon in greater detail below:
In administering the system the Secretary shall-
(A) provide for the conservation of fish, wildlife, and plants, and their habitat
within the System;
(B) ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of
the System are maintained for the benefit of present and future generations of
Americans;
394 See Service Manual Chapters: Series 600 - Land Use and Management Seies, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/Q93L-S223 (last updated Nov. 2, 2017).
395 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A).
396 Id. § 668ee(1). Establishment legislation is of key importance in refuge management as a
source of refuge purposes and a guide to refuge management. Many refuges have purposes
derived from multiple pieces of establishment legislation, which can lead to confusion regarding
the relative priorities of the various refuge purposes. ROBERT L FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 164 (2003).
397 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(D).
398 Id § 668ee(1); see Del. Audubon Soc'y v. Salazar, 829 F. Supp. 2d 273, 288-89 (D. Del.
2011) (finding that a dune restoration decision was within sound professional judgment when it
was "supported by scientific literature").
39 50 C.F.R. § 25.12,(2016).
400 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2).
401 See id. § 668dd(a)(4).
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(E) ensure effective coordination, interaction, and cooperation with owners of
land adjoining refuges and the fish and wildlife agency of the States in which
the units of the System are located.4
Two significant court cases interpret many of the provisions of the Act.
In Wyoming v. United States, the state argued that FWS interfered with the
state's sovereign right to manage wildlife by prohibiting the state from
vaccinating elk against brucellosis on refuge lands.4 The Tenth Circuit
ultimately determined that ordinary principles of preemption applied; if the
state's actions would conflict with federal mandates or present an obstacle
to their accomplishment, then the state is preempted by the Improvement
Act.' In National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis environmental groups
challenged California over a state law banning the use of all leg-hold traps in
the state, including those used on federal lands or to protect endangered
species.4 The Ninth Circuit found that the ban conflicted with FWS's
statutory authority to manage refuges, and so the state law was preempted.4
These two cases are discussed in detail below!
. Provide for the Conservation of Fish, Wildlife, Plants, and Their
Habitats
The Refuge Improvement Act groups the terms "conserving,"
conservation," "manage," "managing," and "management" together, and
provides a single definition for all of them: "to sustain and, where
appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy populations of fish, wildlife, and
plants."' As the Wyoming court states, it would be impossible for the
agency to meet its obligation for conservation "unless [refuges] are
consistently directed and managed as a national system."m Furthermore,
that court found that "Congress undoubtedly intended a preeminent federal
role for the FWS in the care and management of the [National Wildlife
Refuge System]."o The Audubon court concurred in this reasoning,
402 Id
403 Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2002).
404 Id. at 1234-35.
405 307 F.3d 835, 842-44 (9th Cir.), amended on denial ofreh'g, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002).
406 Id. at 854.
407 See infra notes 409-411, 426-433 and accompanying text.
40 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(4) (2012).
409 Wyoming 279 F.3d 1214, 1233 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-106, at 8
(1997)).
410 Id. at 1234. In another case, Defendeis of Wildlife v Salazar, the D.C. Circuit defined
"conservation" in this context by referencing the specific facts of the case. 651 F.3d 112, 115-17
(D.C. Cir. 2011). In that case, FWS was accused of violating the conservation mandate of the
Improvement Act by failing to'comnuit to a deadline to end the agency's elk feeding program in
the National Elk Refuge. Id at 115. The court determined that there was "no doubt that
unmitigated continuation of supplemental feeding would undermine the conservation purpose
of the National Wildlife Refuge System," yet the court determined that a phased (rather than an
abrupt) ending of that program was reasonable. Id. at 117.
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referencing the goals of the Improvement Act and FWS's authority over
refuge lands in its finding that state law was preempted.41 1
ii Ensure That the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and
Environmental Health of the System Are Maintained
While the statute itself does not define these terms, FWS defines them
in its manual.41 2 The manual states that the "highest measure of biological
integrity, diversity, and environmental health is viewed as those intact and
self-sustaining habitats and wildlife populations that existed during historic
conditions."' 3 Therefore, the agency "favor[s] management that restores or
mimics natural ecosystem processes or functions." 14 The agency's manual
also lays out the major principles underlying the biological integrity policy,
the first of which is that wildlife conservation must always be the primary
concern in the management of the refuges4 " and that ensuring biological
integrity, diversity, and environmental health is necessary for the agency to
fulfill the system mission of conservation.4 16
The requirement to maintain "biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health" requires refuge officials to "manage lands to conserve
the full range of wild species and plant communities" that existed in a refuge
before it was substantially changed by humans, and also "calls for the
conservation of basic ecological processes with little human alteration,
including the natural biological processes that shape genomes, organisms,
and communities."4 " As Fischman describes the biological integrity
requirement: "No other organic mandate employs as unconditional or
specific a series of ecological criteria to constrain management and promote
conservation."
ii Ensure Effective Coordination, Interaction, and Cooperation
Congress clearly intended for FWS to cooperate meaningfully with
other land managers, particularly states. Included in the statute is a
requirement that the agency issue a conservation plan for each refuge that is
"consistent with the provisions of this Act and, to the extent practicable,
consistent with fish and wildlife conservation plans of the State in which the
refuge is located."4 " As the Wyoming court states, the Improvement Act calls
411 Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 307 F.3d at 854.
412 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SERVICE MANUAL 610 FW 3, BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, DIVERSITY,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH § 3.6 (2001), www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.html.
413 Id. § 3.10.
414 Id § 3.7(E).
415 Id § 3.7(A).
416 Id. § 3.7(B).
417 FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 212.
418 FISCHMAN, supra note 396, at 126; see also Des. of Wildlife, 651 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (emphasizing the agency's "biological integrity" mandate).
419 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
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for, "at a minimum, state involvement and participation in the management
of the [National Wildlife Refuge System] as that system affects surrounding
state ecosystems."o2 0 However, in understanding the statute we must give
effect to all of the language provided, and while Congress strongly
encourages cooperation, it also tempers that goal by finding that it is only
necessary "to the extent practicable," otherwise the agency would not be
capable of fulfilling its congressionally designated mission. As the
Wyoming court observed: "Congress undoubtedly intended a preeminent
federal role for the FWS in the care and management of the [National
Wildlife Refuge System]."a
iv. Savings Clause
The Improvement Act also contains two savings clauses. First, the Act
prohibits the taking of any fish or animal within refuges without FWS
permission 4 but the prohibition does not extend beyond refuge boundaries:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Secretary to control
or regulate hunting or fishing of fish and resident wildlife on lands or waters
that are not within the System."4 24 Next, the Act provides that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority,
jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or
regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area
within the System. Regulations permitting hunting or fishing of fish and
resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the extent practicable,
consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and management
plans.42
The state in Wyoming argued that the first sentence of the savings
clause retains to the state "the absolute right to manage wildlife ... free
from federal intervention."a6 However, the Tenth Circuit found that as a
matter of statutory construction the first sentence cannot be read in
isolation; instead, the clause must be understood in its entirety, giving effect
to the whole clause.m7 The second sentence of the savings clause indicates
that federal regulation of wildlife on refuges only has to be consistent with
state law "to the extent practicable."' So while consistency is encouraged, it
is not mandated at the expense of the other requirements of the statute.
420 Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002).
421 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii); Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1233.
422 Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
423 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c); see United States v. Kilpatrick, 347 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (D. Neb.
2004) (upholding conviction for trespassing on and shooting deer in a closed portion of a
wildlife refuge).
424 Id. § 668dd(1).
425 Id. § 668dd(m).
426 Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1231.
427 Id
428 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m); Wyoming 279 F.3d at 1232.
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The Wyoming court also found that if the first sentence is read so as to
exclude the possibility of FWS authority to manage wildlife in ways that
might conflict with state law, such a result "would be inconsistent with the
[Improvement Act's] 'mission ... to administer a national network of
lands.'"' Interpreting the statute as prohibiting FWS from ever acting
contrary to state law would leave the state "free to manage and regulate the
[refuge] in a manner the FWS deemed incompatible with the [refuge's]
purpose." 0 The Wyoming court found it "highly unlikely... that Congress
would carefully craft the substantive provisions of the [Improvement Act] to
grant authority to the FWS to manage the [refuge] and promulgate
regulations thereunder and then essentially nullify those provisions and
regulations with a single sentence."4' The Audubon court agreed, stating "the
first sentence of the savings clause was not meant to eviscerate the primacy
of federal authority over [National Wildlife Refuge] management."" To the
extent that state law conflicts with or undermines statutory requirements or
federal objectives, it is preempted.m The Department of the Interior has
adopted this cooperative federalism interpretation of the savings clause as
well.'
v. Compatbility Deterninations
The compatibility determination forms the central criterion for
determining whether or not actions will be allowed to proceed on refuge
lands and therefore is the key mechanism in implementing the statute's goal
of conservation. A compatible use is one that "in the sound professional
judgment of [FWS] will not materially interfere with or detract from the
fulfillment of the mission of the System or the purposes of the refuge."m In
implementing this provision, FWS must consider direct, indirect, and
cumulative impacts of the proposed use.4m However, actions categorized as
429 Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234 (omission in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2)).
430 Id
431 Id. at 1234-35 (citation omitted); see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870
(2000) ("[TIhis Court has repeatedly 'decline[d] to give broad effect to savings clauses where
doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.'" (second
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)).
432 Nat'I Audubon Soc', 307 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g, 312 F.3d
416 (9th Cir. 2002).
43 Id; see Sch. Bd. of Avoyelles Par. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 647 F.3d 570, 582 (5th Cir.
2011) (finding that Louisiana law was in direct conflict with Property Clause and the National
Refuge Act and was therefore pre-empted insofar as the Louisiana statute-allowing owner of
estate that has no access to public road to claim right of passage over neighboring property-
"would permit the School Board to enter, use, or otherwise occupy Refuge lands in violation of
FWS regulations").
434 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(e) (2016).
435 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(1) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a) (2016).
436 Final Compatibility Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement
Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,484, 62,489 (Oct. 18, 2000).
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"refuge management activity" do not require compatibility determinations,4"
though refuge management activities must be actions in furtherance of the
system mission or refuge purposes and so are inherently compatible.4, State
wildlife management activities may be considered "refuge management
activities" if they are taken "pursuant to a cooperative agreement between
the State and [FWS] where the Refuge Manager has made a written
determination that such activities support fulfilling the refuge purposes or
the System mission.""' Because compatibility determinations must be made
using "sound professional judgment,"4 o the Wyoming court found that a
reviewing court has "law to apply," and the determinations are reviewable in
court."1
In conclusion, Congress delegated to FWS the responsibility to manage
the national wildlife refuges in accordance with the specific requirements
laid out in both the Refuge Improvement Act and the establishment
legislation for individual refuges. Ultimately, it is up to refuge managers to
determine whether it is "practicable" and "consistent" for state laws to be
applied on refuge lands.442 As the Wyoming court stated: "The first sentence
of the saving clause does not deny the FWS, where at odds with the State,
the authority to make a binding decision bearing upon the 'biological
integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System.'""3 Both the
compatibility requirement and the mandate to promote biological integrity,
diversity, and environmental health impose legally enforceable restrictions
and obligations on FWS that cannot be cast aside at the request of states.
4. The National Forest System
a. The 1897 Organic Act
USFS's 1897 "Organic Act""' authorizes the establishment of national
forests." It states in part that "[n]o national forest shall be established,
except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the
purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a
continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States.""a The law also authorizes USFS to regulate "the occupancy
437 Id. at 62,488; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SERVICE MANUAL 610 FW 1, GENERAL OVERVIEW
OF WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP PoLIcY § 1.5(V) (2008) [hereinafter FWS WILDERNESS POLICY].
8 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a); Final Compatibility Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge
System Improvement Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. at 62,489; see Joly, supra note 275, at 45-46.
9 Final Compatibility Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement
Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. at 62,488.
4o 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(1).
41 Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1237 (10th Cir. 2002).
442 FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 215.
443 Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B)).
444 Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34-36 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482,
551 (2012)).
44 16 U.S.C. § 475.
446 Id
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and use" of the national forests and "to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction. "447
The Organic Act is silent on fish and wildlife management on national
forests. In an early wildlife decision, however, the Supreme Court found
USFS to have broad powers in protecting the national forests (in this case
the Kaibab) from damage inflicted by deer in northern Arizona." The power
of the United States, said the Court, to "protect its lands and property does
not admit of doubt, the game laws of any other statute of the state to the
contrary notwithstanding." 5
b. The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960
In 1960, Congress passed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Acts
(MUSYA). For the first time, it was statutorily recognized that USFS had
some responsibility to consider fish and wildlife values on the national
forests. MUSYA states in pertinent part: "It is the policy of the Congress
that the national forests are established and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and Ash
purposes."' This language does not require USFS to conserve wildlife in any
specific way, only to consider wildlife and fish in the context of multiple-use
decision making. As defined in the law, multiple use means:
The management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national
forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the
needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the land for
some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to
provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to
changing needs and conditions; that some land will be used for less than all of
the resources; and harmonious and coordinated management of the various
resources, each with the other, without impairment of the productivity of the
land, with consideration being given to the relative values of the various
447 See id. § 551 ("The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection
against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests which
may have been set aside or which may be hereafter set aside under the provisions of section 471
of this title, and which may be continued; and he may make such rules and regulations and
establish such service as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction." (footnote omitted));
see also Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (W.D.
Ky. 2010) (finding that USFS unlawfully delegated its Organic Act authority in allowing the
National Wild Turkey Federation to issue special use permits on forest lands).
44 Hun 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928).
49 Id. (citations omitted).
450 Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531).
451 16 U.S.C. § 528.
452 Id. (emphasis added).
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resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the
greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output.4u
As the courts generally view it, the multiple-use mandate "breathe[s]
discretion at every pore"A4 and grants USFS wide latitude in determining the
"proper mix of uses" for national forest lands.45 In Perkins v. Bergand, the
plaintiffs argued that MUSYA contained standards that cabined USFS's
discretion over the proper number of grazing permits to protect the public
land from damage.4 " The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
These sections of MUSYA contain the most general clauses and phrases.
For example, the agency is "directed" in section 529 to administer the national
forests "for multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and
services obtained therefrom," with "due consideration [to] be given to the
relative values of the various resources in particular areas." This language,
partially defined in section 531 in such terms as "that [which] will best meet
the needs of the American people" and "making the most judicious use of the
land," can hardly be considered concrete limits upon agency discretion.
Rather, it is language which "breathe[s] discretion at every pore." What
appellants really seem to be saying when they rely on the multiple-use
legislation is that they do not agree with the Secretary on how best to
administer the forest land on which their cattle graze. While this disagreement
is understandable, the courts are not at liberty to break the tie by choosing one
theory of range management as superior to another.
Since Perkins v. Bergland, the courts have consistently found that USFS
has broad discretion under the multiple-use framework." This includes
Wyoming v. US. Department of Agriculture, where the Tenth Circuit upheld
the 2001 Roadless Rule 4 over challenges that the Rule failed to satisfy the
statutory multiple-use mandate because it precluded timber harvesting in
453 Id. § 531(a).
454 Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (alteration in original) (quoting
Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)).
455 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1268 (10th Cir. 2011).
456 Perkins, 608 F.2d at 806.
457 Id at 806-07 (alterations in original) (citations and footnotes omitted).
458 See, e.g, Cal. Forestry Ass'n v. Bosworth, No. 2:05-cv-00905-MCE-GGH., 2008 WL
4370074, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2008); Pac. Rivers Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 2:05-cv-
00953-MCE-GGH., 2008 WL 4291209, at *16-17 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2008), aff'd in part and rev'd
inpan; 689 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2012); California exrel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 2:05-
cv-0211-MCE-GGH., 2008 WL 3863479, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008), affd sub nom., Sierra
Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2011); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1058 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Clinch Coal. v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d
364, 378 (W.D. Va 2004); Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp. 1317, 1328 (E.D. Wis. 1994), affd, 46
F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995); Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. 1362, 1372 (D.
Wyo. 1993), aftd, 85 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1996); Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 686
F. Supp. 256, 264 (D. Mont. 1988).
459 Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001).
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certain areas.4" The court reaffirmed MUSYA's discretionary nature and
found that, while the Rule did not permit timber harvesting, it permitted
other multiple uses, such as "'outdoor recreation,' 'watershed,' and 'wildlife
and fish purposes.'"46'
A relatively short and simple savings clause is also provided in MUSYA:
"Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the
national forests.,- However, as noted above, in California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock Co., the Supreme Court held that federal law
preempted the extension of state land use plans onto national forest lands
because the savings clause merely indicates that ordinary principles of
preemption govern such disputes." By the same token, contradictory state
regulation of wildlife in the national forests would be preempted despite the
savings clause.4
c. The National Forest Management Act of 1976
Born out of the timber clear-cutting controversies of the 1960s and
1970s, NFMA was passed in order to better balance timber management,
resource use, and environmental protection." Unlike the highly
discretionary Organic Act and MUSYA, NFMA provides substantive and
procedural planning requirements, goals, and constraints on the agency,
including obligations for managing fish and wildlife." NFMA requires the
writing of land and resource management plans (LRMPs or forest plans) by
every national forest and grassland in the National Forest System (NFS)."
NFMA created a three-tiered regulatory approach to planning.4 At the
highest level, national-level NFMA regulations govern the development and
revision of second-tier forest plans." Forest plans typically make zoning and
suitability decisions, and limit and regulate various activities within a forest
area, therefore acting as a gateway through which subsequent project-level
proposals must pass .4 " Forest plans also include long-term goals and desired
460 Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1267-69; accord Am. Whitewater v. Tidwell, 959 F. Supp. 2d 839,
863 (D.S.C. 2013), affd, 770 F.3d 1108 (4th Cir. 2014); Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 816 F.3d 119, 128
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 301 (2016).
461 Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1268-69 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012)).
462 16 U.S.C. § 528.
463 Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 585, 593-94 (1987).
464 Bun4 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (upholding federal removal of deer from the Kaibab
National Forest to protect the forest from damage caused by overgrazing, despite objections
from the state).
465 16 U.S.C. § 1600.
466 See id. §§ 1603-1604; 36 C.F.R. § 219.1 (2016).
467 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
468 Id § 1604. For a more elaborate explanation of this tiered approach, see Citizens for
Better Forestry v US. Department ofAgriculture, 341 F.3d 961, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2003).
469 Citizens for BetterForestry 341 F.3d at 965 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)).
470 Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land-Use Planning and Its Impact on Resource Management
Decisions, in PUBLIC LAND LAw II (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found., Special Inst. 1997).
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conditions of the land and resources."' Site-specific projects make up the
third tier of planning.4m Any such proposed use of a national forest is subject
to the requirement in NFMA that "[r]esource plans and permits, contracts,
and other instruments for use and occupancy of National Forest System
lands shall be consistent with" the applicable forest plan.m Thus, to the
extent that states are subject to USFS authority, that authority must be
exercised in conformance with the provisions in the current forest plan.
i. NFMA and Wildlife
One of NFMA's most powerful provisions is its wildlife diversity
mandate.'" It requires that forest plans "provide for diversity of plant and
animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific
land area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives." According to
Wilkinson and Anderson's authoritative history of NFMA's development, the
diversity provision was meant to require "[USFS] planners to treat the
wildlife resource as a controlling, co-equal factor in forest management and,
in particular, as a substantive limitation on timber production.""
Regulations implementing NFMA address requirements for diversity in
greater detail.m If state wildlife management actions occur on national
forest lands they must be considered in this statutory and regulatory
context, and may be subject to preemption based on USFS's authority and
obligations for wildlife diversity.7
Most "first-generation" forest plans were written pursuant to the 1982
NFMA regulations. Those regulations required that "[f]ish and wildlife
habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native
and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area."4 9 While this
language emphasized management of habitat, the regulation also established
a minimum population threshold, at least in concept, by defining "viable
population" as "one which has the estimated numbers and distribution of
471 See generalyMichael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature ofLand and Resource
Management Planning Under the National Forest Management Act; 3 ENvrL. LAw. 149 (1996)
(discussing the various planning processes under NFMA); see also Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra
Club, 523 U.S. 726, 729 (1998) (describing the nature of forest plans).
472 Citizens forBetter Forestry 341 F.3d at 966.
473 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).
474 See generally Courtney A. Schultz et al., Wildlife Conservation Planning Under the
United States Forest Service's 2012 Planning Rule, 77 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 428 (2013) (exploring
the broad implications for wildlife management under the 2012 Planning Rule).
475 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
476 CHARLES F. WILINSON & H. MIcHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE
NATIONAL FORESTS 296 (1987).
477 See, e.g., National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg.
43,026, 43,050 (Sept. 30, 1982) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
478 See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (2016) (discussing the requirements for pursuing and
maintaining ecological diversity).
479 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. at 43,048
(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.19); see, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401,
1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying viability regulations to northern spotted owl).
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reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence is well distributed
in the planning area." m
Existing forest plans will be revised (many during the next decade) and
amended under new NFMA implementing procedures codified in the 2012
Planning Rule. 8' They include a different set of substantive requirements for
management of wildlife. For ESA-listed species, forest plan components
(e.g., desired future conditions, objectives, standards, and guidelines) must
provide the "ecological conditions necessary to[] contribute to" their
recovery.m For other at-risk species, referred to as species of conservation
concern (SCC), forest plan components must provide the "ecological
conditions necessary to ... maintain a viable population of each species of
conservation concern within the plan area." There is an exception for SCC
management: where population viability is beyond the authority of USFS or
capability of the land, USFS must coordinate to the extent practicable with
others having management authority over lands relevant to a larger
population.4 4
The 2012 Planning Rule defines "ecological conditions" to include
"habitat and other influences on species and the environment."m Other
influences include "human uses."' The Rule defines "viable population" as
"[a] population of a species that continues to persist over the long term with
sufficient distribution to be resilient and adaptable to stressors and likely
future environments."48 7 Like its predecessor, the 2012 Planning Rule thus
establishes population levels for at-risk species as a goal, which is to be
achieved by providing ecological conditions and regulating human uses.
Forest plans may be considered as "regulatory mechanisms," as defined
by the ESA, during the listing process and may be a basis for not listing a
species. Regulations of the United States Department of Agriculture
480 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. at 43,048
(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.19).
481 National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162 (Apr. 9, 2012).
482 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(b)(1).
483 Id. Agency planning policy requires that species identified by states as being at risk be
considered as potential SCC. U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK: LAND MANAGEMENT
PLANNING HANDBOOK § 1909.12 (2013).
484 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(b)(2).
45Id. § 219.19.
486 Id
487 Id. § 219.49.
488 See Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding forest plan direction was properly considered a valid regulatory mechanism for
providing protection for grizzly bears). The decision to list Canada lynx as a threatened species
was based largely on the lack of regulatory mechanisms in federal plans. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Contiguous U.S.
Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx and Related Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,052, 16,074
(Mar. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) ("Therefore, amendment of Forest Plans to
provide protection for lynx and lynx habitat is needed to conserve habitat for lynx and its prey
on Federal forest lands. Without such amendments, the species is threatened."). The decision to
not list the greater sage grouse was based largely on plans for federal lands that conserved the
species. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition to
[Vol. 47:797862
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(USDA) require USFS-and other USDA agencies-to "avoid actions which
may cause a species to become threatened or endangered."48e Under current
plans and policies, species identified as "sensitive" were so designated in
part to avoid their listing under the ESA,' and agency actions may not
create "significant trends towards federal listing.""' Current forest plans
must ensure that viable populations of sensitive species are maintained.N
The relationship of newly identified SCC and the ESA has not been as clearly
articulated, but their role in developing adequate forest plan regulatory
mechanisms should be similar.
When forest plans are amended or revised, they are also subject to the
substantive requirements of the ESA for listed species." This means that
they cannot jeopardize the continued existence of listed species,49 or
destroy or adversely modify any critical habitat that has been designated,
or result in prohibited incidental take. 4 9 Forest plans may also be viewed as
the primary means by which the agency is "carrying out programs for the
conservation of' listed species, in accordance with section 7(a)(1) of the
ESA.4 97
When it prepares forest plans under NFMA, USFS may include plan
components that govern activities affecting wildlife.4 ' These plan
components may include both desired ecological conditions and restrictions
List Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) as an Endangered or Threatened
Species, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,858, 59,858 (Oct. 2, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
489 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NO. 9500-004, DEPARTMENTAL REGULATION: FISH AND WILDLIFE
POLICY § 1(d) (2008), https://permacc/7T2X-FD7T.
490 U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL [FSM] § 2670.22(1) (2005).
491 Id § 2670.32(4).
492 Id. § 2672.41 (2009).
493 See, e.g, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1086-88 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 293 (2016).
494 See, eg, Res. Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding FWS
conditioned its "no jeopardy" conclusion on the USFS's continued adherence to grizzly bear
guidelines).
495 See Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1088 (reinitiation of consultation on forest plans required
after designation of critical habitat for Canada lynx).
496 Recently settled litigation involving the Superior National Forest Plan claimed that USFS
is responsible for the take of Canada lynx resulting from hunting and trapping on the national
forest. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 6, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Tidwell, No. 1:16-cv-01049-TSC (D.D.C. June 6, 2016).
497 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2016). The Preamble to the 2012 Planning Rule states that the
requirement to contribute to recovery, "will further the purposes of § 7(a)(1) of the ESA, by
actively contributing to threatened and endangered species recovery and maintaining or
restoring the ecosystems upon which they depend." National Forest System Land Management
Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162, 21,215 (Apr. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 219). The FWS
Handbook for consultation states that a programmatic review based on section 7(a)(1) is
appropriate for Federal agency planning and program management documents. U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR
CONDUCTING CONSULTATION AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED
SPEcIES ACT 1-1, 5-1 (1998), https://perma.cc/LN7H-HNNL.
498 See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg.
43,026, 43,044 (Sept. 30, 1982) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.11) (listing ecological factors as
a planning criteria).
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on activities that are likely to adversely affect these conditions." Such
restrictions could be applicable to state actions occurring in a national
forest.ss However, the 2012 Planning Rule states that plans do not
themselves regulate uses by the public, such as hunting and fishing.ul
i. Wildlife and Special Use Authoizadon
Several wildlife conflicts playing out in the national forests involve the
question of whether or not USFS should authorize a wildlife-focused action
by a nonfederal actor. For example, states may be engaged in introducing
new species on national forest lands, or limiting or removing species that are
undesirable from the state's perspective. Questions may arise about USFS's
role in these state actions and the applicability of federal law to them.
USFS implements forest plans by authorizing specific uses that promote
achievement of the desired outcomes, such as plant and animal diversity and
viable populations& It may also authorize activities that would not
necessarily promote these outcomes. This is often the case with requests
for special use authorizations by applicants for permits, which could include
state and local governments&4 A forest plan may include mandatory
requirements (e.g., standards or guidelines) applicable to the issuance of
such permits.
The objective of the USFS special uses program is to "[aluthorize and
manage special uses of National Forest System lands in a manner which
protects natural resources and public health and safety, consistent with
[forest plans]."50 Permits may be granted only if "[t]he proposed use cannot
reasonably be accommodated on non-National Forest System lands.""O
Almost all uses of NFS lands, improvements, and resources are
designated "special uses."5s Wildlife management activities on national
499 See id.
500 A conflict between a state action and NFMA's diversity requirement could possibly arise
where a state game species is considered at-risk by USFS. This is the case for bighorn sheep,
where the State of Wyoming passed a law authorizing removal of bighorn sheep if USFS were to
eliminate domestic sheep grazing. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 11-19-604(e) (2017); see also Idaho Wool
Growers Ass'n v. Vilsack, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1092 (D. Idaho 2014) (finding USFS's forest plan
"committed 'no clear error in judgment'" by reducing domestic sheep grazing in order to prevent
disease transmission to bighorn sheep), affd, 816 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2016).
501 36 C.F.R. § 219.2(b)(2) (2016). A forest plan direction to limit public uses must be
implemented by a closure order, pursuant to id. § 261.50, and may include special closures to
protect wildlife pursuant to id. § 261.53(a).
502 Id. § 219.9.
503 Id. § 219.9(b)(2).
504 Id. § 251.50(a).
505 Id. § 251.52.
506 FSM § 2702 (2011).
507 Id. § 2703.2(2)(b).
508 36 C.F.R. § 251.50(a), (e) (some uses are not considered "special uses" because they are
regulated by separate authorities); see also FSM § 2701.1 (listing the various authorities for
different kinds of special uses):
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forests by nonfederal parties would be considered special uses.5" Before
conducting a special use, individuals or entities must obtain a special use
authorization from the authorized officer, unless that requirement is waived
by regulation.5 0 There is no waiver provision that necessarily allows state
actions taken on NFS lands without a permit. A special use authorization is
normally not required for hunting or fishing.' However, USFS may manage
public recreation of any kind by issuing a closure order."'
i. Coordination with State and Local Governments
NFMA includes a requirement to coordinate with the land and resource
management planning processes of state and local governments in the
development of forest plans."' The 2012 Planning Rule requires review of the
planning and land use policies of state and local governments, consideration
of the objectives of these policies, and opportunities to reduce conflicts.5 14
However, it explicitly does not permit the responsible USFS official to
"conform the management to meet non-[USFS] objectives or policies." 1 5
The 2012 Planning Rule also requires the official responsible for forest
planning to "encourage States, counties, and other local governments to
seek cooperating agency status in the NEPA process for development,
amendment, or revision of a plan."1 ' The role of such cooperating agencies is
to assist in the environmental review process.' NEPA also includes a
requirement to "cooperate with State and local agencies to the fullest extent
possible to reduce duplication between NEPA and State and local
requirements."" In addition, NEPA documents must identify any
inconsistencies with state and local plans or laws, and "describe the extent
to which the agency would reconcile its proposed action with the plan or
5 36 C.F.R. § 251.50(a).
510 Id. § 251.50(c)-(e) (the requirement for a special use permit is waived for most
noncommercial recreational activities not involving a large organized group, most forms of
travel on NFS roads, uses with nominal effects, and uses regulated by a state agency or another
federal agency in a manner that adequately protects national forest lands and resources).
511 Id. § 251.50(c).
512 Id. § 261.50; see also id. § 261.70(a)(4) (among other reasons, closure orders are
authorized for the "[p]rotection of threatened, endangered, rare, unique, or vanishing species of
plants, animals, birds or fish, or special biological communities").
513 See NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (providing that, "as appropriate," forest plan
revisions should be "coordinated with the land and resource management planning processes of
State and local governments and other Federal agencies"); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(1)
(requiring NFMA officials to coordinate with the "equivalent and related planning efforts" of
Tribes, agencies, and state and local governments).
514 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(2).
515 Id § 219.4(b)(3); see, e.g, Letter from USDA Forest Serv., Intermountain Region, to Matt
Mead, Governor of Wyo. (Feb. 20, 2015) (on file with authors) (Bridger-Teton National Forest
refused to "adopt" a Wyoming plan for bighorn sheep, describing it only as "a valuable
framework").
516 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(1)(iv).
517 Id. § 219.4(a)-(b).
518 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.6,1506.2(b) (2016).
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law.""" There is no general NEPA requirement to coordinate decision-making
processes or for USFS decisions to be consistent with state plans.
In conclusion, although it is clear that USFS must coordinate the
development of LRMPs with tribal, state, and local governments, this
coordination requirement does not give such nonfederal entities equal
footing in managing NFS lands, nor does it require USFS to act and manage
NFS lands consistent with these nonfederal plans.
d US. Forest Service Cooperation in Wildlife Management
Federal regulations applicable to USFS require cooperation among
wildlife management agencies:
The Chief of [USFS], through the Regional Foresters and Forest
Supervisors, shall determine the extent to which national forests or portions
thereof may be devoted to wildlife protection in combination with other uses
and services of the national forests, and, in cooperation with the Fish and
Game Department or other constituted authority of the State concerned, he
will formulate plans for securing and maintaining desirable populations of
wildlife species, and he may enter into such general or specific cooperative
agreements with appropriate State officials as are necessary and desirable for
such purposes. Officials of [USFS] will cooperate with State game officials in
the planned and orderly removal in accordance with the requirements of State
laws of the crop of game, fish, fur-bearers, and other wildlife on national forest
lands. 2'
USFS directives provide additional coordination guidance.5 21 In
particular, they require development of a written Memorandum of
Understanding with each state involving policies or procedural matters.'
Hunting, fishing, and trapping on NFS lands are subject to state fish and
wildlife laws and regulations, unless those regulations conflict with federal
laws or they would permit activities that conflict with land and resource
management responsibilities of USFS or that are inconsistent with direction
in forest plans."' Memorandums with state fish and wildlife agencies must
519 Id. § 1506.2(d) ("To better integrate environmental impact statements into State or local
planning processes, statements shall discuss any inconsistency of a proposed action with any
approved State or local plan and laws (whether or not federally sanctioned). Where an
inconsistency exists, the statement should describe the extent to which the agency would
reconcile its proposed action with the plan or law.").
520 36 C.F.R. § 241.2.
521 See FSM § 2671.1 (2005).
522 Id. § 2611.1 (1990).
523 Id. § 2643.1 (1995); see, e.g, Meister v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 623 F.3d 363, 379-80 (6th Cir.
2010) (stating that it is not beyond USFS's authority to consider using a forest plan to prohibit
gun hunting in areas to be managed for non-motorized recreation); La. Sportsmen All. v. Vilsack,
984 F. Supp. 2d 600, 611 (W.D. La. 2013) (holding that a forest plan may prohibit hunting deer
with dogs to reduce conflicting uses), rev'd on other grounds, 583 F. App'x 379 (5th Cir. 2014);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-12-8176-PCT-SMM, 2013 WL 3335234,
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"recognize the role of [USFS] in cooperating in the development of State fish
and wildlife laws and regulations, especially those addressing hunting,
fishing, and trapping as they would apply to occupancy and use of National
Forest System lands.""'
"Introductions or stocking of species may be made to restore resources
following environmental changes, [and] to provide recreation opportunities
where reproduction is insufficient to meet demand."" Authority is also
provided to "restore locally extinct indigenous species, to recover
threatened and endangered species, and to introduce new species in
coordination with State and Federal agencies.",1 6 A prior joint agreement
with appropriate state fish and wildlife agencies is needed for any
introductions.5 2 7 "Such MOU's must document agreements on each fish and
wildlife translocation project and appropriate environmental
documentation.""' When stocking and reintroductions occur, USFS "has the
responsibility to prevent damage to resources occurring on [NFS] lands" and
comply with the ESA and Wilderness Act.5"
State cooperative agreements are found in MOUs that are appended to
the USFS Manual as regional supplements that pertain to the states found in
each region. For example, an MOU between Idaho and USFS commits USFS
to considering state goals when developing its forest plans."o It also
recognizes that special use permits may be needed for some state actions on
federal lands.' The MOU requires prior consultation (but not permission)
for use of chemicals and for transplants or introductions of wildlife or fish
"with sufficient lead time to permit joint field investigations regarding the
effects of such programs on National Forest System lands."`"' It also contains
a savings clause regarding state and federal authorities.
e. Special DesignatedAreas Managed by the US. Forest Service
The laws and regulations reviewed above generally apply throughout
the NFS, but the System also includes special areas, designated by Congress
or the President, that may include additional authority and direction for
*3 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2013) (determining that USFS has authority to regulate the use of lead bullets
to protect California condors), rev'd on other grounds, 640 F. App'x 617 (9th Cir. 2016).
524 FSM § 2643.
525 Id § 2640.3(3); see also Exec. Order No. 11,987, 3 C.F.R. § 116 (1977) (generally
restricting federal agencies from introducing exotic species to lands they administer and
encouraging the prevention of introductions by other levels of government and by private
citizens).
526 FSM § 2640.3. "The State has the responsibility to make the determination as to which
wildlife and fish species are native or indigenous." Id. § 2641.
527 Id §§ 2640.41-.42.
528 Id. § 2641.
529 Id
5 Id. § 1561.2(A)(3) (1994).
551 Id § 1561.2(A)(6)-(7).
532 Id. § 1561.2(B)(6)-(8).
53 Id § 1561.2(C)(12).
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managing wildlife. These include an assortment of USFS-administered
national recreation areas, conservation areas, and other specially designated
landscapes.5 These include national monuments that are established by the
President using the Antiquities Act.' A recent national monument
established on NFS lands (which also includes BLM lands) is the Sand to
Snow National Monument in Californiam President Obama's Proclamation
establishing the monument emphasizes the area's "remarkable species
richness that makes it one of the most biodiverse areas in southern
California," that it "is home to 12 federally listed threatened and endangered
animal species" and "frequented by over 240 species of birds," and that the
area's "intersection of mountains makes th[e] area a critical bridge for
wildlife traversing the high elevations of southern California's desert
landscape."a The Proclamation orders USFS and BLM to use "their
respective applicable legal authorities" to implement these wildlife-focused
purposes of the national monument and includes a savings clause stating
that the Proclamation does nothing "to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction
of the State of California, including its jurisdiction and authority with
respect to fish and wildlife management."'
5 Publc Lands Managed by the Bureau ofLand Management
a. Federal Land Polcy Management Act (1976)
Of most relevance to wildlife on public lands managed by BLM is the
Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976. FLPMA is considered to be
BLM's Organic Act because it consolidated and articulated the agency's
mission and management responsibilities.m Its full history is beyond the
purview of this Article, but it is commonly recognized that the Act was
designed, in part, to correct the agency's historic practice of prioritizing
livestock grazing and mining as the dominant uses of public lands.w In
FLPMA, Congress declared that fish and wildlife values were to be balanced
with other resources and uses of the public lands, and expressed a policy
that:
54 For a comprehensive listing of "special recreation and conservation overlays," see
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINs ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 946-47 (6th ed.
2007); NAT. RES. LAW CTR., PROTECTIVE DESIGNATIONS ON FEDERAL LANDS: CASE STUDIES OF
NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREAS, NATIONAL MONUMENTS, NATIONAL PARKS, NATIONAL RECREATION
AREAS, AND WILDERNESS AREAS 2 (2004); Martin Nie & Michael Fiebig, Managing the Nadonal
Forests Through Place-Based Legislation, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 15-23 (2010).
535 Antiquities Act of 1906, 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301-320303 (Supp. In 2016); see id. § 320301.
536 Proclamation No. 9396, 81 Fed. Reg. 8379 (Feb. 18, 2016).
537 Id. at 8380.
53 Id. at 8382-83.
539 See DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED: REMOVING LIVESTOCK FROM
PUBLIC LANDS TO CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERsIY 203 (1999); JAMES R. SILLEN, THE NATION'S
LARGEST LANDLORD: THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 102 (2009).
540 See DONAHUE, supra note 539, at 206-07; SKILLEN, supra note 539, at 102-03.
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[TIhe public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will
preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will
provide.food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that
will provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.54
FLPMA also codified a multiple-use mandate,' which is defined as
follows:
[T]he management of the public lands and their various resource values so that
they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future
needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the land for
some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to
provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to
changing needs and conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the
resources; a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into
account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and
nonrenewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range,
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife andfish, and natural scenic, scientific and
historical values; and harmonious and coordinated management of the various
resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and
the quality of the environment with consideration being given to the relative
values of the resources and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will
give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.
Three components of this definition are essential to understanding
BLM's multiile-use mandate. First, it means that some lands may be used for
less than all of the possible resources and values present in an area In fact,
some land may be used for only one resource or value. Second, "multiple
use" means that some lands may be used for purposes that do not return the
greatest profit to individuals, corporations, or federal, state, or local
governments. Third, the diverse resources for which BLM is given direction
to manage include "wildlife and fish," and not just fish and wildlife habitat
We return to this issue in Part IV.A.
Similar to other federal land laws, Congress recognized the national
interest in these public lands and wanted their management to be based on a
systematic inventory and an informed land use planning process. To this
end, FLPMA requires the preparation of resource management plans.5" In
preparing these plans, the agency must consider such things as the "present
and potential uses of the public lands[,] ... the relative scarcity of the values
involved," to "rely, to the extent it is available, on the inventory of the public
541 43U.S.C..§ 1701(a)(8).
5A Congress first codified a multiple-use management for BLM in the Classification and
Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1970) (omitted as obsolete in 1976).
5 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
5" Id. § 1712.
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lands, their resources, and others values," and "weigh long-term benefits to
the public against short-term benefits."M
As in the case of the national forests, the multiple-use mandate given to
BLM provides a great deal of agency discretion.' But this discretion is not
boundless. The agency violates FLPMA if it fails to "engage in any reasoned
or informed decisionmaking process" concerning the implementation of
multiple use." FLPMA's multiple-use mandate is also bounded by two
additional provisions of FLPMA 1) the requirement to avoid "permanent
impairment ... [to] the quality of the environment,"a and 2) the requirement
that the Secretary of Interior (and hence BLM) must "take any action
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands."a
i. Areas of Critical Environmental Concern
FLPMA requires BLM's land use planning process to "give priority to the
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern"
(ACECs).i As defined in FLPMA:
The term "areas of critical environmental concern" means areas within the
public lands where special management attention is required (when such areas
are developed or used or where no development is required) to protect and
prevent irreparable damage to important historic, cultural, or scenic values,
fish and wildlife resources or other natural systems or processes, or to protect
life and safety from natural hazards."'
This is a unique provision in federal land law. ACECs are often
designated because of the fish and wildlife values associated with them.M
Congress, in unambiguous fashion, ordered the agency to prioritize the
designation and protection of ACECs.m This means that BLM should be
giving ACECs priority for consideration in the planning process and extra
5S Id § 1712(c)(4)-(7).
546 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 (D. Nev. 1985),
affd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987).
547 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 140 Interior Dec. 85, 101 (IBLA 1997). For a more complete history
of this case and its implications for multiple use, see generally Joseph M. Feller, The Comb
Wash Case: The Rule of Law Comes to the Public Rangelands, 17 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L.
REV. 25 (1996).
54 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
549 Id § 1732(b). See generally Roger Flynn, -Daybreak on the Land: The Coming of Age of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 29 VT. L. REV. 815 (2005) (reviewing the
application of this provision as it relates to water, mining, and property rights).
550 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3).
551 Id § 1702(a) (emphasis added).
552 Karin P. Sheldon & Pamela Baldwin, Areas of Critical Environmental Concern: FLPMA 's
Unfulilled Conservation Mandate, 28 CoLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28
(2017).
553 Debra L. Donahue, Federal Rangeland Poicy: Perverting Law and Jeopardizing
Ecosystem Servces, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 299, 337-38 (2007).
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weight in decision making. As summarized in a recent study: "The
legislative history of FLPMA establishes Congress' clear intent to provide for
special protection of ACECs and to direct BLM to accord priority for that
protection over other multiple uses in the agency's inventory, land
designation and planning activities."as The study finds that such
prioritization has not taken place and recommends a number of steps be
taken to meet FLPMA's mandate. This includes "restor[ing] the visibility and
effectiveness of ACECs"-in BLM regulations, policy guidance, and budget
justifications-and providing them "the heightened level of protection
required by FLPMA."'
iA Bureau ofLand Management Regulation and PoHey
Three provisions are of particular importance to wildlife management
on public lands managed by BLM. The first is the "fundamentals of rangeland
health" regulation that requires standards and guidelines to be developed by
BLM, including those focused on wildlife habitatn7 The regulation requires
that "[h]abitats are, or are making significant progress toward being,
restored or maintained for Federal threatened and endangered species,
Federal proposed or candidate threatened and endangered species, and
other special status species."'
The second is found in the BLM Manual for management of "special
status species."as This policy was written pursuant to FLPMA, the ESA, and
other laws.6s BLM special status species are defined as: "(1) species listed or
proposed for listing under the [ESA], and (2) species requiring special
management consideration to promote their conservation and reduce the
likelihood and need for future listing under the ESA."' The objectives of the
policy are "[t]o conserve and/or recover ESA-listed species and the
ecosystems on which they depend so that ESA protections are no longer
needed for these species," and "[t]o initiate proactive conservation measures
that reduce or eliminate threats to Bureau sensitive species to minimize the
likelihood of and need for listing of these species under the ESA."as
Candidate species for ESA listing are included in BLM's sensitive species
category." Furthermore, BLM must address "Bureau sensitive species and
their habitats in land use plans and associated NEPA documents."" With
55 See id. (noting that Congress repeatedly emphasized the "priority" to be given to ACECs).
555 Sheldon & Baldwin, supra note 552, at 5.
556 Id. at 61, 63.
557 43 C.F.R § 4180.1 (2016).
558 Id. § 4180.1(d).
559 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., MANUAL TRANSMITTAL SHEET: 6840-SPECIAL STATUS SPECIES
MANAGEMENT (2008), https://permacc/ME8D-HBTM.
560 Id. § 6840.03.
561 Id § 6840.01.
562 Id. § 6840.02.
53 Id. § 6840.01; see also id at Glossary 5.
564 Id. § 6840.2Al(B).
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respect to implementation-level planning, BLM "should consider all site-
specific methods and procedures needed to bring species and their habitats
to the condition under which management under the Bureau sensitive
species policies would no longer be necessary.".
The third regulation pertains to the issuance of special recreation
permits. Wildlife is implicated when it is the object of a commercial or
competitive event.m BLM is obligated to regulate the use and occupancy of
public lands,"7 and its regulations and policy require special recreation
permits for "commercial use, organized group activities or events,
competitive use, and for use of special areas."as Discretion is provided to the
agency over whether to issue a permit based on the following factors:
(a) Conformance with laws and land use plans,as
(b) Public safety,
(c) Conflicts with other uses,
(d) Resource protection,
(e) The public interest served,
(f) Whether in the past [the applicant] complied with the terms of [the] permit
or other authorization from BLM and other agencies, and
(g) Such other information that BLM finds appropriate.5 0
BLM may also impose stipulations and conditions on the permit "to meet
management goals and objectives and to protect lands and resources and the
public interest. "5 7
565 Id
566 43 C.F.R. §2932.11 (2016) ("[Y]ou must obtain a Special Recreation Permit for
(1) Commercial use, including vending associated with recreational use; or (2) Competitive
use."); see also id. § 2932.14(b) ("Outfitters and guides providing services to hunters, trappers,
or anglers must obtain Special Recreation Permits from BLM. Competitive event operators and
organized groups may also need a Special Recreation Permit for these activities.").
567 FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
68 43 C.F.R. § 2931.2. A competitive use is defmed as "[a]ny organized, sanctioned, or
structured use, event, or activity on public land in which 2, or more contestants compete" and
either register, enter, or apply for the event and/or use a "predetermined course or area." Id
§ 2932.5. Commercial use means "recreational use of the public lands and related waters for
business or financial gain," and the activity, service, or use is commercial if "[a]ny person,
group, or organization makes or attempts to make a profit, receive money, amortize equipment,
or obtain goods or services, as compensation from participants in recreational activities
occurring on public lands led, sponsored, or organized by that person, group, or organization."
Id
569 Permits must be consistent with the applicable resource management plan for the area.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a); 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a).
570 43 C.F.R. § 2932.26.
571 Id. § 2932.41.
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b. The National Landscape Conservation System
BLM is also tasked with managing units within the National Landscape
Conservation System (NLCS).572 NLCS includes BLM-administered national
conservation areas (NCAs) and similar designations, national monuments,
and wilderness study areas, and provides direction, either through statute or
presidential proclamation, in how to manage individual units.'" It is beyond
the scope of this Article to review the full extent and diversity of the NLCS.
Importantly, however, most conservation areas and monuments managed by
BLM include special provisions, going beyond FLPMA, that pertain to
wildlife management and the biological values associated with the
designations. For example, a purpose declared by Congress in establishing
the Morley Nelson Snake River Birds of Prey NCA in Idaho is to "provide for
the conservation, protection, and enhancement of raptor populations and
habitats and the natural and environmental resources and values associated
therewith."" Many of these laws also include wildlife savings clauses, some
simply stating that nothing in the designation "shall be deemed to enlarge or
diminish the jurisdiction" of the state "with respect to fish and wildlife
management."' In 2009, Congress formally recognized and established the
NLCS and provided another wildlife-specific savings clause that would serve
as a backup if the enabling legislation was silent on the matter.57 6
c. Federal-State Interactions
FLPMA includes a provision encouraging the coordination and
consistency of federal and state land use plans:
[T]o the extent consistent with the laws governing the administration of the
public lands, coordinate the land use inventory, planning, and management
572 16 U.S.C. § 7202(c) (2012).
573 Id. § 7202(b). BLM manages roughly 4.1 million acres of NCAs and lands with similar
designations, and roughly 9.5 million acres of national monuments. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
NATIONAL LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION SYSTEM: NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREAS AND SIMILAR
DESIGNATIONS, https://perma.cc/XYV3-H4UZ (last updated Oct. 2016); BuREAu OF LAND MGMT.,
NATIONAL LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION SYSTEM: NATIONAL MONUMENTS, https://perma.cc/8F7Y-
6CNV (last updated Jan. 2017). Federal wilderness areas are also included in the NLCS, and we
address those areas in Part m.B.7.
574 16 U.S.C. § 460iii-2(a)(2).
575 E.g., Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg. 7359, 7361 (Jan. 22, 2001).
576 Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, 33, 36, 42, and 43 U.S.C.)
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or
responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident
wildlife under State law or regulations, including the regulation of hunting, fishing,
trapping and recreational shooting on public land managed by the Bureau of Land
Management. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as limiting access for hunting,
fishing, trapping, or recreational shooting."
16 U.S.C. § 7202(d)(2).
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activities of or for such lands with the land use planning and management
programs of other Federal departments and agencies and of the States and
local governments within which the lands are located .... In implementing this
directive, the Secretary shall, to the extent he finds practical, keep apprised of
State, local, and tribal land use plans; assure that consideration is given to
those State, local, and tribal plans that are germane in the development of land
use plans for public lands; assist in resolving, to the extent practical,
inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal Government plans, and shall
provide for meaningful public involvement of State and local government
officials, both elected and appointed, in the development of land use programs,
land use regulations, and land use decisions for public lands, including early
public notice of proposed decisions which may have a significant impact on
non-Federal lands. Such officials in each State are authorized to furnish advice
to the Secretary with respect to the development and revision of land use
plans, land use guidelines, land use rules, and land use regulations for the
public lands within such State and with respect to such other land use matters
as may be referred to them by him. Land use plans of the Secretary under this
section shall be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent
he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act."
This provision provides state governors the opportunity to advise BLM of
their positions on draft land use plans. BLM must consider this advice in so-
called "consistency reviews.""
In short, there are several engagement points for state and local
governments to participate in the land use planning process and multiple
responsibilities on the part of BLM to respond to state and local concerns.
But this entire process is conditioned on federal primacy: that priority be
given to federal law and purposes in the land use planning processes. We
return to this provision in Part IV.F, as we believe the
coordination/consistency provisions of FLPMA provide a constructive
opportunity for federal and state govermnents to plan for the management
and conservation of wildlife across political jurisdictions.
FLPMA's savings clause pertaining to wildlife provides additional
direction on federal-state interactions regarding wildlife management:
That nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary
concerned to require Federal permits to hunt and fish on public lands or on
lands in the National Forest System and adjacent waters or as enlarging or
diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for management of
fish and resident wildlife. However, the Secretary concerned may designate
areas of public land and of lands in the National Forest System where, and
establish periods when, no hunting or fishing will be permitted for reasons of
577 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2012) (emphasis added).
578 Resource Management Planning, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580, 89,666 (Dec. 12, 2016) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-3); see New Mexico exrel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
565 F.3d 683, 721 (10th Cir. 2009) ("A meaningful opportunity to comment is all the regulation
requires."); W. Expl., ILC v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. 3:15-cv-00491-MMD-VPC, 2017 WL
1237971, at *16 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2017) ("The statute and regulations are silent on how detailed
or specific BLM needs to be," and that BLM met its obligation to resolve inconsistencies
between local plans and federal sage grouse plans "to the extent practical.").
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public safety, administration, or comphance with provisions of appEcable law.
Except in emergencies, any regulations of the Secretary concerned relating to
hunting and fishing pursuant to this section shall be put into effect only after
consultation with the appropriate State fish and game department. Nothing in
this Act shall modify or change any provision of Federal law relating to
migratory birds or to endangered or threatened species.
This provision was at the center of a dispute involving a proposed wolf
hunt on federal lands by the State of Alaska. In Alaska v Andnis,u the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska found that this
provision of FLPMA, along with the multiple-use mandate, "taken together
clearly provide the Secretary with the power to halt the wolf hunt.""
Furthermore, said the court, under the power of "'[a]dministration,' the
Secretary is commanded to manage the public lands under principles of
multiple use [and m]ultiple use includes the management of wildlife."'
Although FLPMA grants authority to either permit or prohibit the wolf hunt,
this authority, in and of itself, did not trigger NEPA when the agency failed
to exercise it because there was no major federal action.su The NEPA
application question was at the heart of two circuit court reviews, both
affirming that the non-exercise of power by the Secretary did not trigger
NEPA, though the Ninth Circuit seemed to lament that it did "not reach the
intriguing questions of statutory construction and application that would
lurk in defining the Secretary's power to supersede the State in managing
wildlife."as We return to the questions unresolved by these courts in Part
IV.D.
The Department of the Interior sought to provide more guidance on
federal-state relationships through a policy statement in 1983.5r In essence,
Department of Interior's Policy simply recognizes some of the principles of
wildlife federalism that we covered in Parts II and LI.A of the Article, from
states as trustees of wildlife to federal constitutional powers to inanage
579 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (emphasis added).
580 429 F. Supp. 958 (D. Alaska 1977), affd, 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979).
581 Id. at 961-62.
582 Id at 962.
5 Id. at 963; see NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012); COGGINS & GucKSMAN, supra note 124,
§ 17:16 (noting that "[i]f federal and state projects are sufficiently interrelated to constitute a
single 'federal action' for NEPA purposes, state agencies may be enjoined for NEPA
violations").
5 Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537, 538 (9th Cir. 1979). The District of Columbia Circuit
reached the same conclusion regarding NEPA, but used language in dicta that was relatively
favorable to the state's authority to manage wildlife. See Defs. of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d
1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("We are simply unable to read [FLPMA's] cautious and limited
permission to intervene in an area of state responsibility and authority as imposing such
supervisory duties on the Secretary that each state action he fails to prevent becomes a 'Federal
action.'").
585 Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Policy; State-Federal Relationships, 48 Fed.
Reg. 11,642, 11,642 (Mar. 18, 1983) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 24). Although the Policy
appears in the C.F.R. "as a matter of convenience to the public," id., it was not subject to the
rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), and as
such does not carry the force of law. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
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wildlife. For example, the Policy states that "[flederal authority exists for
specified purposes while State authority regarding fish and resident wildlife
remains the comprehensive backdrop applicable in the absence of specific,
overriding Federal Law."a
The Policy goes further than these fundamental principles of
federalism, however, by stating that it is intended "to reaffirm the basic role
of the States in fish and resident wildlife management, especially where
States have primary authority and responsibility, and to foster improved
conservation of fish and wildlife."8' In other sections, the Policy recognizes
that "[s]tate jurisdiction remains concurrent with Federal authority,"a and
asserts that, in passing FLPMA, Congress "recognized and reaffirmed the
primary authority and responsibility of the States for management of fish
and resident wildlife on such lands."a While the Policy does acknowledge
basic constitutional principles pertaining to the Property Clause, Commerce
Clause, federal preemption, and treaty-making powers,m0 it also makes the
often-repeated assertion that BLM "has custody of the land itself and the
habitat upon which fish and resident wildlife are dependent" and that
"[m]anagement of the habitat is a responsibility of the Federal
Government," thereby implying that BLM only has power over the land and
not the wildlife that inhabit it.
In Part IV.C, we explain the fundamental problems with the Department
of Interior's Policy on federal-state relationships and discuss the
implications resulting from this problematic interpretation of law.
6. The Special Case ofAlaska .
a. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
Alaska presents a unique situation within the federal public lands
system. Alaska includes all of the same land categories and federal laws that
exist elsewhere in the country. However, federal land managers in Alaska
must also contend with the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act5 92 (ANILCA), which creates new land categories'93 and statutory
exceptionss that do not exist elsewhere, as well as an overarching system of
subsistence management which adds an additional management
586 43 C.F.R. § 24.1(a) (2016).
587 Id. § 24.2(a).
588 Id. § 24.3(c).
589 Id § 24.4(c).
590 Id. § 24.3.
591 Id. § 24.4(d).
592 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2012).
593 See, e.g, id § 3201 (establishing National Preserves, a subcategory of National Park
Lands on which sport hunting is permitted); id § 410hh-2.
594 Such as exceptions to the prohibitions laid out by the Wilderness Act. For instance, snow
machine use, which is banned as mechanized transport in every other state, is permitted in
Alaska Wilderness Areas where that use was established before the creation of the Wilderness
Area See id. § § 3121(a)-(b), 3170(a), 3171(a).
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mission/goal to nearly all federal lands in Alaska.m In Sturgeon v. fost4
the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged this unusual status, stating that
"ANILCA repeatedly recognizes that Alaska is different .... [And] ANILCA
itself accordingly carves out numerous Alaska-specific exceptions.""
i. Subsistence
It is the subsistence requirement that is the single biggest difference
between managing wildlife on federal lands in Alaska and managing them in
the rest of the country. ANILCA is the establishment legislation for nearly
every federal conservation unit in the state.tm This creates an opportunity for
uniformity in management strategy across agencies and conservation units
that could not exist elsewhere in the country where units were set aside in a
more haphazard manner. Taking advantage of that opportunity, ANILCA
establishes that subsistence shall be permitted on all federal lands with few
exceptionstm and creates a subsistence preference that applies to rural
Alaskans that grants them a priority position in relation to other
consumptive users of fish and game.m
Subsistence is defined by ANCILA as "the customary and traditional
uses by rural Alaska residents of wild, renewable resources for direct
personal or family consumption."6 More colloquially, it refers to rural
hunting, fishing, and gathering of resources for personal use.m When
ANILCA was originally passed, the intent of the statute was for the state to
administer the subsistence hunting program (like all other hunting
programs) on federal lands, and. merely required that the state abide by
ANILCA's requirements. It soon became clear, however, that the state
could not implement the rural subsistence preference because it violated the
state's constitutional requirement for equal access to fish and game,
according the Alaska Supreme Court.' Several efforts were made to amend
the Alaska constitution so that the state could reclaim authority over all
595 See generally id. §§ 3111-3126 (establishing the overarching system of subsistence
management under ANILCA).
596 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016).
597 Id. at 1070.
598 16 U.S.C. §§ 410hh-410hh-1; id. §§ 460mm-460mm-2; id. § 539; ANILCA, Pub. L. No. 96-
487, §§ 302-303, 94 Stat. 2371, 2385-93 (1980); id. §§ 601-603, 94 Stat. 2412-15; id. §§ 701-704, 94
Stat. 2371, 2417-19.
599 The exceptions are within the original boundaries of Denali National Park and Preserve
and Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve, which were both expanded by ANILCA. 16 U.S.C.
§ 410hh-1(1), (3)(a).
600 See id. § 3112(2) ("[Nlonwasteful subsistence uses of fish and wildlife and other
renewable resources shall be the priority consumptive uses of all such resources on the public
lands of Alaska.").
601 Id § 3113.
602 ANILCA states that "the situation in Alaska is unique in that, in most cases, no practical
alternative means are available to replace the food supplies and other items gathered from fish
and wildlife which supply rural residents dependent on subsistence uses." Id. § 3111(2).
60 Id. § 3115(d).
604 McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989).
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hunting,. but those attempts were never successful.m In 1990, the Federal
Subsistence Board, which mirrors the functions of the state's Board of
Game, was created, and the federal government began to assume control of
subsistence hunting on federal lands.i
ANILCA instructs the agencies to manage subsistence "consistent with
sound management principles, and the conservation of healthy populations
of fish and wildlife," and "consistent with management of fish and wildlife in
accordance with recognized scientific principles and the purposes for each
unit."a ANILCA also states that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed
as ... permitting the level of subsistence uses of fish and wildlife within a
conservation system unit to be inconsistent with the conservation of healthy
populations, and within a national park or monument to be inconsistent with
the conservation of natural and healthy populations, of fish and wildlife."'
So the management standard for all federal public lands is the requirement
to maintain healthy populations, but for national park lands, the requirement
is to maintain natural and healthy populations of wildlife. Agencies must
also evaluate the effect of all uses on public lands on subsistence uses and
needs, and formally notify subsistence users if there could be any effects on
subsistence harvests as a result of other uses.6w
ii Sport Hunting
Sport hunting (non-subsistence hunting) is permitted on most non-park
lands in Alaska and is managed largely through the state regulatory process,
as it is elsewhere in the United States.6 10 However, ANILCA creates a new
category of park lands called "Preserves" where sport hunting and
commercial trapping are permitted.6 ' The State of Alaska regulates sport
hunting statewide, including on federal lands."r' However, conflicts have
arisen between the state's hunting regulations, which express the state's
wildlife laws and goals, and the wildlife management goals expressed by
several federal statutes. For instance, the State of Alaska is required to
intensively manage wildlife populations in order to maximize a sustained
yield of desirable prey (e.g., moose, caribou, and deer). 13 This intensive
605 FRANK NORRIS, ALASKA SUBSISTENCE: A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT HISTORY
162-63 (2002).
606 Id. at 165; Kyle Joly, Sanford P. Rabinowitch & Julie Lurman Joly, Dual Management of
Wildlife in Alaska Malng Federal Practice Align with Federal Mandates, 32 GEORGE WRIGHT F.
18, 18 (2015).
607 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1).
60s Id § 3125(1).
609 Id. § 3120(a).
610 Id. § 3202(c).
611 Id. §§ 410hh-2, 3201; see Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64,325, 64,325 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 13).
612. Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,326.
613 ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2016).
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management requirement often leads to predator reduction efforts. 14 NPS on
the other hand is required to maintain natural and healthy populations of all
species according to ANILCA and "to conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wild life" according to the NPS Organic Act.""
NPS policies implementing the Organic Act require the agency to "protect
natural ecosystems and processes, including the natural abundances,
diversities, distributions, densities, age-class distributions, populations,
habitats, genetics, and behaviors of wildlife."6 1 6 These state and federal goals
are mutually exclusive."
In 2015, NPS promulgated new regulations restricting how the state's
sport hunting laws could apply within parks, so that they do not conflict
with NPS's legal obligations under the Organic Act and ANELCA.'1 The new
rules clarify that state wildlife regulations that conflict with NPS regulations
or laws are not applicable on NPS lands.' The Alaska Regional Park Service
Director will publish a list, at least annually, of all state-permitted activities
that are prohibited on NPS lands. 20
There has been a great deal of criticism of these rule changes. NPS's
effort has been characterized by the state as statutory overreach and a
violation of the public trust doctrine, 62' though both ANILCA and the Organic
Act recognize NPS's authority to regulate these activities.2
Once the NPS rules were successfully promulgated, FWS began a
similar rulemaking process. FWS's effort to follow a similar course was
initially marked by efforts to block the development of such rules on
national wildlife refuges,n though FWS's effort was eventually successful,
614 See Alaska- Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,326 ("In the
last several years, the State of Alaska has allowed an increasing number of liberalized methods
of hunting and trapping wildlife and extended seasons to increase opportunities to harvest
predator species.").
615 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (Supp. 112015) (previously codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1).
616 See Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,326 (citing
NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 375, § § 4.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.1.2, and 4.4.2).
617 Lurman & Rabinowitch, supra note 275, at 165.
618 Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,325. This rule
change has been followed by a similar rule change on National Wildlife Refuges. See infra notes
623-624 and accompanying text.
619 36 C.F.R. § 13.42(a), (f) (2016).
620 Id. § 13.42(f)(1).
621 See, e.g, Doug Vincent-Lang, Alaska Must Reject Feds' Claim to Control Hunting in
Preserves and Refuges, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (June 26, 2016), https://permacc/2F3L-VGYN.
Lang is the former director of Wildlife Conservation at the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game. Id
622 Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,329, 64,333.
623 Senator Sullivan (R. AK) submitted an amendment, which was ultimately never passed,
to the Bipartisan Sportsmen's Act of 2015 that would prohibit FWS from implementing
regulations restricting the application of state hunting rules on Refuge lands. Sam Friedman,
Sullivan Moves to Prohibit Federal Refuge Predator Hunt Rules, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER
(Jan. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/E7EA-WNY9.
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and the rules were promulgated.m Ultimately, in 2017, Congress-exercising
its authority under the Congressional Review ActS 2 5-abolished the FWS
regulations." Therefore, the FWS regulations are no longer in force (though
this elimination of the regulations does not speak in any way to their
legality), while the NPS regulations remain in place. Furthermore, while the
FWS regulations have been eliminated, the statutes animating them are still
in place. FWS still possesses the authority, and often the obligation, to
prevent the state from acting in ways contrary to federal mandates regarding
wildlife management on refuges, regardless of the status of these particular
regulations. As NPS states, "the State's responsibility [to manage fish and
wildlife] is not exclusive and it does not preclude federal regulation of
wildlife on federal public lands, as is well-established in the courts and
specifically stated in ANILCA"6 27
7 The National Wilderness Preservation System
a. The Policy and Objectives of the Wilderness Act
The Wilderness Act of 1964 expresses the following policy:
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by
expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify
all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands
designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition, it is
hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American
people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource
of wilderness. For this purpose there is hereby established a National
Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned areas
designated by Congress as "wilderness areas", and these shall be administered
for the use and eijoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave
them unimpaired for future use and ejoyment as wilderness62
The Act defines wildernessm and imposes a duty on the federal
agencies to administer designated areas for "preserving the wilderness
character."m In addition, Congress designated fifty-four areas managed by
USFS,uI detailed inventory procedures,"" prohibited a number of uses,m and
624 Non-Subsistence Take of Wildlife, and Public Participation and Closure Procedures, on
National Wildlife Refuges in Alaska, 81 Fed. Reg. 52,248 (Aug. 5, 2016) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pts. 32 and 36).
625 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012). The law authorizes Congress to review and repeal federal
agency regulations passed within the last sixty legislative days. Id. § 801(a)(3).
626 Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-20, 131 Stat. 86 (providing congressional disapproval).
627 Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,331.
628 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
629 Id. § 1131(c).
630 Id. § 1133(b).
631 Id § 1132(a); KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31447, WILDERNESS: OVERVIEW
AND STATISTICS (2015).
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adopted special provisions to clarify certain other uses.6 Sections of the Act
particularly relevant to managing wildlife in wilderness areas include the
definition of wilderness and the federal responsibility to preserve wilderness
character, the prohibited uses; and the congressionally authorized special
provisions that apply to managing wildlife in wilderness.
i Preserving Wilderness Character
Congress directed each federal agency managing a wilderness to
"preserve its wilderness character." To implement this requirement, the
four wilderness-managing agencies have endorsed the following definition of
wilderness character:
Wilderness character is a holistic concept based on the interaction of (1)
biophysical environments primarily free from modem human manipulation and
impact, (2) personal experiences in natural environments relatively free from
the encumbrances and signs of modem society, and (3) symbolic meanings of
humility, restraint, and interdependence that inspire human connection with
nature. Taken together, these tangible and intangible values define wilderness
character and distinguish wilderness from all other lands.w
Specifically, five qualities of wilderness character are identified in the
Act's definition of wilderness: untrammeled; natural; undeveloped; solitude
or primitive and unconfined recreation; and other features of value,
including ecological and scientific features3' We review each of these
qualities below.
Untrammeled In one of the most poetic passages found in the U.S.
Code, the Wilderness Act provides that "wilderness, in contrast with those
areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby
recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are
632 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b)-(d). BLM's authority to inventory for wilderness characteristics and
to manage areas designated by Congress was expressed in FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711, 1782
(2012).
63 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
6 Id. § 1133(d).
6 Id. § 1133(b).
636 PETER LANDRES ET AL., RMRS-GTR-340, KEEPING IT WILD 2: AN UPDATED INTERAGENCY
STRATEGY TO MONITOR TRENDS IN WILDERNESS CHARACTER ACROSS THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS
PRESERVATION SYSTEM 7 (2015) [hereinafter KIW2]; see Memorandum from Chair, Interagency
Wilderness Steering Committee to Chair, Interagency Wilderness Policy Council, Interagency
Wilderness Steering Committee's Keeping It Wild 2 Recommendations (Sep. 21, 2015)
(approved by the Wilderness Policy Council Dec. 23, 2015). Understanding the complex
meaning of the term "wilderness character" has been an ongoing task for the federal agencies
mandated to preserve it for over a decade. See PETER LANDRES ET AL., RMRS-GTR-212, KEEPING
IT WILD: AN INTERAGENCY STRATEGY TO MONITOR TRENDS IN WILDERNESS CHARACTER ACROSS THE
NATIONAL WILDERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTEM 5-7 (2008) [hereinafter KIWI; PETER LANDRES ET
AL., RMRS-GTR-151, MONITORING SELECTED CONDITIONS RELATED TO WILDERNESS CHARACTER: A
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK, at iii-iv, 4-6 (2005).
637 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
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untrammeled by man" that "generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature" and "retain[s] its primeval character and
influence."' Untrammeled means "essentially unhindered and free from the
intentional actions of modem human control or manipulation."a In terms of
wildlife management, this concept precludes intentional manipulation of
species, populations, and individuals (with the exception of casual,
noncommercial hunting and fishing, where allowed).Y 0 The Untrammeled
Quality is a unique requirement among federal land management legislation;
it is what puts the "wild" in "wilderness." When manipulation is necessary-
for instance, to comply with another law such as the ESA or to improve
another quality of wilderness character-action should be taken with the
utmost restraint and humility. '
Natural. The Act provides that wilderness is "protected and managed so
as to preserve its natural conditions.""' This means that ecological systems
within wilderness areas "are substantially free from the effects of modern
civilization."a In terms of wildlife management, wilderness ecosystems
should retain their native or indigenous species composition, distribution
patterns, and ecological processes, including predator-prey dynamics,
disturbance regimes, and abiotic and biotic fluctuations." These ecosystems
should be uncompromised by non-native species, or by artificially increased
(or decreased) populations of native species or other biophysical
conditions." While the Untrammeled Quality reflects the wilderness
character mandate to halt actions undertaken to consciously manipulate
"the earth and its community of life," the Natural Quality minimizes the
adverse ecological effects to a wilderness area from intentional or
unintentional actions, as well as the adverse effects from larger scale
ecological change occurring outside the wilderness-for example, the
spread of non-native species and habitat fragmentation."
Undeveloped The Wilderness Act also identifies wilderness as "an area
of undeveloped Federal land ... without permanent improvements or human
habitation," "where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.. . with the
imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable."" This means that
wilderness is unmarred by "the sights and sounds of modern human
occupation."w The Act's prohibition on "improvements" is not restricted to
those that are permanent, but includes any physical developments (e.g.,
638 Id.
639 KIW2, supra note 636, at 10-11.
640 See id at 104.
641 See Sandra B. Zellmer, Wilderness Imperatives and Untrammeled Nature, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CONTRASTING IDEAS OF NATURE: A CONSTRUCTrIVIST APPROACH 179, 184-
85 (Keith H. Hirokawa ed., 2014).
642 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
643 KIW2, supra note 636, at 11; see also id. at 39.
644 Id. at 41-43.
645 Id at 11.
646 Id. at 101, 109-10.
647 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
648 KIW2, supra note 636, at 11; see also id at 45-48.
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structures, installations, and both permanent and temporary roads) as well
as temporal developments (i.e., where the wilderness is "developed" for the
duration of the use of the prohibited tool, such as motor vehicles, motorized
equipment, and mechanical transport).' Again, restraint and humility are
key: "[In wilderness areas] we stand without our mechanisms that make us
immediate masters over our environment. "` The implications for wildlife
management are discussed in greater detail below.ml
Soltude or Primitive and Unconiined Recreation. Wilderness areas
provide "outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and
unconfined type of recreation." 652 This means that, in wilderness,
recreational opportunities occur "in an environment that is relatively free
from the encumbrances of modern society, and for the experience of the
benefits and inspiration derived from self-reliance, self-discovery, physical
and mental challenge, and freedom from societal obligations."a In terms of
wildlife management, recreational opportunities to enjoy wildlife (including
hunting and fishing) are allowed within the constraints of preserving
wilderness character as a whole-that is, without structures, installations,
the use of motorized equipment, motor vehicles, or mechanical transport,
and without manipulating populations for a more "desirable" (and less
natural) assemblage of species.
Other Features of Value. Finally, the Wilderness Act provides that
wilderness "may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of
scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value."a "This quality captures
important elements or 'features' of a particular wilderness that are not
[necessarily] covered by the other four qualities."m In terms of wildlife
management, the ecological and scientific values are key, and in most cases,
they are already addressed within the purview of the Natural Quality."
ii Within and Supplemental
Under section 4(a) of the Wilderness Act: "The purposes ... are hereby
declared to be within and supplemental to the purposes for which national
forests and units of the national park and national wildlife refuge systems
are established and administered."a As section 4(b) makes clear, however,
"each agency administering any area designated as wilderness shall be
responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area and shall so
administer such area for such other purposes for which it may have been
64 See 16U.S.C. § 1133(c).
650 Howard Zahniser, The Needfor WildernessAreas, 59 LIViNG WILDERNESs 37, 38 (1956).
651 See discussion infra Part UE.B.7.aiii.
652 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
653 KIW2, supra note 636, at 11-12; see also id at 51-55.
65 Id at 51, 78.
655 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
656 KIW2, supra note 636, at 12; see also id. at 57-60.
65 Id. at 39, 57-58.
658 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a).
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established as also to preserve its wilderness character."" For all four
agencies, upon designation as wilderness, the preservation of wilderness
character becomes the primary duty of the underlying unit,"e and
management of other purposes must meet the requirements of the
Wilderness Act in addition to the requirements of each agency's Organic
Act. 1
All four land management agencies struggle with this concept, but it has
been especially problematic for FWS and NPS, largely because many
employees of these two agencies believe that their conservation-oriented
purposes are equivalent to wilderness preservation.6 How these agencies
have addressed this problem is discussed below.m Implications and
continuing issues surrounding "within and supplemental" are discussed in
Part IV.E. The "within and supplemental" requirement crops up routinely
with respect to justifying uses explicitly prohibited by the Wilderness Act.6m
in. Prohibition of Certain Uses
Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act specifically prohibits ten uses."
These are all subject to two exceptions: "Except as specifically provided for
in this chapter, and subject to existing private rights."' Notably, there are no
"existing private rights" associated with the management of wildlife in
wilderness, and other specific provisions are discussed below.
7 Two of the
ten prohibited uses-commercial enterprise and permanent roads-are
subject only to these two exceptions (unless specifically authorized in
subsequent legislation).m The prohibition on commercial enterprises has
been a significant issue in wildlife management.
Commercial enterprise is defined as "a project or undertaking of or
relating to commerce."' Only three types of commercial activity may be
allowed in wilderness, as they are specifically provided for in the Act:
659 Id. § 1133(b) (emphasis added).
660 See Wilderness Watch v. Vilsack, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1182 (D. Idaho 2017) ("Congress
made preservation of wilderness values 'the primary duty of [USFS], and it must guide all
decisions as the first and foremost standard of review for any proposed action.'" (quoting
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Timchak, No. CV-06-04-E-BLW, 2006 WL 3386731, at *6 (D. Idaho
Nov. 21, 2006))), amendedbyNo. 4:16-CV-012-BLW, 2017 WL 3749441 (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2017).
661 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a).
662 See Sandra B. Zellmer, Wilderness Management in National Parks and Wildlife Refuges,
44 ENvTL. L. 497, 500 (2014) (analyzing wilderness management on dominant use lands).
6W5 See discussion infra Part Ill.B.7.c
664 See discussion infra Part IV.E.
665 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
666 Id
667 See discussion infra Part III.B.7.aiv.
68 Ross W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41649, WILDERNESS LAWs: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES 10-11 (2011).
669 See Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (7Tstemena Lake), 353 F.3d 1051, 1061,
1065 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating that commercial means "work that is intended for the
mass market" and "even non-profit entities may engage in commercial activity"), amended en
banc by360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004).
[Vol. 47:797884
DEBUNKING STATE SUPREMACY
livestock grazing,"' exercising certain mineral rights,"" and commercial
services. 67 ' Absent those three activities, no commercial enterprise can take
place in wilderness, and no wilderness resources can be removed for
financial gain, including animals or parts of animals such as antlers and
fur.6' Therefore, collection of wilderness wildlife resources may be allowed
only for personal use. Not only is it a violation of the Wilderness Act to
remove wilderness resources for financial gain, but also, no action may be
taken to enhance a commercial activity, even if the activity itself takes place
entirely outside the wilderness and even if it causes only "minimal intrusion
on wilderness values."6 74
Although commercial enterprises and permanent roads are tightly
proscribed by the Wilderness Act, the other eight prohibited uses-
temporary roads; use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment, and
motorboats; landing of aircraft; any other form of mechanical transport;
structures; and installations-are subject to an exception "as necessary to
meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the
purpose of this chapter."' This "minimum requirements" exception has
three components.
For the purpose of this Act As described above, the purpose of the
Wilderness Act, and congressional direction to the federal agencies on the
means of accomplishing that purpose, is to preserve wilderness character...
Unless necessary in the exercise of a legal right, or unless specifically
allowed elsewhere in the Wilderness Act (or other federal law), Congress
has made it clear that otherwise-prohibited uses cannot be authorized for
any purpose other than preserving wilderness character. 7
For the administration of the area Otherwise-prohibited uses cannot be
authorized to facilitate management objectives or activities occurring
outside of the wilderness area.' 8 Notably, in section 4(c), Congress clearly
670 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
671 Id. § 1133(d)(3).
672 Id. § 1133(d)(5); see supra notes 693-696 and accompanying text.
673 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., MANUAL TRANSMrrAL SHEET: 6340-MANAGEMENT OF
DESIGNATED WILDERNESS AREAS (PUBUC) § 1.6(C)(21)(C)(ix)(E) (2012), https://perna.cc/287T-
JA3V [hereinafter BLM MANUAL] ("Sale of wildlife products gathered from wilderness is
prohibited.").
674 Tustemena Lake, 353 F.3d at 1062, 1066-67 (prohibiting FWS approval of salmon
stocking within the Kenai Wilderness).
675 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
676 See discussion supra Part EI.B.7.ai.
677 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)-(c).
678 See High Point, LLLP v. Nat'l Park Serv., 850 F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding
that, just as a van filled with tourists could not "be construed as 'necessary' to meet the
'minimum requirements' for administering the area," neither could enlargement of a dock (a
prohibited structure) be construed as an "existing private right[]" given the narrow construction
applied to Wilderness Act exceptions (citing Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1092(11th Cir. 2004))); High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1134, 1137,
1144 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the repair, maintenance, and operation of dams in a
wilderness area to enhance downstream flows for fisheries and to preserve historical values
was not necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area as the
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referenced "the area";6 not, as the Act does elsewhere, the National
Wilderness Preservation System as a whole.m" In other words, prohibited
uses cannot be authorized in Wilderness A to preserve the wilderness
character of Wilderness B, unless they also preserve the wilderness
character of Wilderness A.
Necessary to meet minimum requirements. Defining the "minimum"
"necessary" is a work of art. One court cautioned that a generic finding of
necessity will not suffice, and while it declared that the agencies need not
"make a finding of 'absolute necessity,"'"' it offered no measure of exactly
how necessary is necessary enough to meet the statute's requirements when
coupled with the qualifier "minimuth."a To guide the agencies, the Arthur
Carhart National Wilderness Training Center (Carhart) has devised a two-
step process: first, managers must determine if any action is necessary to
address a problem of wilderness stewardship; if so, managers must then
determine what the least amount of an otherwise prohibited use is necessary
to accomplish the problem identified in the first step.' Though not
specifically required by the Act, Carhart's Minimum Requirements Decision
Guide is the most frequently used tool for making a minimum requirements
decision, and the two-step analysis process has become ubiquitous. i In any
event, the courts have made it clear that before the federal agency can
authorize one of these prohibited uses, it must explain why non-prohibited
uses would be insufficient to preserve the area's wilderness character.6
enhancement of fisheries was not necessary to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area).
679 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
680 See, e.g; id. § 1281(b) ("Any portion of a component of the national wild and scenic
rivers system that is within the national wilderness preservation system... shall be subject to
the provisions of both the Wilderness Act and this chapter.. . .").
681 Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (Kofa), 629 F.3d 1024, 1037 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
682 See id. at 1049 & n.9 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (arguing that the word "necessary" should be
construed broadly, as it has with respect to other legislation, but failing to recognize that none
of the other examples couples "necessity" with the Wilderness Act's qualifier "minimum").
683 See ARTHUR CARHART NAT'L WILDERNESS TRAINING CTR., MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
DECISION GUIDE: OVERVIEW 1, 3 (2016), https://permacc/XDH4-F6BP.
684 See, e.g, Director's Order No. 41, Jonathan Jarvis, Dir., Nat'l Park Serv., U.S. Dep't of
Interior, Wilderness Stewardship § 6.4 (May 13, 2013), https://permacc/5XKB-L9TJ (requiring
national parks to follow the two-step analysis process when completing the minimum
requirements analysis); ARTHUR CARHART NAT'L WILDERNESS TRAINING CTR., MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS DECISION GUIDE: U.S. FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES 1 (2008),
https://perma.cc/8YL6-S3V7 ("Use of the MRDG is not currently required by law or agency
policy .... However, use of the MRDG or a similar minimum requirements analysis (MRA)
process was strongly recommended by the chief in a 2000 memo."); BLM MANUAL, supra note
673, app. B-1 ("BLM will use the Minimum Requirements Decision Guide (MRDG) developed by
the Arthur Carhart National Wilderness Training Center."); FWS WILDERNESS POLICY, supra note
437, § 1.20 (requiring national wildlife refuge staff to attend a wilderness training at Carhart
before making minimum requirement decisions).
685 See Kofa, 629 F.3d at 1037-38 ("[T]he key question-whether water structures were
necessary at all-remains entirely unanswered and unexplained by the record .... [N]owhere in
the record does the Service explain why [conforming] actions, alone or in combination, are
insufficient ... ."); cf High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 2004)
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iv. Special Provisions
The Wilderness Act contains a number of "special provisions."' Three
of these are applicable to the management of wildlife in wilderness. One
special provision deals wholly with wildlife management, the so-called
savings clause: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the
jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife
and fish in the national forests."a As with similar savings clauses discussed
above, this provision retains federal jurisdiction over wildlife on federal
lands, while recognizing the traditional interest of the states with respect to
wildlife management insofar as consistent with Wilderness Act purposes.
Federal land managers cannot defer to state management prerogatives when
doing so would violate the express terms of the Wilderness Act,ns or
undermine the purposes of the Act.co0
The second relevant special provision involves pre-existing uses of
aircraft or motorboats. The Wilderness Act states "the use of aircraft or
motorboats, where these uses have already become established, may be
permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary ... deems
(construing the Wilderness Act's provision for commercial services "to the extent necessary for
activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the
areas," and holding that in order to invoke that exception, the agency must make a reasoned
finding of necessity (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5))).
686 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d).
68 Id. § 1133(d)(7). This provision was extended to BLM: "Once an area has been designated
for preservation as wilderness, the provisions of the Wilderness Act which apply to national
forest wilderness areas shall apply with respect to the administration and use of such
designated area." FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2012) (citation omitted).
88 See Lindsay Sain Jones, Note, The Problem with the Bureau of Land Management's
Delegation of Wildlife Managementin Wilderness, 47 GA L. REv. 1281, 1310 (2013) (stating that
the savings clause does not affect "the nature of the jurisdiction or responsibility of the states
with respect to wildlife on federal lands"; thus "the federal government's jurisdiction over
wildlife on federal lands remains intact"); ef Izaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F.
Supp. 698, 707 (D. Minn. 1973) (holding that, despite the general rule that the federal
government has no inherent police power and that zoning is a power of the states, state zoning
provisions were not applicable within a national forest wilderness area), rev'd on other grounds,
497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
689 See Kofa 629 F.3d at 1027, 1039-40 (invalidating a cooperative initiative with Arizona to
maintain water structures); Thstemena Lake, 353 F.3d 1051, 1066-67, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (prohibiting a salmon enhancement project as a prohibited "commercial enterprise" even
though the state had previously administered and maintained regulatory control over the
project), amended en banc by 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004); Californians for Alts. to Toxics v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 814 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (invalidating a joint federal-
state plan to restore cutthroat trout to its historic range in a wilderness area by eradicating non-
native trout with rotenone); TIgh Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122, 1137 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (holding that the repair, maintenance, and operation of dams in a wilderness area to
enhance fisheries was not necessary to meet minimum requirements and thus was prohibited
despite involvement and support of the California Department of Fish and Game).
690 See Wolf Recovery Found. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266, 1269-70 (D.
Idaho 2010) (affirming a decision to allow the Idaho Fish and Game Commission to use
helicopters to monitor wolves in the Frank Church Wilderness, but only because the activity
was "designed to aid the restoration of a specific aspect of the wilderness character of the
Frank Church Wilderness that had earlier been destroyed by man").
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desirable."a' Agency regulations and policy specify the conditions to allow
such uses and also limit the permissible locations to established sites to be
used by the public, rather than for any agency's administrative uses (such as
wildlife management), which is subject to the more liberal analysis of simply
meeting the "minimum necessary" test"2
Third, while commercial activity in wilderness is severely restricted,
commercial services are allowable "to the extent necessary for activities
which are proper for realizing .. . wilderness purposes."M In a series of cases
over outfitters in wilderness areas on the Inyo National Forest as well as the
Sequoia-Kings Canyon Wilderness, the courts have made it clear that "the
[federal] agency's primary responsibility is to protect the wilderness, not
cede to commercial needs."m Determining the "extent necessary" is
paramount: "[The] argument that [certain services] are not specifically
forbidden in the wilderness area confuses the absence of a specific
prohibition with the requirement of necessity; the fact that something is
otherwise 'legal' does not make it necessary."65 In allocating guiding permits,
the federal agency errs if it "elevate[s] recreational activity over the long-
term preservation of the wilderness character of the land."a
b. Subsequent Wilderness Legislation with Wildlife Provision?7
A common refrain from wilderness managers is that "the Act
designating my wilderness contains special direction on the management of
wildlife." In most cases, however, the precise language of any given piece of
691 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1); see also Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 799 F.
Supp. 2d 1172, 1176, 1181 (D. Nev. 2011) (holding that this exception supported BLM's
determination to allow police department to conduct search and rescue helicopter training
where aircraft use pre-dated designation as protected wilderness area); United States v. Gregg,
290 F. Supp. 706, 706-08 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (upholding conviction for an unauthorized landing
of an airplane in a wilderness, but noting that the Secretary could, by regulation, "create an
exception to this blanket prohibition at places where the use of aircraft was established before
the passage of the Act").
692 See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERv., HELICOPTER LANDINGS IN WILDERNESS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 2-3 (1997), https://perma.cc/BS2C-PGTU ("Established helicopter use was
for general public access, not helicopter access authorized by. .. law (such as ...
administrative use by [USFS] or other agencies)."); see also Memorandum from James Sippel,
Wilderness Planner, Bureau of Land Mgmt., to Robert Taylor, Assistant Field Manager for Natl
Landscape Conservation Sys., & Juan Palma, Las Vegas Field Manager (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file
with authors) (stating that this section of the Wilderness Act is "in reference to previously
existing landing strips used as fly-in trailheads" in relatively few wilderness areas).
693 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5).
694 High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042, 1047
(N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2004).
696 High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Weingardt, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(emphasis added) (noting the agency's conclusion "improperly equates 'preference' with
'need'").
696 Blackwell, 390 F.3d at 636, 647.
697 For a comprehensive analysis of wildlife management provisions in post-1964 wilderness
bills, see Federal Lands & Wildlife, supra note 3 (FAQs currently under construction).
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subsequent legislation makes no substantive difference in the
implementation of the Wilderness Act's provisions.68
As of 2017, Congress has designated 711 wilderness areas"" since the
original fifty-four were designated in 1964.7'0 Each subsequent bill contains
nearly identical "boilerplate" regarding administration of the area: "Subject
to valid existing rights, this wilderness area shall be administered by the
Secretary . .. in accordance with the Wilderness Act. "701
The first wilderness legislation to include extra special language7 2
specifically pertaining to wildlife was passed in 1972, with the establishment
of the Sawtooth National Recreation Area, including the Sawtooth
Wilderness.7' The relevant language of this extra special provision makes no
actual difference in wildlife management within the Sawtooth Wilderness.
In 1978, Congress started the custom of including not only the blanket
"boilerplate" direction,'7  but also repeating or rewording the Wilderness
Act's statement on wildlife jurisdiction and responsibilities. 6
698 See infra notes 707-708 and accompanying text.
699 National Widerness Preservation System Fact Sheet WILDERNESS CONNECT,
https://perma.cc/7EUS-4TBN (last updated June 27, 2017).
70 Shannon Meyer & Peter Landres, A Nadonal Wilderness Preservadon System Database,
INT'L J. WILDERNESS, April 2000, at 13, 13.
701 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-271, § 3, 82 Stat. 51, 52 (codified at 16 U.S.C.§ 1132 (2012)) ("The ... Wilderness shall be administered by the Secretary ... in accordance
with the provisions of the Wilderness Act governing areas designated by that Act as wilderness
areas, except that any reference in such provisions to the effective date of the Wilderness Act
shall be deemed to be a reference to the effective date of this Act."); Sawtooth National
Recreation Area and Jerry Peak Wilderness Additions Act, Pub. L. No. 114-46, § 102(a), 129 Stat.
477, 477 (2015) (similar); Big Sur Wilderness and Conservation Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-370,§ 3(a), 116 Stat. 3071, 3073 (similar). With minor variations, this wording is found in every
subsequent law designating wilderness.
702 We use the term "extra special language" to describe provisions other than those found
in the Special Provisions enumerated at 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) or other direction found in the
Wilderness Act of 1964.
703 Sawtooth National Recreation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 92-400, §§ 1(a), 8, 86 Stat. 612, 612,
614 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460aa-460aa-14).
704 See 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-7 (providing that hunting and fishing "shall" be permitted "within
the boundaries of the recreation area in accordance with applicable laws of the United States
and the State of Idaho, except that the Secretary may designate zones where, and establish
periods when, no hunting or fishing shall be permitted for reasons of public safety,
administration, or public use and enjoyment," after consultation with the State; the consultation
requirement is inapplicable in emergencies); id. § 460aa-1(b) ("The lands designated as the
Sawtooth Wilderness Area ... shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and the provisions of the Wilderness Act whichever is more restrictive . . . ." (citation
omitted)).
705 See supra note 701 and accompanying text (describing boilerplate language found in all
bills designating wilderness areas).
706 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, § 14, 92 Stat. 1649, 1657 ("Nothing in
this Act shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the State with
respect to fish and wildlife in the wilderness... ."); cf Clark County Conservation of Public
Land and Natural Resources Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-282, § 208(a), 116 Stat. 1994, 2005
(reasserting that nothing "affects or diminishes" state jurisdiction).
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Of the 139 laws designating wilderness since the passage of the 1964
Act,7 07 only four have extra special language that create minor effects in
wilderness stewardship of wildlife resources in those particular wilderness
areas,7 u and only one has extra special language affecting that particular
wilderness that is completely out of the norm of all other wilderness
legislation. That bill designated the Wovoka Wilderness and is embedded
within the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.'" The unique provisions of this law
are as confusing as they are astonishing, and so are given extended attention
here as an extreme outlier. On the one hand, the legislation states the
Wovoka "shall be administered by the Secretary in accordance with the
Wilderness Act"o and House Report 101-405 Appendix B.' The law then
adds: "The State, including a designee of the State, may conduct wildlife
management activities ... in accordance with the... 'Memorandum of
Understanding: Intermountain Region [USFS] and the Nevada Department of
Wildlife State of Nevada' and signed ... [in] 1984."' The legislation says
"may," retaining a measure of federal discretion. But the cited MOU, which
does not mention wilderness, contains contradictory direction and does not
conform to federal law: "[USFS] agrees [tlo recognize the Department [of
Wildlife of the State of Nevada] as the agency responsible for the
preservation and management of the wildlife resources in Nevada and for
determining the regulations under which fish and wildlife will be managed,
utilized, and protected."" There is no authority for a state to determine
federal regulations, and this provision is contradicted later in the document:
"[E]ach and every provision of the Memorandum is subject to the laws of the
State of Nevada, the laws of the United States, and the regulations of the
Secretary of Agriculture." 1 4 The MOU also defines "exotic" wildlife species
as "those species that do not or have not existed within the continental
United States within recorded historical times."" By this definition, any
707 Methodology for counting wilderness bills varies. Here, we count as a separate law bills
with their own public law number, separate titles within one public law, and separate sections
where the law refers to that section as a Wilderness Act.
708 See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, §§ 503, 506(b), 108 Stat
4471, 4490 (directing the Secretary to allow hunting in the Mojave National Preserve Wilderness,
which was created largely out of BLM lands where hunting was permitted);. North Cascades
National Park Service Complex Fish Stocking Act, Pub. L. No. 113-137, § 3, 128 Stat. 1741, 1741
(2014) (mandating fish stocking in the North Cascades NPS Complex); Endangered American
Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 40, 44 (directing the USFS to conduct
wildlife research in cooperation with the State of Idaho in the Gospel-Hump Wilderness); Lee
Metcalf Wilderness and Management Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-140, § 2(c), 97 Stat 901, 901-02
(limiting the use of motor vehicles for wildlife management in the Lee Metcalf Wilderness).
709 Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 3066(b)(1), 128 Stat. 3292, 3838 (2014) (codified in scattered
sections of 10, 16, 40, and 46 U.S.C.).
710 Id. § 3066(c)(1), 128 Stat. at 3839.
711 Id. § 3066(d)(2)(B)(ii), 128 Stat. at 3841; see H.R. REP. No. 101-405 (1990).
712 Id. § 3066(d)(5), 128 Stat. at 3842.
713 FSM § 1561.2 exhibit 3(A)(1) (1994).
714 Id. § 1561.2 exhibit 3(C)(16).
715 Id. § 1561.2 exhibit 3(B)(6)(1).
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species from anywhere in the world that is currently anywhere within the
continental United States is not exotic (and, according to the MOU, no
USFS-advanced approval is necessary for species within the continental
United States to be transplanted by the State).7 "' This conflicts with the
Executive Order defining exotic species as, "with respect to a particular
ecosystem, any species . .. that is not native to that ecosystem," and defining
a native species as, "with respect to a particular ecosystem, a species that,
other than as a result of an introduction, historically occurred or currently
occurs in that ecosystem." 17
Two other statutes are notable in that they contain language affecting
the management of wildlife in multiple wilderness areas. The first is
ANILCA, which contains far more extra special language on a variety of
issues than any other wilderness-designating language "in recognition of the
unique conditions in Alaska."7 1 Concerning wildlife, ANILCA provides that in
national forest wilderness areas the Secretary may allow activities and
facilities to enhance aquaculture "in a manner which adequately assures
protection, preservation, enhancement, and rehabilitation of the wilderness
resource."71 Other provisions dealing with wildlife center on allowable
public uses, rather than management actions per se. These include
construction of certain structures-with some Secretarial discretion-to
facilitate the taking of fish and wildlife,72 0 and public use of motor vehicles
for subsistence hunting.72 ' Additional analysis of the wildlife provisions in
ANILCA is found in Part m.B.6.
The other wilderness legislation with extra special language affecting
multiple areas is in Title I of the California Desert Protection Act of 1994,
which designated sixty-nine wilderness areas under the stewardship of
BLM.' Section 103(f) contains a unique provision: "Management activities to
maintain or restore fish and wildlife populations and ... habitats ... maybe
carried out ... and shall include the use of motorized vehicles by the
appropriate State agencies."7 2 4 The contradictory use of "shall" and "may"
caused considerable confusion in the offices tasked with stewardship of
716 See id. § 1561.2 exhibit 3(B)(6) (requiring Regional Forester approval "before
transplanting nonindigenous, Federally classified endangered or threatened or exotic[] wildlife
species" but not for all other species).
717 Exec. Order No. 13,112, 3 C.F.R. § 159 (2000) (emphasis added) (defining "alien" and
"native" species); see also Frequently Asked Question About Invasive Species, U.S. FISH &
WIIDLIFE SERV., https://perna.cc/A9YV-MRHT (last updated Nov. 20, 2012) ("Other terms
sometimes used for exotic species include 'non-native[]' 'non-indigenous,' and 'alien.'... These
definitions come from Executive Order 13112.").
718 16 U.S.C. § 3203(a) (2012).
719 Id. § 3203(b).
720 Id § 3204(a).
721 Id § 3121(b).
722 Id. §§ 410aaa-410aaa-83.
723 See, e.g, California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. Law No. 103-433, § 102(3), (55),
(61), 108 Stat. 4471, 4473, 4479-80 (designating, among others, the Bighorn Mountain
Wilderness, Rodman Mountains Wilderness, and Sheephole Valley Wilderness).
724 Id § 103(f), 108 Stat. at 4482 (emphasis added).
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these areas.mn Ultimately, BLM determined the correct interpretation of this
language is that "BLM continues to hold the ultimate responsibility for
managing any actions occurring with in [sic] the wilderness areas ... [and
w]hen BLM and [the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFG)]
cooperatively determine the need [for any access by CDFG] ... CDFG and
their volunteer organizations will be allowed to continue to use motor
vehicles to carry out these necessary activities."7 26
Another notable wilderness bill is the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of
1990,727 which was the first of many laws to direct wildlife management "in
accordance with appropriate policies and guidelines such as those set forth
in Appendix B of [House Report 101-405]."7 As discussed below, this House
Report is a verbatim transcript of the substantive portions of the 1986
International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (IAFWA)
agreement 7 and Congressional direction here contains two important
points: 1) management actions "may be carried out"-i.e., action is not
mandatory but discretionary; and 2) actions should be "consistent with
relevant wilderness management plans"-i.e., discretion to take action lies
with the federal land manager.? In short, except for aerial fish stocking,m'
the federal responsibility to manage wildlife in such a way as to preserve an
area's wilderness character was not changed.
Some more recent laws in Nevada and Idaho have lengthy sections on
wildlife management that affirm federal discretion, but (with one
exception)2 these sections change nothing of substance from the authority
found in the Wilderness Act itself2 The considerable confusion and
725 Memorandum from Ed Hartey, State Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., to Dist. Managers of
Bakersfield and Cent. Cal. Dist, Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Sept. 30, 1997), https://perma.cc/T4MU-
N2GT.
726 Id
727 Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460ddd).
728 Id. § 101(h), 104 Stat. at 4474; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-405 (1990).
729 See discussion infra Part I.B.7.d.
730 Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, § 101(h), 104 Stat. at 4474.
731 See U.S. FOREST SERV., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. & INT'L Ass'N OF FISH & WILDUFE
AGENCIES, APPENDIX I: PoLICIES AND GUIDELINES FOR FISH AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN
NATIONAL FOREST AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT WILDERNESS 1-8 to -9 (1986),
https://permacc/YE3K-8DEF [hereinafter IAFWA 1986 AGREEMENT]. Under the IAFWA 1986
Agreement "Aerial stocking of fish shall be permitted for those waters in wilderness where this
was an established practice before wilderness designation or where other practical means are
not available." Id. (emphasis added). While "[a]erial stocking requires approval by the
administering agency," agency discretion is limited in that such use of aircraft is exempted from
the "minimum necessary" requirement as discussed above in Part fIB.B.7.aiii. Id at 1-9.
732 See supra notes 709-717 and accompanying text (discussing the Wovoka Wilderness
legislation). We review extra special wildlife provisions in wilderness law in more detail in the
FAQs accompanying this Article. See Federal Lands & Wildlife, supra note 3 (FAQs currently
under construction).
733 See Clark County Conservation of Public Land and Natural Resources Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-282, § 208, 116 Stat. 1994 (2005); Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and
Development Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-424, § 209, 118 Stat. 2403, 2411-12; Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 329, 120 Stat. 2922, 3036-37; Omnibus Public
Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 1503(b)(8), 123 Stat. 991, 1035-36; Carl
Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,
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misinterpretation of these laws by federal managers, state employees, and
nongovernmental organizations is discussed in Part IV.E.
c. Agency Polcy
Each of the four agencies has developed policy measures to guide
wilderness managers. According to NPS's policy, both planning and
management activities "must ensure that wilderness character is likewise
preserved" within designated units of the National Park System.m4 It
provides: "The purpose of wilderness in the national parks includes the
preservation of wilderness character and wilderness resources in an
unimpaired condition and, in accordance with the Wilderness Act,
wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational,
scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical use."'37 "In
addition to managing these areas for the preservation of the physical
wilderness resources, planning for these areas must ensure that the
wilderness character is likewise preserved."7a
FWS's policy provides that, upon designation, wilderness character
becomes an additional purpose of any wilderness area within a refuge. More
specifically, the agency's policy states: "As we carry out individual refuge
establishing purpose(s), the Administration Act purposes, the Refuge System
mission and goals, and [FWS]'s mission in areas designated as wilderness,
we do so in a way that preserves wilderness character."m
For the National Forest System, USFS's policy states that "[w]ildlife and
fish management programs shall be consistent with wilderness values."'3 It
commits the agency to "[b]ase any [USFS] recommendation to State wildlife
and fish agencies on the need for protection and maintenance of the
wilderness resource"; m  "[p]rovide an environment where the forces of
natural selection and survival rather than human actions determine which
and what numbers of wildlife species will exist";4 and "[dliscourage
measures for direct control (other than normal harvest) of wildlife and fish
populations. "74' In addition, practical application of the USFS policies
reflects the Polcies and Guidelines for 1ish and Wildlife Management in
Pub. L. No. 113-291, §§ 3064(e), 3066(d), 128 Stat. 3292, 3831-32, 3841-42 (2014). For a section-
by-section analysis of these laws, see Federal Lands & Wldlife, supra note 3 (FAQs currently
under construction).
4 NPS MANAGEMENT POUCIES, supra note 375, §§ 6.1, 6.3.1.
735 Id. § 6.1.
736 Id. § 6.3.1.
737 FWS WILDERNESS PoucY, supra note 437, § 1.12(B).
.738FSM § 2323.32(2) (2006).
7 Id § 2323.32(1). This provision recognizes that states also have responsibilities for the
protection of wildlife in wilderness and calls for cooperative federalism in fish and wildlife
management Id.
740 Id. § 2323.31(1).
741 Id. § 2323.32(3).
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National Forest and Bureau of Land Management Wilderness developed with
AFWA." This document is discussed below.
BLM's wilderness policy was completely rewritten in 2012.143 Though
never explicitly stated, the wildlife section of this policy purposefully
adheres more closely to the IAFWA 1986 Agreement than the 2006
Agreement.'" Importantly, the 2012 BLM policy provides that "States have a
primary and critical role" rather than "the primary role" in wildlife
management,74 5 recognizing that the states' interests are not supreme, but
that either the states or the federal agency may initiate wildlife stewardship
proposals in wilderness. In addition, the policy plainly declares "[t]he
ultimate responsibility to preserve wilderness character rests with the BLM";
it emphasizes wilderness preservation and requires the use of the Carhart
Mirnmum Requirements Decision Guide for any wildlife management
action.'46 It also clarifies the prohibition on commercial use of wildlife.4
d Wilderness and the Association of Fish & Wildlife Agencies
While Congress has not substantially changed wildlife management in
wilderness with the recent legislation discussed above, for a little more than
a decade there have been significant efforts to do so through legally
questionable policy channels and nontransparent agreements between
federal agencies and IAFWA or AFWA (the Association changed names in
2006).
In 1986, USFS and BLM made a comprehensive revision of their
wilderness management directives with the cooperation of IAFWA.'" This
agreement consists of a statement of purpose, general sideboards for the
management of fish and wildlife in wilderness, and details regarding
specified actions that may or may not be taken in cooperation with the
states.749 It maintains federal control over decision-making processes,
742 See id § 2323.32(5) (citing U.S. FOREST SERV. ET AL., POLICIES AND GUIDELINES FOR FISH
AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL FOREST AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT WILDERNESS
(2006), https://perma.cc/M8MK-WDCY [hereinafter AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT]). For details on the
AFWA 2006 Agreement, see discussion infra Part l1.B.7.d.
743 BLM MANUAL, supra note 673 (superseding BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., MANUAL TRANSMITTAL
SHEET: 8560-MANAGEMENT OF DESIGNATED WILDERNESS AREAS).
744 See, eg, id. § 1.6(C)(21)(c)(v) (discussing chemical treatment of pesticides). Compare
AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742, at 6 (providing a less comprehensive policy and
guidelines for application of pesticides), with IAFWA 1986 AGREEMENT, supra note 731, at 1-6 to
-7 (providing a more comprehensive policy and guidelines for application of pesticides).
745 BLM MANUAL, supra note 673, § 1.6(C)(21)(b)(i) (emphasis added). This is a shift from
the misleading language of 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2016). See discussion infra Part IV.C.
746 BLM MANUAL, supra note 673, § 1.6(C)(21)(b)(ii)-(iii), app. B-1 (discussing application of
the ARTHUR CARHART NAT'L WILDERNESS TRAINING CTR., supra note 683).
747 Id. § 1.6(C)(21)(c)(ix)(E).
748 IAFWA 1986 AGREEMENT, supra note 731, at I-1.
749 Id at I-1 to -2. Fourteen specific action areas are listed: use of motorized equipment; fish
and wildlife research and management surveys; facility development and habitat alteration;
threatened and endangered species; angling, hunting, and trapping; population sampling;
chemical treatment; spawn taking; fish stocking; aerial fish stocking; transplanting wildlife;
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recognizes the responsibility afforded federal managers by the Wilderness
Act, and is guided by the following direction: "Fish and wildlife management
activities will emphasize the protection of natural processes ... [and] by the
principle of doing only the minimum necessary to manage the area as
wilderness."" As noted above, these guidelines were incorporated into
House Report 101-405 and referenced in several subsequent wilderness
bills.
Although USFS, BLM, and IAFWA "reaffirmed [their] mutual
commitment" to the 1986 Agreement in 199552 and again in 2002," the
agencies initiated a complete revision of the document and ultimately issued
a revamped "Policies and Guidelines" in 2 0 0 6 ." There were remarkable
changes between the 1986 Agreement and the 2006 Agreement." The
solicitor assigned to review the 2006 Agreement on behalf of the Department
of the Interior noted several problems with it, including significant
inconsistencies with federal law.7" At least one AFWA officer was
unconcerned: "[U.S. Department of the Interior] Solicitors balked but BLM
Director made the decision to sign. "
wildlife damage control; visitor management to protect wilderness wildlife resources; and
management of fire. Id. at 1-2 to -11.
750 Id. at I-1. The 1986 Agreement veers off course in one respect, found in the section on
aerial fish stocking: "Aerial stocking of fish shall be permitted for those waters in wilderness
where this was an established practice before wilderness designation or where other practical
means are not available." Id. at 1-8 to -9 (emphasis added).
751 See supra notes 710-712, 727-729 and accompanying text.
752 Memorandum from Jack Ward Thomas, Chief, U.S. Forest Serv., et al., to Reg'l Foresters
et al., Int'l Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies 1 (Feb. 23, 1995) (on file with authors).
753 Memorandum from Dale N. Bosworth, Chief, U.S. Forest Serv., et al., to State Gov't
Members of the Int'l Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies, et al. 1-2 (Aug. 9, 2002) (on file with
authors) (noting "the statutory endorsement. of the existing guidelines by the Arizona Desert
Wilderness Act").
754 AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742.
755 Compare IAFWA 1986 AGREEMENT, supra note 731, at 1-5 ("[S]uch actions [related to
threatened and endangered species] must be necessary for the perpetuation or recovery of the
species and it must be demonstrated that the actions cannot be done more effectively outside
wilderness."), with AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742, at 8-9 (omitting the language from
the IAFWA 1986 Agreement).
756 See Facsimile Transmission from Kris Clark, Div. of Land & Water Res., U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, to Dwight Fielder, Bureau of Land Mgmt., & Jeff Jarvis, Bureau of Land Mgmt. 1, 6-7
(Aug. 10, 2005) (on file with authors) ("[T]he handling of the 'minimum requirements' analysis
appears to conflict with the Wilderness Act .... [It] materially changes the meaning of the
provision [of section 4(c) in the Wilderness Act]," "[The Agreement fails to recognize that]
Federal law, including regulations and discretionary actions, preempt[s] state jurisdiction.");
see also e-mail from Kris Clark to E. Dwight Fielder, Chief, Div. of Fish, Wildlife & Plant
Conservation, Bureau of Land Mgmt. (June 22, 2006) (on file with authors) (explaining that
"decisions about federal agency management of wildlife in wilderness areas is not the
appropriate subject for negotiation with an outside group" and stating that the Agreement's
characterizations of the Wilderness Act "are misleading and in many cases incorrect").
757 E-mail from Gary J. Taylor, Legislative Dir., Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies, to Duane
Shroufe et al. (July 18, 2006) (on file with authors) (also noting "USDI Solicitors question[ed]
[the] legal status of AFWA being able to speak for the states. Whatever ... the important thing is
that it is signed." (omission in original)); see also id. (stating that the USFS Chief, BLM Director,
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A complete inventory of the changes is available elsewhere,' but
problematic additions or deletions include the following:
* Declaring that "State fish and wildlife management activities
that do not involve Wilderness Act prohibitions identified . . . in
Section 4(c) ... are generally exempt from authorizations by
the Federal administering agencies,"'" when in fact federal
requirements to preserve wilderness character go beyond
prohibiting section 4(c) uses and include prevention of any
action that may degrade an area's wildemess character (e.g.,
introducing a non-native species).7 0
* Giving states responsibility to determine whether wildlife and
fish species are indigenous, thereby possibly degrading the
Natural Quality of wilderness character.7 6' Associated with this
change is the deletion of the IAFWA 1986 Agreement
prohibition on stocking exotic fish.76
* Identifying any state plans and agreements as sufficient to
establish if an action is necessary in wildemess, when the
Wilderness Act states prohibited uses can be approved only to
manage the area for the purpose of the Act."
* Deleting a passage committing the agencies to being guided by
the principle of doing "only the minimum necessary to manage
the area as wildemess," and assigning authority for completing
the "minimum requirements" analysis in part to the states,M
when the Act unequivocally gives federal agencies the sole
responsibility to manage wildemess areas and preserve their
wildemess character.
* Analyzing implementation alternatives on the basis of impacts
to "the wilderness characteristics (naturalness, outstanding
and AFWA Executive Vice President "all agreed no fanfare, news release or anything
spotlighting it").
758 ARTHUR CARHART NAT'L WILDERNESS TRAINING CTR., POLICIES AND GUIDELINES FOR FISH
AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL FOREST AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
WILDERNESS: A COMPARISON OF THE 1986 IAFWA AND 2006 AFWA DOCUMENTS,
https://perma.cc/KR83-7CNK (last updated May 30, 2017).
759 AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742, at 5.
760 See discussion supra Part.m.B.7.ai
761 AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742, at 5.
762 See IAFWA 1986 AGREEMENT, supra note 731, at 1-8 ("Exotic species of fish shall not be
stocked.").
763 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012); AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742, at 5,
16.
764 See IAFWA 1986 Agreement, supra note 731, at 1 (containing the now-deleted language
about doing only the minimum necessary); AFWA 2006 Agreement, supra note 742, at 14 ("[Tlhe
intent of this attachment is to document the analysis process used by the BLM and [USFS], in
cooperation. with the State fish and wildlife agencies, to determine the 'minimum requirements'
for accomplishing fish and wildlife projects and activities within a wilderness area.").
765 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
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opportunities for solitude or primitive and unconfined
recreation, and other special features)," and omitting
consideration of other important impacts, in particular, to the
untrammeled quality and the undeveloped quality.`
These provisions, and other AFWA initiatives, reflect AFWA's
fundamental misunderstanding of the federal role in managing wildlife.
According to AFWA: "The state fish and wildlife agencies are responsible for
fish and wildlife management within their borders, even on most federal
public lands-including federal lands designated as Wilderness.""' While the
states have duties related to wildlife management, no statute grants them
authority in wilderness-or other federal lands-superior to the federal
agencies."
It is clear from the plain text of the Wilderness Act that Congress
intended the preservation of wilderness character as the primary purpose of
the Act. Congress was adamant that wilderness areas shall be "administered
for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will
leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness,"' and
that allowing otherwise prohibited uses to meet minimum necessary
requirements must be for the purpose of the Act,70 not for meeting "states'
abilities to accomplish big game harvest objectives.""' The misconception
that federal agencies should only utilize "[w]ilderness management planning
processes that support the state wildlife agencies and their wildlife
management responsibilities and goals" 2 is exactly backward. In
wilderness, state wildlife agencies should support-and cannot undermine-
the congressional mandate to preserve wilderness character. While the state
agencies may not be required to do so, the federal agencies must evaluate
any action that may degrade wilderness character and are required to deny
any action that does so.m
IV. ANALYsIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Federal Obligadon to Manage and Conserve Fsh and Wildlife on
Federal Lands
We begin our analysis by recognizing that federal land agencies have an
obligadon, and not just the discretion, to manage and conserve fish and
766 AFWA 2006 AGREEMENT, supra note 742, at 17.
767 John Kennedy, Speech at the National Wilderness Conference in Albuquerque, New
Mexico: Fish and Wildlife Management in Wilderness 2 (Oct. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Kennedy
Speech] (transcript on file with authors).
768 See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(3) ("Nothing in this chapter shall modify the statutory authority
under which units of the national park system are created.").
769. Id. § 1131(a) (emphasis added).
770 Id. § 1133(c).
771 Kennedy Speech, supra note 767, at 6.
772 Id at 11.
773 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
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wildlife on federal lands. Before explaining, it is important to first dispel the
common myth that "the states manage wildlife, federal land agencies only
manage wildlife habitat.""' We found this mantra repeated throughout our
study, and it was commonly invoked by state and federal agencies in
multiple cases and contexts.
The mantra has a long history and can be traced to the different sources
of federal and state powers regarding wildlife management. As discussed in
Part II.A, states claim ownership of wildlife and a commensurate public trust
duty to manage it in the public's interest. On the other hand, the Property
Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides federal land agencies with vast
plenary powers to manage public lands-and the wildlife thereon.77 5 Writing
in 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission noted that "[h]istorically,
the states have regulated the game population, and the Federal Government
has managed the habitat."7 '6 But the Commission also observed that,
"increasingly,... the line between the traditional functions has become
shadowy" because of the interplay between wildlife populations and
habitat.7 The Commission released its report prior to passage of the ESA,
NFMA, and FLPMA."7 7 And while these laws gave federal land agencies new
responsibilities to conserve at-risk species and manage wildlife, and not just
wildlife habitat, the "federal lands-habitat" refrain continued.
Part of the mantra's endurance is also due to the states' traditional role
in regulating hunting, fishing, and trapping. As discussed previously, FLPMA
and the Sikes Act include provisions related to hunting and fishing on public
lands administered by USFS and BLM, meaning that federal agencies most
often defer to the states when it comes to regulating the harvest of fish and
wildlife on federal lands.7 Congress has shown no interest in usurping this
traditional role of the states. However, wildlife management goes beyond
simply setting harvest levels and methods. Just because the federal
government has - traditionally deferred to the states in establishing
regulations pertaining to hunting, fishing, and trapping does not mean "the
states manage wildlife, and federal land agencies manage wildlife habitat."
We suspect that this non sequitur explains why the mantra has been so
rarely questioned in the past.
774 See, e.g, KIeppe, 426 U.S. 529, 534 n.4, 536-37 (1976) ("[The State of New Mexico]
contend[s] that the [Property] Clause grants Congress essentially two kinds of power (1) the
power to dispose of and make incidental rules regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the
power to protect federal property. According to [the State], the first power is not broad enough
to support legislation protecting wild animals that live on federal property; and the second
power is not implicated since the Act is designed to protect the animals, which are not
themselves federal property, and not the public lands.").
775 See id. at 546; Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1461.
776 Pus. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 158 (1970),
https://permace/7R834JWLF.
777 Id
778 See id. at iii (submitting the report in 1970). The ESA, NFMA, and FLPMA were passed in
1973, 1976, and 1976, respectively. See supra notes 87-88, 287 and accompanying text.
779 See supra notes 104-105, 579-582 and accompanying text.
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The mantra is wrong from a legal standpoint, limited from a biological
one, and problematically simplifies the complexity of wildlife-habitat
relationships. We take issue with the mantra because it invariably leads to
fragmented approaches to wildlife conservation and unproductive battles
over agency turf, and it often leads to an abdication of federal responsibility
over wildlife.
We begin with a review of the public land laws surveyed in Part ITI.B.
We then turn to the public trust and national interest in federal lands, and
finally to the biological and ecological concerns perpetuated by the wildlife-
habitat mantra.
1. Federal Land Laws Governing Wildlife Management
Part m.B makes clear that Congress directed all four federal land
management agencies to manage wildlife on federal lands and to not just
provide wildlife habitat. The ESA is a good starting point because the Act
and its regulations so clearly intertwine the fate of species and ecosystems.
The two are linked together under the law, and the statute mandates that all
federal land agencies utilize their authorities to effectuate the purposes of
the Act.' And the purpose of the Act, after all, is "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved." 8' Furthermore, the meaning of "harm,"
in the definition of "take" includes "significant habitat modification or
degradation."'" The ESA obligates federal agencies to conserve species and
to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of the listed species or
destroying critical habitat."
The ESA is also significant because of the role played by federal lands
in the conservation of listed and candidate species. The most recent
assessment, completed in 2008, measured the distribution of ESA-status
species (listed as endangered, threatened, or candidate) and species defined
by NatureServe as imperileda 4 It found that federal lands are significant
reservoirs of biodiversity7 " Lands managed by USFS and the Department of
Defense (DOD) stood out in terms of supporting the greatest number of
species with status under the ESA. Both agencies harbored about 23% of
species with ESA-status (at least 355 species for each agency), followed by
780 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2012); see supra note 311 and accompanying text.
781 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
782 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c)(3) (2016).
783 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)-(2).
78 Bruce A. Stein et al., Federal Lands and Endangered Species: The Role of Mifitary and
Other Federal Lands in Sustaining Biodivemsity 58 BIOSCIENCE 339, 341 (2008). NatureServe
provides independent conservation status assessments for extinction risks facing species in the
United States. Id at.340; About Us, NATURESERVE, https://permacc/K8TD-6J8R (last visited Nov.
11, 2017) ("[W]e collect decision-quality data about imperiled species and entire ecosystems,
transform that data into knowledge products and visualizations, and provide meaning through
expert analyses and support to guide decision-making, implement action, and enhance
conservation outcomes.").
785 Stein et al., supra note 784, at 346.
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NPS (19/6), FWS (18%), and BLM (16%).7" USFS also harbored the most
NatureServe-defined imperiled species: approximately 27% of the total (at
least 821 species). This was followed by BLM (20/) and DOD lands
(15%).
To put these percentages in context, consider the importance of
national forest lands to fish and wildlife more broadly:
The 193 million acres of the National Forest System support much of North
America's wildlife heritage, including: habitat for 430 federally listed
threatened and endangered species, six proposed species, and 60 candidate
species, with over 16 million acres and 22,000 miles of streams designated as
critical habitat for endangered species; approximately 80% of the elk, mountain
goat, and bighorn sheep habitat in the lower 48 States; nearly 28 million acres
of wild turkey habitat; approximately 70% of the Nation's remaining old growth
forests; over 5 million acres of waterfowl habitat; habitat for more than 250
species of migratory birds; habitat for more than 3,500 rare species; some of
the best remaining habitat for grizzly bear, lynx, and many reptile, amphibian
and rare plant species; over two million acres of lake and reservoir habitat; and
over two hundred thousand miles of fish-bearing streams and rivers.
Amongst federal land agencies, BLM has the "fewest ESA status
species" and "ranks second for number of imperiled species."'" Nonetheless,
over 245 ESA-listed species and at least another 31 candidate species are
found on BLM lands, and roughly 450 rare and listed plant and animal
species "are believed to occur only on BLM-managed lands."m' While private
and other landholdings are essential to biodiversity conservation, federal
lands will play an increasingly crucial role in the future.
The wildlife conservation mandates given to NPS and FWS are
unambiguous in the obligation to prioritize the conservation of fish and
wildlife. The National Park Service Organic Act makes the conservation of
786 Id. at 343 & fig.2.
787 Id
788 Id.
789 U.S. FOREST SERV., BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING RULE FOR FEDERALLY
LISTED ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES; SPECIES PROPOSED FOR FEDERAL LISTING; SPECIES
THAT ARE CANDIDATES FOR FEDERAL LISTING ON NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LANDS 17-18 (2011),
https://perma.cc/F4EP-4LQZ.
790 Stein et al., supra note 784, at 345.
791 Threatened and Endangered Species, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https*//perma.ce/2RYC-DFY2
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017); see Threatened and Endangered. . ., FLICKR, https://perma.cc/W65S-
3QD4 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (follow "Show more" hyperlink).
792 Stein and colleagues conclude that "[g]iven the current and projected pace of private
land development, we can expect that federal lands will assume greater importance for the
protection of our native species." Stein et al., supra note 784, at 346; see also U.S. FOREST SERV.,
FUTURE OF AMERICA'S FORESTS AND RANGELANDS: FOREST SERVICE 2010 RESOURCES PLANNING ACT
ASSESSMENT 11 (2012), https://perma.cc/ZDB2-TJUR (reviewing how development pressure on
nonpublic lands is affecting "the ability of those public lands to sustain important ecosystem
services and biodiversity"); The Disappearing West CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
https://perma.cc/RU3C-54L2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (discussing the loss of natural land due
to human development and the need for private, state, and federal conservation efforts).
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park resources, including wildlife, a primary management goal, and the
courts are consistent in their reading that conservation is to be prioritized
over facilitating public enjoyment.'" Furthermore, the enjoyment of park
resources and wildlife may only occur in "such manner and by such means
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."m
The wildlife conservation mandate is even more well defined for national
wildlife refuges. The 1997 Improvement Act prioritizes "the conservation of
fish, wildlife and plants, and their habitats within the System" and seeks to
"ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of
the System are maintained for the benefit of present and future generations
of Americans. " The laws governing national parks and wildlife refuges
make clear the obligation to conserve fish and wildlife and its habitat.
The wildlife-habitat mantra is most often invoked in the context of
USFS and BLM management."' But the multiple-use mandates given to both
agencies require that these lands be managed for fish and wildlife purposes,
with no distinction made between wildlife and wildlife habitat. 19 The
multiple-use mandates provide USFS and BLM considerable discretion, but
that does not mean that the agencies can arbitrarily opt out of managing fish
and wildlife where laws or regulations require such management.
NFMA provides a more substantive and enforceable mandate for USFS:
"[to] provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall
multiple-use objectives. "7 Land and Resource Management Plans, whether
written pursuant to the 1982 or 2012 NFMA regulations, must ensure the
viability of species in planning areas.7 9 The regulations differ in how the
viability requirement is defined, but both regulations emphasize the
importance of habitat or "ecological conditions" in meeting the diversity
mandate.so Yet the definitions of viability, in both sets of regulations, focus
on the population of species (e.g., their distribution, persistence, resilience,
etc.)."
FLPMA provides BLM with no wildlife diversity mandate, and it
possesses more discretion than other federal land agencies. But this
discretion is limited by FLPMA and its regulations.in Multiple use is defined
in the Act to include "wildlife and fish."a Though "habitat for fish and
wildlife and domestic animals" is referenced in FLPMA as well, the language
793 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
794 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (Supp. 1 2015).
795 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4) (2012).
796 See, e.g., Ileppe, 426 U.S. 529, 536-37 (1976) (invoking the wildlife mantra to challenge
federal jurisdiction over unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands
administered by USFS and BLM).
797 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1); FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012).
798 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
799 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(b) (2012); id. § 219.19 (1983).
80 Id. §§ 219.9(b), 219.19 (2012); id. § 219.19 (1983).
80 Id. § 219.19 (2012); id. (1983).
802 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c).
803 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(i) (2016).
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is embedded in a more inclusive section focused on the ecological and other
values for which public lands must be managed.an The Act also requires
BLM's land use planning process to "give priority to the designation and
protection of areas of critical environmental concern,"" and "to protect and
prevent irreparable damage" to the "fish and wildlife resources" found
within these areas.m Furthermore, whatever discretion BLM has regarding
wildlife conservation becomes much less relevant once a species found on
BLM lands is protected by the ESA.
2. The Public Trust and National Interest in Federal Lands
In addition to the statutory requirements summarized above, many of
these federal land- laws include trust-like language pertaining to the national
interest in federal lands, non-impairment, and intergenerational
responsibility that further clarifies the federal obligation to conserve
wildlife. The NPS Organic Act, for example, requires the conservation of
"scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life" therein and also requires
the provision for the enjoyment of the same "in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations."8" The mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System, as
provided by the Improvement Act, "is to administer a national network of
lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate,
restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within
the United States for the benefit of present and future generations of
Americans."a In the Wilderness Act, Congress secured "for the American
people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring
resource of wilderness."m Section 101 of NEPA expresses the federal
government's responsibility to use all practicable means to "fulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations."s1o Finally, the ESA includes similar language
pertaining to the multiple values of species "to the Nation and its people"
and the importance of "better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the
Nation's heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.""'
804 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
805 Id. § 1712(c)(3).
8W Id. § 1702(a).
807 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (Supp. I 2015).
808 National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2)
(2012); see also Robert L. Fischman & Robert S. Adamcik, Beyond Thust Species. The
Conservation Potential of the National Wildlife Refuge System in the Wake of Climate Change,
51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 6 (2011) (analyzing FWS's "variable and amorphous application of 'trust'
terminology and the doctrine that such terminology reflects").
809 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
810 NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (2012).
811 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a); see also Palila, 471 F. Supp. 985, 994 (D. Haw. 1979), affd on other
grounds, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). According to the court:
"It is also possible that Congress can assert a property interest in endangered species which is
superior to that of the state... . The importance of preserving such a national resource may be
of such magnitude as to rise to the level of a federal property interest." Palia, 471 F. Supp. at
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While the multiple-use statutes of USFS and BLM do not specifically
reference an intergenerational trust, it is implied in various provisions
pertaining to the national interest in federal lands and the command to not
impair them. MUSYA, for instance, requires USFS to manage multiple uses in
a combination "that will best meet the needs of the American people ...
without impairment of the productivity of the land."' NFMA speaks to "the
public interest" and serving "the national interest" in the renewable
resources program. 8 13 And finally, FLPMA similarly recognizes "the national
interest" in public lands and requires multiple-use management to "meet the
present and future needs of the American people" as well as "long-term
needs of future generations," and to do so "without permanent impairment
of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment."8 14 The
public trust is also acknowledged in Department of the Interior regulations
on intergovernmental cooperation in fish and wildlife management:
The Secretary of the Interior reaffirms that fish and wildlife must be
maintained for their ecological, cultural, educational, historical, aesthetic,
scientific, recreational, economic, and social values to the people of the United
States, and that these resources are held in public trust by the Federal and
State governments for the benefit of present and future generations of
Americans."
As the statutory language suggests, applying trust principles to lands as
varied as those found in the federal system is challenging. It is one thing, for
example, to find a trust duty for the national parks, but it becomes murkier
when thinking of the routine multiple-use decisions that must be made by
USFS and BLM, decisions that often involve the private use of public
resources. But even here, there is an understanding by the courts that such
private uses must be for "national and public purposes,""" and that anti-
monopoly restrictions impose a constraint on Congress in making decisions
about federal lands as a trust resource.8 " At least one prominent scholar
places federal public lands "at the outer reaches of the public trust
doctrine.""" This is in part because federal public land law is a field heavy
995 n.40. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation
of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act 34 ENVTL. L. 605 (2004) (analyzing the wildlife trust
doctrine).
812 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 531(a).
813 Id. § 1600(2)-(3).
814 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(2), (a)(7), 1702(c) (2012).
815 43 C.F.R. § 24.1(b) (2016).
816 Light 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
817 See Carnfeld, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) ("[The United States] would be recreant to its
duties as trustee for the people ... to permit any individual or private corporation to
monopolize them for private gain... ."); United.States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S.
160, 170 (1890) ("[Iin making regulations for disposing of [lands], Congress took no thought of
their pecuniary value, but, in the discharge of a high public duty and in the interest of the whole
country, sought to develop the material resources of the United States .....
818 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 269, 273 (1980).
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with statutes and regulations, leaving some to question the relevance of
applying a common law-based trust doctrine,8 and also because, in the
past, Congress has not hesitated to deploy its Property Clause powers to
privatize federal public lands and resources.82 0 But by the same token, when
it appears Congress has chosen to dispose of federal property, the Court has
demanded a clear expression of congressional intent."'
The issue of a federal trust duty has received vigorous judicial and
scholarly debate in recent years,8 2  but the courts have nonetheless
referenced a public trust duty in numerous federal land cases.? It is fair to
say that the federal public trust, like the Property Clause, "favors retention
of federal land in national ownership (retention), national over state and
local authority (nationalization), and environmental preservation
(conservation)," as a matter of constitutional common law."
Whether employed as an interpretive canon by the courts or a
conservation tool by the federal agencies, the federal public trust provides a
useful way of understanding the broad obligations of federal agencies to
819 See id at 276 ("The legislative matrix is sufficiently comprehensive that doubts can fairly
be raised as to whether there is room for a broad, common law doctrine to operate.").
820 See id. (explaining that the government "sold or . .. transferred away" its public lands to
allow settlement of the western United States and that "[n]o serious suggestion could be made
that private title to some 1.4 billion acres is clouded due to the United States' inability to convey
clear title"); LighI 220 U.S. at 537 (describing the federal public trust doctrine as applicable to
"[all the public lands of the nation [which] are held in trust for the people of the whole country"
but also stating that Congress had sole power to dispose of those lands).
821 See John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-17nst Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
1101, 1110 (2004) ("[T]he Court demands that Congress express itself more clearly when it
wants to dispose of federal lands than when it retains them."). Leshy places the Light opinion
within the burgeoning conservation thrust of 20th century cases. See id at 1120. Although the
Court remarked that Congress, when exercising its rights incident to proprietorship and
sovereignty, holds the power to "establish[] a forest reserve for what it decides to be national
and public purposes ... [or] disestablish a reserve," it in fact upheld federal authority to reserve
and protect its public lands from destruction by unregulated grazing. LiW4 220 U.S. at 537.
822 Much of the recent debate stems from a misinterpretation of PPL Montan, LLC v.
Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012). See, e.g, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1256, 1258
(D. Or. 2016) ("[A] close reading of PPL Montana reveals that it says nothing about the viability
of federal public trust claims."). For additional background, see Amicus Curiae Brief of Law
Professors in Support of Granting Writ of Certiorari at 3-8, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy,
135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (No. 14-496), 2014 WL 5841697, at *3-8 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]
(arguing the lower court misapplied PPL Montana). See generally Hope M. Babcock, Using the
Federal Public Tmst Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the Legal Systems Protecting Migradng Wildlife
from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB. L. REV. 649 (2017) (arguing the legal basis for a
federal version of the public trust doctrine); Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal
Publc 7Yust Doctrine: Misinteiprang Justee Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENvrL.
L. 399, 408-09 (2015) (discussing Justice Kennedy's comments in PPL Montana regarding the
public trust doctrine).
823 See Wilkinson, supra note 818, at 298 (identifying thirty-six court opinions describing
"the inland public lands as being held in trust"); Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1258-89 (applying
the public trust doctrine to the federal government as a fundamental attribute of sovereignty).
824 See Leshy, supra note 821, at 1101 (reviewing Property Clause powers); Juliana, 217 F.
Supp. 3d at 1260 ("[P]ublic trust rights both predated the Constitution and are secured by it").
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manage and conserve wildlife located on or integral to federal lands.8 We
are not suggesting that the trust doctrine will provide a precise guide or
formula that can be used by federal agencies to make complicated wildlife
decisions. Rather, it will require that federal agencies explicitly consider
their own trust obligations in decision-making processes and stop the
practice of reflexively acquiescing to state claims of wildlife authority.
The famous "Mono Lake decision" by the California Supreme Court
provides a constructive way of thinking about this obligation and what it
means in practice.83 6 There, the court had to reconcile two different systems
of legal thought-the prior appropriation doctrine and public trust doctrine
of Western water law-that were on a "collision course." 827 Though the court
did not dictate any "particular allocation" of water in the dispute, leaving
that decision to the water management agencies, it did make clear that there
is "an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning
and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever
feasible."a The public trust duty, said the court, "imposes a duty of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water."
In the case, the court asked state agencies to integrate two different
doctrines of law and corrected the State of California who "mistakenly
thought itself powerless to protect" trust resources.830 Federal agencies
similarly have statutory and trust obligations for federal lands and wildlife,
and these responsibilities must be factored into their decision-making
processes.
Another trust responsibility of relevance is that between the federal
government and Indian tribes. While we cannot give this complicated issue
full consideration, it is important to recognize yet another layer of trust
responsibilities found on federal lands. The federal government has a unique
trust responsibility to protect the rights, assets, and property of Indian
tribes.8 This trust responsibility extends to protecting those off-reservation
825 See Melissa K Scanlan, A Comparative Analysis of the Public Trust Doctrine for
Managing Water in the United States and India, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF WATER LAW AND
PoucY 23, 25 (Alistair Rieu-Clarke et al. eds., 2017) (describing the trust as a judicial
presumption that the state cannot privatize or substantially impair trust resources without a
clear statutory directives and findings); William D. Araiza, The Pubic Trust Doctrine as an
Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 693, 738 (2012) (characterizing the public trust
doctrine as "[a]n interpretive canon... that provides courts with a judicially manageable
method of vindicating the fundamental principle of public purpose in government management
of natural resources").
826 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 711-12 (Cal. 1983).
827 Id at 712.
828 Id. at 728, 732.
829 Id. at 728.
80 Id at 732.
831 "Though sovereign, Indian tribes are not foreign nations, but rather distinct political
communities 'that may more correctly perhaps be denominated domestic, dependent nations,'
whose 'relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.'" Martin Nie, The
Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use Designations to Protect Tibal Cultural
Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 595 (2008)
(quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831)). "A less paternalistic way of
thinking about this trust relationship" is cast in terms of property; "the federal government has a
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use rights that were reserved by tribes through treaties.m Hundreds of
treaties precede the creation of federal land agencies, and many of these
contain provisions that reserved rights on what is now federally managed
land.m These off-reservation treaty rights often include "hunting and fishing
rights, gathering rights, water rights, grazing rights, and subsistence
rights."m The trust responsibility to protect these rights is recognized by
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts.83
3. The Ecological Fallacy of Separating Wildlife from Habitat
The "states manage wildlife, federal land agencies manage habitat"
mantra is also problematic from a biological and wildlife management
perspective. This is because it creates a reductionist and oversimplified
dichotomy between wildlife and habitat. It is obvious that 1) land
management decisions made by federal agencies impact fish and wildlife
populations, and 2) the decisions made by state agencies about fish and
wildlife populations impact federal land and resources. Consider, for
example, the impact a federal oil and gas lease can have on a state-managed
mule deer population, or a state introducing non-native mountain goats to a
national forest and the impact this introduction will have to that forest's
alpine environment. Now, imagine in the latter case, USFS acquiescing to the
introduction of non-native mountain goats on the grounds that the agency
does not have authority over wildlife management and that it simply
manages habitat. In cases like this, the habitat mantra becomes an
abdication of federal responsibility over wildlife and its habitat.
duty to prevent harm to another sovereign's property." Id. (citing Mary Christina Wood, Indian
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Thst Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1471, 1503-04 (1994)).
832 Id .
833 See id at 585-86, 596 (discussing reserved treaty rights of Native Nations on federal
lands and approaches for protecting such rights).
83 Id at 597.
8 See Exec. Order 13,175, 3 C.F.R. § 304 (2000) ("The United States has a unique legal
relationship with Indian tribal governments as set forth in the Constitution of the United States,
treaties, statutes, Executive Orders, and court decisions. Since the formation of the Union, the
United States has recognized Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations under its protection.
The Federal Government has enacted numerous statutes and promulgated numerous
regulations that establish and define a trust relationship with Indian tribes."); Order No. 3335,
Sally Jewel, Sec'y of the Interior, Reaffirmation of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Federally
Recognized Indian Tribes and Individual Indian Beneficiaries § 3 (Aug. 20, 2014) (providing
background on the trust responsibility including a reviewof relevant statutes and case law).
USFS "recognizes the Federal Government has certain trust responsibilities and a unique legal
relationship with federally recognized Indian Tribes." 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(2) (2016); see also
U.S. FOREST SERV. HANDBOOK § 1509.13(11) (2016) (discussing consultation with Indian tribes);
Joint Secretarial Order No. 3206, Sec'y of the Interior & Sec'y of Commerce, American Indian
Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act § 1 (June 5,
1997), https://permaccUJ45L-UWXF ("This Order further acknowledges the trust responsibility
and treaty obligations of the United States toward Indian tribes and tribal members and its
government-to-government relationship in dealing with tribes.").
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The fields of wildlife biology and management recognize the complex
interplay between wildlife and habitat. For example, state wildlife agencies
often make clear in their educational and outreach materials that wildlife
management is habitat management.8 And a popular text views habitat
as a concept that is related to a particular species, and sometimes even to a
particular population, of plant or animal. Habitat, then, is an area with a
combination of resources (like food, cover, water) and environmental
conditions (temperature, precipitation, presence or absence of predators and
competitors) that promotes occupancy by individuals of a given species (or
population) and allows those individuals to survive and reproduce.8
What is wildlife? The authors propose a similarly inclusive definition
that includes "the full array of all biota present in an ecosystem as well as
their ecological functions."83r From here, the text goes on to analyze the
interconnections between wildlife and habitat, while noting the obvious:
"That vegetation plays, a central role in the life of many animals is self-
evident."" The authors, as do others in the field, call for managing wildlife in
this larger ecosystem context.w In some ways, the call differs little from
Aldo Leopold's views of "thinking like a mountain" and protecting the
integrity of biotic communities: "The land ethic simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively: the land."8"
B. State Wildlife Governance
1. State Ownership and the Wildlife 7rust
The common claim that "states own wildlife"-full stop-is incomplete,
misleading, and needlessly deepens divisions between federal and state
governments. The claim is especially dubious when states assert ownership
as a basis to challenge federal authority over wildlife on federal lands. As
8 See, eg, Mont. Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Fish & Wldife: Fsh Habita MoNTANA.Gov,
https://permacc/5QWH-7TKS (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) ("Habitat is the KEY to fish and wildlife
management in Montana.").
837 MICHAEL L. MORRISON ET AL, WILDLIFE-HABITAT RELATIONSHIPS: CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS 10 (3d ed. 2006).
83 Id at 380.
8 Id. at 43.
840 Id. at 12; see, e.g, Michael A. Huston, Introductory Essay: Criical Issues for Improving
Predictions, in PREDICTING SPECIES OCCURRENCES: ISSUES OF AccURACY AND SCALE 7, 7 (J.
Michael Scott et al. eds., 2002) (explaining that theories of "how certain processes are expected
to produce particular ecological patterns" are important "for the management and conservation
of natural resources, including endangered species and biodiversity"); BRENDA C. MCCOMB,
WILDLIFE HABITAT MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN FORESTRY 7 (2d. ed. 2016)
("[V]egetation management by forest-land managers is probably the greatest factor influencing
the abundance and distribution of animals in our forests today.").
841 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND
RIVER 137-41, 239 (1953).
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reviewed in Part IU.A, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected this argument
time and again. "To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed," ruled the Court in Missouri v. Holland " ' Decades later, in
Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court called such claims a "19th-century legal
fiction."w
The states are on firm ground when declaring a "sovereign ownership"
of wildlife that must be managed in the public interest. However, a more
accurate phrase is to say that states manage wildlife under a doctrine of
"sovereign trusteeship."8" In Part II, we highlighted trust-like language found
in state constitutions, statutes, and case law. The so-called "wildlife trust
doctrine" is essentially a branch of the public trust doctrine. It requires
governmental trustees to manage the corpus of the trust-in this case
wildlife-in the public interest and for the benefit of present and future
generations, who are the beneficiaries of the trustw But the development
and application of the wildlife trust is limited when contrasted to other trust
resources, such as navigable waterways, submerged lands, and public
access.w
While rejecting claims of state ownership, the Hughes Court makes
clear that there nevertheless remain "legitimate state concerns for
conservation and protection of wild animals" and that the states are not
"powerless to protect and conserve wild animal life within their borders." 7
The KIeppe Court also acknowledged that "States have broad trustee and
police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions." Although it did
not elaborate on these powers, the Court emphasized that they were
nevertheless subject to the constitutional powers and supremacy of the
federal government."9 Similarly, in Baldwin v. FYsh & Game Commission of
Montana, the Court remarked that "the State's control over wildlife is not
exclusive and absolute in the face of federal regulation."8" In Part iI.A, we
842 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
843 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979), overruling Geer, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
844 Mary Christina Wood, The hbal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying
Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populatons, 37 IDAHo L. REV. 1, 59
(2000).
845 See Juiana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016) ("[B]asic trust principles ... impose
upon the trustee a fiduciary duty to 'protect the trust property against damage or destruction.'
The trustee owes this duty equally to both current and future beneficiaries of the trust."
(citation omitted)).
846 See, e.g, Frank, supra note 15, at 678 ("[T]here has been precious little development of
public trust principles in the fish and wildlife context over the past three decades.... [T]he
reported decisions that do exist seem reluctant to apply public trust principles vigorously to
protect fish and wildlife resources."). But see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the
Western States'Publc Trust Doctrines Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward
an Ecological Public Yhst, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 84-86 (2010) (noting that California courts, for
example, have applied the public trust doctrine to wildlife).
84 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336, 338 (emphasis added).
848 Ileppe, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976).
849 Id.
850 Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978) ("Nor does a State's control over its resources preclude
the proper exercise of federal power."); see also Otter v. Jewel, 227 F. Supp. 3d 117, 124-26,
(D.D.C. 2017) (holding that sovereign ownership of wildlife based on a state statute did not
[Vol. 47:797908
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reviewed other cases where the courts struck down state wildlife laws-and
assertions of state ownership of wildlife-as being in violation of the U.S.
Constitution, thus clarifying that state powers over wildlife on federal lands
are qualified.
I The problem is that states seem to most frequently reference ownership
and a public trust in wildlife when declaring broad powers to manage it in
opposition to federal (or tribal) interests. In other words, states often claim
the powers of a trustee without the accompanying responsibilities."" The
public trust in wildlife raises a number of related questions. What are the
state's affirmative conservation duties under their trust obligations? What
must they refrain from doing? Does the doctrine apply to just game species
or to biological diversity more broadlyM2 Does it help resolve conflicts
amongst species and if so how? Does the doctrine extend to the protection
of wildlife habitat? How is the doctrine enforced and, in particular, do
private citizens-the beneficiaries of the trust-have the ability to challenge
state agencies to ensure protection of trust resources?' How can a state
exert its trust responsibilities for wildlife on federal lands when a state's
trust responsibility is limited to. the people of that state only, while federal
land and its resources are to be managed for the benefit of all Americans? It
is only when these and related questions are sufficiently answered by the
states that the term "sovereign ownership" can be used meaningfully&'
To summarize, unqualified proclamations that states own wildlife and
that the rights associated with ownership limit federal agencies from taking
actions to conserve wildlife and its habitat must be challenged. We
appreciate that the term "state ownership" is sometimes used as a shortcut
to express the trust principles on which it is based and to characterize the
state's substantial interest in conserving wildlife. But the term is too often
used by the states as a way to challenge federal authority-as if "ownership"
mean that management of sage grouse on federal lands by the federal government produced an
injury-in-fact for the purpose of state standing to challenge federal land management plans),
appealfiledsub nom., Otter v. Zinke, No. 17-5050 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2017).
851 See Homer, supra note 14, at 28 ("[S]tates have been quick to assert their 'rights' with
respect to public trust resources .... Unfortunately, their corresponding 'duties' have not been
as readily accepted.").
852 See, e.g., Jeremy T. Bruskotter et al., Rescuing Wolves from Politds Wildlife as a Publc
Trust Resource, 333 SCIENCE 1828, 1828-29 (2011) (arguing that states should utilize the public
trust doctrine to protect wildlife species in need of support); Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Alaskan
Wolf War The Puble Trust Doctrine Missing in Action, 15 ANmIAL L. 193, 197 (2009) ("The
public trust doctrine ... imposes a fiduciary duty on state government to protect and preserve
public resources.... [It] 'demands fair procedures, decisions that are justified, and results that
are consistent with protection and perpetuation of the resource.'").
8 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 603 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (affirming that the public has standing to challenge the state's management of
wildlife under the public trust doctrine).
854 Eric Freyfogle and Dale Goble summarize: "The problem with taking [wildlife] trust
language literally is that there is no trust document that sets forth the precise terms of the
trust." FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 292, at 33.. So far, they say, "courts have had little or no
occasion to struggle with these issues" and "[t]he duties states have and the limits they face in
managing wildlife remain largely undecided." Id. at 34; accon Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 5,
at 1471; Horner, supra note 14, at 27.
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provides them with more clout than "trust responsibility"-and it does little
to help solve conflict or find common ground with federal agencies.8
Further complicating matters is that the state's wildlife trust duty,
insofar as it is defined at all, is subject to the federal government's statutory
and trust obligations over federal lands. As we discussed above, courts have
found a trust responsibility for federal lands and integral resources.
Although its potential application and parameters remain ill-defined, the
cases tend to reinforce and strengthen federal powers over public lands, not
limit them.ss This is in stark contrast to cases addressing the state public
trust doctrine, which tend to restrict legislative and executive actions that
run counter to trust responsibilities.8" This is not to suggest, however, that
the doctrine cannot be used to impose limits and obligations on federal
agencies. The Redwood National Park litigation is the most well-known
example.8m In a series of cases involving the Park, national park statutes and
the public trust doctrine were invoked to require affirmative action be taken
to protect park resources from external threats posed by logging89 There
was, according to the court, an obligation to act: "any discretion vested in
the Secretary concerning time, place and specifics of the exercise of such
855 As summarized by the Tenth Circuit in the Wyoming National Elk Refuge dispute: "FWS's
apparent indifference to the State of Wyoming's problem and the State's insistence of a
'sovereign right' to manage wildlife on the [National Elk Refuge] do little to promote
'cooperative federalism.'" Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002).
856 See Julana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1253, 1260 (D. Or. 2016) (applying the public trust
doctrine to the federal government as a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, and finding that
"plaintiffs' public trust rights both predated the Constitution and are secured by it"); Eric
Pearson, The Public Thst Doctrine in Federal Law, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 173, 175
(2004) (noting that the trust doctrine "supplements federal power rather than restricts it");
Wilkinson, supra note 818, at 284 ("[T]he trust concept was used to reach results in favor of the
United States, that is, to create and reinforce federal powers."). But see MICHAEL C. BLUMM &
MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAw 305 (2d ed. 2015) (challenging the notion that the trust obligation does not
impose a restraint on federal land management and noting that these early cases never tested
the issue, as many of them centered on the federal government's ability to protect federal lands
from trespassers).
857 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-54 (invalidating a transfer of state trust
lands-submerged lands under Lake Michigan-to a private company); Robin Kundis Craig,
Adapting to Cmate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Pubbc Thtst Doctrines,
34 VT. L. REv. 781, 784 (2010) (discussing how "the classic statement of the American public
trust doctrine" provides limitations on the States' ability to alienate trust resources).
858 See Redwoods 1M 424 F. Supp. 172, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (finding that the Department of
the Interior had taken all the necessary steps required of it to protect Redwood National Park
under the Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79j (2012), and therefore was
discharged of its previous failure to perform duties required by law); Redwoods H, 398 F. Supp.
284, 287, 293-94 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (stating that there is a "general trust duty" to conserve and
provide for enjoyment of "scenery and natural and historic objects and wildlife ... in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired"), modified, Redwoods 117 424 F.
Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Redwoods 1, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93, 95-96 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (finding that
any discretion vested in the Secretary of Interior was subordinate to his obligations to.protect
the park under the public trust doctrine as "guardian of the people of [the] United States over
the public lands" and the Redwood National Park Act).
859 Redwoods lZT 424 F. Supp. at 172-73; Redwoods .iB 398 F. Supp. at 285; Redwoods 1, 376
F. Supp. at 93.
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powers is subordinate to his paramount legal duty imposed, not only under
his trust obligation but by the statute itself, to protect the park.tm
In moving forward, then, there would be value in attempting to
harmonize the multiple trust obligations found on federal lands. As a starting
place, the federal government must respond to state assertions of ownership
and a wildlife trust by making clear that it too has statutory and trust
obligations over federal lands, and they may extend to the conservation of
wildlife. In some cases, the implication may be that the federal interest in
wildlife preempts that of the states. But, in other cases when there are no
competing objectives, a more cooperative form of "co-trusteeship" is
possible. Mary Christina Wood uses this term to characterize the multiple
trust obligations-at the federal, state, and tribal levels-as they apply to the
interjurisdictional nature of salmon conservation and resource management
more generally." This co-trustee approach provides one way of refraining
what is too often an adversarial relationship between federal and state
governments. As Wood explains, the co-trustee framework creates mutual
rights to transboundary assets along with collective responsibilities for
conserving the resource.
2 Hunting and the North Amencan Model of Wildlife Conservation
Several conflicts examined as part of this project are partially driven by
the way in which wildlife is managed and funded at the state level. Many of
the cases reviewed as part of this research involve federal agency actions
that are perceived to be in conflict with the state's interest in promoting and
regulating fishing, hunting, and trapping. The Alaska cases provide the
clearest examples, as the State of Alaska views actions by NPS and FWS to
be in direct opposition to the state's mandate to intensively manage wildlife
population in order to maximize a sustained yield of prey species in order to
achieve high levels of human harvest.tm The wolf management cases in Idaho
860 Redwoods 1, 376 F. Supp. at 96.
861 Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Thst of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Fliture Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for
a Paradigm Shif4 39 ENvTL. L. 43, 84-85 (2009).
862 Id. at 85. Wood calls the approach a "sovereign cotenancy" over shared assets. Id. "A
cotenancy is a 'tenancy under more than one distinct title, but with unity of possession.'" Id She
cites, among other cases, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. US. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated sub nom., Washington v.
Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), where the Ninth
Circuit "invoked the cotenancy model to describe shared sovereign rights to migrating salmon."
Wood, supra note 861, at 85 & n.226. The most referenced case pertaining to co-trusteeship is
United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situatedin Boston, Suffolk, Massachusetts, 523 F. Supp. 120,
123-24 (D. Mass. 1981). See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 822, at 7 (reviewing the co-
trustee/cotenancy model and its application to wildlife and other resources); Wood, supra note
861, at 71 & n.149 (stating that the public trust doctrine is not only prevalent in litigation at state
level but applies with equal force to the federal government).
863 See, e.g, Alaska, 591 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing Alaska's challenge to the
Secretary of the Interior's decision "to close .. . federal lands to [a state-run] wolf-kill program,"
which had been "designed to relieve pressure upon the caribou herd").
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provide another example.8s In the Frank Church River of No Return
Wilderness, the State of Idaho undertook actions to protect elk from wolves
and did so in complete contravention of the Wilderness Act.8
In these cases, and others, those outside interests challenging federal
agency action/inaction on state wildlife management express a deep mistrust
in a state's willingness to protect nongame species and predators. Clearly,
some interests prefer federal management, or continued protection under
the ESA or federal land law, because they believe that most states prioritize
the management of fish and game and the revenue it produces through their
license-based funding systems.
This is one reason why it is important for the states to find a more
secure and predictable stream of funding for nongame management.
Increased funding for nongame species would build capacity at the state
level and help harmonize federal-state responsibilities over wildlife on
federal lands. It is also necessary to broaden the base of wildlife funding at
the state level. Doing so would bring states closer to the principles of
wildlife trust management. Jacobson and others get to the crux of the
matter:
According to the [public trust doctrine], wildlife is owned by no one and
held in trust for the benefit of all, but with the user pay-benefit model, those
who both derive direct benefits from wildlife and fund wildlife conservation
from user fees may believe they have the only legitimate voice in governance
of public wildlife conservation and management. Further, this model logically
encourages those who pay via licenses and permits for the privilege of using
wildlife to expect greater benefits than those who do not pay. This is a
potentially fatal, deeply rooted inconsistency between rhetoric and reality in
wildlife management in the United States, given the core premise of the [public
trust doctrine] that wildlife is a public resource and no single stakeholder
group should benefit from wildlife management more than others.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively address the.
North American Model of Wildlife Conservation. But, we were surprised to
find the Model referenced so often in the cases examined, as it is merely a
set of principles and is not based in law or regulation.8 7 Its frequent
invocation by AFWA and the states is problematic, from providing a
864 See, e.g, Wilderness Watch, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1174, 1182-83 (D. Idaho 2017) (finding
that USFS's approval of the efforts made by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game's (IDFG)
to collar elk violated NEPA and the Wilderness Act), amended by No. 4:16-CV-012-BLW, 2017
WL 3749441 (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2017); Maughan v. Vilsack, No. 4:14-CV-0007-EJL, 2014 WL
12605649, at *1-2 (D. Idaho July 25, 2014) (discussing plaintiffs' claim that a wolf trapping and
hunting program conducted by IDFG in a wilderness area violated NFMA, NEPA, the
Wilderness Act, and other federal laws).
865 Wilderness Watch, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 1174, 1182-83.
866 Cynthia A. Jacobson et al., A Conservation lbstitution for the 21st Centuy Imphcadons
for State Wildlife Agencies, 74 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 203, 205-06 (2010).
867 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47:797912
DEBUNKING STATE SUPREMACY 1
particularly narrow and hunting-centric view of conservation history to
asserting the power and authority of the states to regulate wildlife.w
First, the Model is often used to emphasize the importance of hunting,
hunter access, and the significance of license-based revenue for state
wildlife agencies.' This exacerbates the potential for intergovernmental
conflict by displaying an institutional bias toward game species and hunters,
primarily because of the role hunters play in funding state wildlife agencies.
Instead of building bridges between federal and state governments, the
Model is wielded to draw distinctions between federal and state priorities.
In addition, the Model further undermines the potential for cooperative
federalism by failing to include a principle focused on habitat and the role
played by federal lands in the conservation of wildlife. As detailed above,
federal lands and the habitat they provide are increasingly significant to
biodiversity." Any story of wildlife conservation failing to acknowledge the
contribution of federal lands-and the laws and regulations governing
them-is woefully incomplete.
Another problem is that while the Model has a principle regarding
wildlife as an international resource, it includes no such principle related to
intergovernmental cooperation within the United States."' This makes little
sense because of the transboundary and interjurisdictional nature of wildlife
conservation. Some proponents of the Model suggest that it "must be viewed
as a dynamic set of principles that can grow and evolve" and that its "future
rests to a high degree on the adaptability and application of its principles to
contemporary wildlife conservation needs."" If so, the Model must consider
more seriously how states can cooperate, as co-trustees, with federal and
tribal governments in the conservation of wildlife.
C The Department ofInterior's Polcy Statement on Federal-State
Relationships
In Part lIU.B.5.c, we reviewed the Interior Department's 1983 policy.
statement and regulations on federal-state relations in wildlife policy.
Although the Policy appears in the Code of Federal Regulations "as a matter
of convenience to the public,""" it was not subject to the rulemaking
868 See, e.g., Brief for the Ass'n of Fish & Wildlife Agencies as Arnicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 8, at 10 (referencing the Model to assert, "States have legal authority to
manage fish and wildlife within their borders, except for federally protected species"); see also
discussion supra Part II.C (providing examples of the Model's role in various cases).
86 See, e.g., Kennedy Speech, supra note 767, at 1, 6 (invoking the Model, on behalf of the
Wyoming Game and Fish Department and AFWA's State-Federal Relations Committee, to,
criticize management of federal wilderness areas because of restrictions on types of hunter use
and access).
870 See supra notes 784-788 and accompanying text.
871 ORGAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 19.
872 Id. at 29.
873 Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Policy; State-Federal Relationships, 48 Fed.
Reg. 11,642, 11,642 (Mar. 18,1983) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 24).
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requirements of the Administrative Procedure Acte- (APA)," and as such
does not carry the force of law. 7 ' Despite its lack of weight, the Policy-
which is not a bona fide regulation-was referenced in several of the cases
we examined as part of this research and is frequently cited by agency
officials. 77
Most of the provisions reiterate basic principles of federalism as
applied to wildlife management on federal lands with references to the
Property, Commerce, Treaty, and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. 8 The Policy also provides that fish and wildlife "are held in
public trust by the Federal and State governments for the benefit of present
and future generations of Americans." 7 9 It makes clear that "Congress may
choose to preempt State management of fish and wildlife on Federal lands,"
but then asserts that Congress nonetheless "reaffirmed the basic
responsibility and authority of the States to manage fish and resident wildlife
on Federal lands."o
The most plausible construction of this language is that the states
manage wildlife (including regulating hunting, fishing, and trapping) up to
the point where the federal government determines that state-regulated
activities conflict with federal law and regulation. This construction
comports with our review of the case law in Part l.A, which expresses the
vast constitutional powers held by Congress to conserve wildlife on federal
lands.
A separate provision of the Department of Interior's Policy muddies the
water, however, by purporting to "reaffirm the basic role of the States in fish
and resident wildlife management, especially where States have primary
authority and responsibility, and to foster improved conservation of fish and
wildlife."88' The word "primary" is not defined, and it is used in an
inconsistent fashion throughout the Policy.' Moreover, it is not clear
"where" (or when) states have such "primary" authority. In one section, the
Policy refers to state wildlife authority as providing a "comprehensive
backdrop applicable in the absence of specific, overriding Federal Jaw."m
When placed in context, however, it becomes clear that this provision is
merely another type of savings clause, recognizing state authority and
874 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012).
875 Id. § 553.
876 Christensen, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
877 See, e.g, Final Appropriate Refuge Uses Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge
System Improvement Act of 1997, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,408, 36,410 (June 26, 2006); N.M. Dep't of
Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1243 (2017).
878 43 C.F.R. § 24.3(a) (2016).
879 Id. § 24.1(b).
880 Id. § 24.3(a)-(b).
881 Id § 24.2(a).
882 Compare id. ("This policy is intended to reaffirm the basic role of the States in fish and
resident wildlife management, especially where States have primary authority and
responsibility. . . ."), with id. § 24.4(c) ("Congress in the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act . .. reaffirmed the primary authority and responsibility of the States for management of fish
and resident wildlife on such lands.").
883 Id. § 24.1(a) (emphasis added).
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responsibility where appropriate under existing law, and where appropriate
to achieve the objective of "improved conservation of fish and wildlife."'
The Policy is more problematic with respect to lands managed by BLM,
where it asserts, without citing any specific statutory provision, that FLPMA
"explicitly recognized and reaffirmed the primary authority and
responsibility of the States for management of fish and resident wildlife on
such lands.""" The problem is that FLPMA did no such thing. The word
"primary" is not used in the statute nor is it implied.m And, the regulations
cannot "reaffirm" a principle of federalism that does not exist today and did
not exist at the time of FLPMA's enactment? Furthermore, as we discuss in
Part III.B.5.c, FLPMA's savings clause does nothing to enlarge or diminish
state responsibilities for wildlife management on federal lands, and it
explicitly reserves to the Secretary of Interior the authority to prohibit
hunting and fishing for reasons of public safety, administration, and
compliance with applicable laws8m
The Department of Interior's Policy on federal-state relations,
particularly for BLM lands, represents an erroneous interpretation of the
law. In its entirety, as currently written, the Policy is internally inconsistent,
easily misconstrued, and provides little practical guidance because it does
not sort through the fundamental tensions involved in managing wildlife on
federal lands. To the extent it attempts to provide guidance, it is confusing
and, in some passages, plainly contrary to law.8m Although it is fair to say
that states may manage wildlife on federal lands unless state management
strategies or measures conflict with federal prerogatives, neither BLM nor
84 Id. § 24.2(a).
88 Id. § 24.4(c).
886 Confusing matters even further, in another section of the same provision, the
Department of the Interior acknowledges its responsibility for multiple-use management as
defined in FLPMA, "including fish and wildlife conservation." Id. (emphasis added).
887 Much of what eventually became FLPMA can be traced to the work of the Public Lands
Law Review Commission whose recommendations were published as One Third of the Nation 's
Land in 1970. See generally PuB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 776. The Commission's
chapter on fish and wildlife management demonstrates what was understood to be the balance
of federal-state power prior to FLPMA's passage in 1976. Far from affirming the "primary
authority" of the states to manage wildlife on federal lands, the Commission emphasized the
extent of federal powers to preempt the states. Id. at 158. Referenced within their
recommendations pertaining to fish and wildlife is a 1964 opinion by the Solicitor of the Interior
stating that "regulation of the wildlife populations on federally owned land is an appropriate
and necessary function of the Federal Government when the regulations are designed to protect
and conserve the wildlife as well as the land," concluding that "this authority is superior to that
of a state." Id (quoting 71 Interior Dec. 469, 473, 476 (1964)).
8 FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012).
889 See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (directing courts to set aside agency actions that are
'not in accordance with law" or "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity"); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (finding that informal
agency interpretations are not entitled to Chevron deference but only receive the level of
deference "proportional to its 'power to persuade'" (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944))).
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the Department of Interior has the authority to rewrite FLPMA,8o much less
to redraw the constitutional boundaries of federal and state powers that
were so clearly addressed in KIeppe v. New Mexico.8' There, the Supreme
Court explained why "'the complete power' that Congress has over public
lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife
living there."9m Accordingly, we recommend that the Policy be corrected, this
time using APA rulemaking procedures with adequate notice and meaningful
opportunities for all interested stakeholders to comment.
D. Failure to Act: The APA, NEPA, and Beyond
As shown in Part M.A, the constitutional authority of federal land
agencies to manage wildlife is well settled, and federal land laws and
regulations provide the discretion and sometimes the obligation to conserve
wildlife on federal lands. One of the most difficult contemporary questions
concerns circumstances where federal agencies have-refused to take action
to protect wildlife on federal lands.
When states are involved, the general questions tend to be: 1) must the
state ask the federal agency for permission to undertake its proposed use of
federal land, and 2) if so, what if a state does not do so? The answer to the
first question depends on whether the federal agency has a legal duty to act.
Such duties may be found in the statutory authorities discussed in Part 11I.B
or in regulations furthering the purposes of those authorities. It is important
to distinguish those circumstances where the agency has a duty to act from
those where the agency has the authority to act but action is discretionary. A
failure to engage in a discretionary act is characterized by law as mere
"inaction" while a failure to execute a mandatory duty is characterized as a
judicially reviewable "failure to act."" The distinction has legal significance
with regard to the second question above.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),' in order for courts "to avoid judicial
entanglement in abstract policy disagreements" there must be a "discrete
agency action" that an agency is required to take."" There was no duty for
BLM to act to prohibit motorized use in wilderness study areas in SUWA
because the statutory provision at issue in FLPMA "is mandatory as to the
object to be achieved, but it leaves BLM a great deal of discretion in deciding
890 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a), 1702(c) (defining the terms "areas of critical environmental
concern" and "multiple use" in ways that limit federal land use).
891 Ileppe, 426 U.S. 529, 539-41 (1976).
892 Id. at 540-41 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text
(discussing Ileppe in detail).
893 Under the APA, a reviewing court may "compel agency action unlawfully withheld." 5
U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). "[Algency action" is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or falure to act" Id. § 551(13)
(emphasis added). For analysis, see generally Julie Lurman, Subsistence at Risk: Falure to Act
and NEPA Compliance in Post-ANIZCA Alaska, 36 ENvTL. L. 289 (2006).
94 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
895 Id. at 66.
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how to achieve it."96 Similarly, the Department of the Interior had no duty
under FLPMA to intervene in the State of Alaska's aerial wolf control
program on federal lands in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus because the
statutory language was discretionary; thus, there was no judicially
reviewable "failure to act.M
In addition to FLPMA, the plaintiffs in both SUWA and Defenders of
Wildlife alleged violations of NEPA.m The courts determined that where
there was simply inaction, NEPA procedures were not required.m
Conversely, failure to act when there is a legal obligation to do so may
trigger NEPA0 0 While NEPA itself does not compel any particular federal
action, a NEPA analysis is required whenever a federal action is otherwise
compelled by law-whether the agency engages in that action or fails to do
so."' Moreover, "[nionfederal actors may ... be enjoined under NEPA if their
proposed action cannot proceed without the prior approval of a federal
agency."9
As described in Part III.B, the federal agencies have, where necessary,
determined through regulations the circumstances where permits or other
approvals are required prior to the use and occupancy of federal lands. In
general, failure by a federal agency to require the necessary approval
represents a "failure to act" and may result in the non-permitted activity
being enjoinedOn
In Maughan v. Vilsack,s a court declined to enjoin the State of Idaho
from contracting to kill wolves in a national forest wilderness area."
However, the court cautioned that its decision was only for the purposes of
96 Id. at 59-61, 66.
897 Defs. of Wildlife, 627 F.2d 1238, 1239-40, 1249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing 43 U.S.C.§ 1732). Claimants also do not appear to be able to sue a state based on federal inaction. See
Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162, 1169-71 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
environmental groups had no rights in federal lands that would give them standing to challenge
defendant county's actions on those lands based on preemption under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution).
898 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61; De& of Wildlife, 627 F.2d at 1240.
89 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 73; Defs. of Wildlife, 627 F.2d at 1245, 1247.
90 See 40 C.F.R § 1508.18 (2016) (defining "actions" subject to NEPA as including
"circumstance[s] where the responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable"
under the APA or otherwise).
901 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see Lurman,
supra note 893, at 294-95 (explaining that NEPA attaches "if action were mandated (under a
separate statute) but that action was not taken ... this is failure to act").
902 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
903 See id. Such injunctions are not limited to NEPA violations. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that USFS's approval of
Notices of Intent to mine constituted "agency action" under the ESA and thus required
consultation); Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1283, 1299-1301 (1st Cir. 1996)
(expansion of ski resort enjoined where USFS failed to require a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit).
904 No. 4:14-CV-0007-EJL, 2014 WL 201702 (D. Idaho Jan. 17, 2014).
905 Id. at *1, *5 (accepting, for the purpose of the temporary restraining order and injunction
analysis, the USFS's conclusion that "the activity is regulated by a State agency in a manner
adequate to protect the lands and resources," which is one of the exceptions found in the
USFS's special use permit regulations).
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a temporary restraining order, and "USFS has not yet reached a
determination regarding the [Idaho Fish and Game] program let alone
concluded that a special use permit is required."' Until that time, there was
no federal action subject to NEPA 07 In Wilderness Watch v. Vilsack,s the
same court enjoined the use of data obtained by the State of Idaho under a
special use permit to use helicopters in the same wilderness area.' It
concluded that the State "must obtain approval from [USFS] before
undertaking [its] project in the [w]ilderness [a]rea," and "that any action
taken by [Idaho] without [USFS] approval would be contrary to the
Wilderness Act.""io
In Friends of Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Elcker9 ' the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon construed the USFS special use
permit regulations to apply to approval of a reintroduction plan that would
use federal land to establish a population of mountain goats in the Columbia
Gorge National Scenic Area.' For this and other reasons, USFS was
required to comply with NEPA 1 3 In Utah, the state released mountain goats
on land adjacent to the Manti-La Sal National Forest, which proceeded to
occupy a research natural area on the national forest that was designated to
protect plant species that would be vulnerable to trampling.
14 These species
included three plant species listed as "sensitive" by USFS." The United
States District Court for the District of Utah held that "allowing" the
mountain goats on national forest land was not a federal agency action, and
that the same special use permit regulations did not require such permits
90 Id. at *5.
907 See id at *6 (explaining that USFS's failure to require an EIS was not a final agency
action).
908 229 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1183 (D. Idaho 2017), amended by No. 4:16-CV-012-BLW, 2017 WL
3749441 (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2017).
909 Id at 1177, 1183.
910 Id at 1182 (referencing Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012)). The injunction was
based in part on a violation of NEPA. Id. In Part m.B.7.a.iii, infra, we assess other issues posed
by this case, in particular, the Wilderness Act's requirement that USFS make a finding that the
activity is "necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area" before
issuing its approval. But cf WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 4:14-cv-00488-REB,
2017 WL 1217099, at *1 & n.2, *5-9 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2017) (Predator hunting "derbies"
organized by private parties and occurring on national forest lands did not meet any of the
regulatory criteria requiring a special use authorization, and did not have effects subject to
NEPA. However, the court struck documents submitted by plaintiffs suggesting such permits
had been issued by USFS for six other organized hunts. BLM was initially a defendant in this
case but the parties reached an agreement to settle those claims, regarding different regulatory
language, out of court.).
911 598 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Or. 2007), vacated, No. 05-CV-646-BR, 2011 WL 3205773 (D. Or
July 27, 2011).
912 Id. at 1153, 1159; see also 36 C.F.R. § 251.50 (2016) (describing USFS's special use
permitting system).
913 Friends of Columbia Gorge, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
914 Utah Native Plant Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 2:16-cv-56-PMW, 2017 WL 822098, at *1-
2 (D. Utah Mar. 2, 2017), appealfiled No. 17-4074 (10th Cir. May 4, 2017).
915 Id. at*1.
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"every time state-managed wildlife enters federal land.""' These cases
indicate that it is incumbent on the land managers to evaluate any state
action against the regulatory criteria for permits so that they can properly
authorize (or deny) the use and occupancy of federal lands.
As noted in Part Ill.B, federal agencies are encouraged to complete
MOUs with the states for cooperative management of fish and wildlife
resources. It is the purpose of these MOUs to clearly delineate the
authorities of the parties and assign responsibilities among them, and this
should include identification of actions that would require a permit. It is
critical that the assignment of authorities reflect the legal principles
described above. Moreover, the MOU process should not be used to
relinquish federal authorities without recognizing that such decisions may
constitute actions subject to federal procedures required by the ESA or
NEPA.1' The agencies should expect scrutiny of the assignment of blanket
authority to states using MOUs. 9 18 For example, the relinquishment of federal
authority to manipulate water levels in a national wildlife refuge was
enjoined because it constituted a federal action subject to NEPA9 '9 Similarly,
an MOU that.delegated authority to the state to assert federal reserved water
rights in the Black Canyon of the Gunnison violated the federal agency's
nondiscretionary duties to protect federal resources.920 Conversely, BLM's
decision to relinquish management of elk feeding grounds to the State of
Wyoming through an MOU rather than through land use permits was upheld
in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Tidwell"' because FLPMA authorized
BLM to enter into such agreements, rendering a permit requirement
superfluous.' The court also affirmed the applicability of NEPA to the MOU
in lieu of the permit process.sas
916 Id. at *4, *9, *11. However, the court also indicated that USFS would have authority to
remove the goats and would "need to take a position" after sufficient study. Id. at *7. USFS had
earlier told the state it objected to the reintroduction. Id. at *1-2. The authority to remove
wildlife was established in Hu, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928), and Ieppe, 426 U.S. 529, 545-46
(1975).
917 See Defs. of Wildlife, 627 F.2d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[E]xarnples of federal
'permission' [requiring compliance with NEPA] were such concrete acts as decisions 'to issue a
lease, approve a mining plan, issue a right-of-way permit, or take other action to allow pivate
acdvity. . . .'" (omission in original) (quoting Ileppe, 427 U.S. at 399)).
918 See Gallatin Wildlife Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-15-27-BU-BMM, 2016 WL 3282047,
at *9-10 (D. Mont. June 14, 2016) (finding NEPA violations in an EIS for a Forest Plan where
USFS failed to disclose MOUs with the State of Montana and grazing permittees that
acknowledged that the state would allow permittees to kill bighorn sheep to prevent comingling
with domestic sheep), appeal fded, No. 16-35665 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 19, 2016).
919 Bunch v. Hodel, 642 F. Supp. 363, 365 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); see also lgh Country Citizens'
All., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242-43, 1249 (D. Colo. 2006) (holding that the relinquishment of a
federal reserved water right was an agency action subject to judicial review).
920 lh Country Citizens' All., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42, 1245, 1253 ("A permanent
relinquishment of a water right with a 1933 priority date for such a scientifically, ecologically
and historically important national park must be viewed as a major action requiring compliance
with NEPA.").
921 572 F.3d 1115 (10th Cir. 2009).
922 Id. at 1119, 1127-28.
923 Id. at 1128.
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An important take-away point is that MOUs cannot be used to evade
legal obligations.2 4 Neither can they change a regulatory requirement, as that
can only be done through APA rulemaking, nor can MOUs be used to alter
statutory provisions, as that power is reserved to Congress.m As a subsidiary
point, if a federal agency were to use an MOU to transfer authority to a state
to undertake actions that would be subject to federal requirements, such as
those required by the ESA or NEPA, those requirements would attach to the
MOU decision itself because that decision would constitute "affirmative
conduct" necessary before a nonfederal actor could proceed98
E. The National Wilderness Preservation System
While all agencies have the authority to assert federal supremacy over
the management of fish and wildlife on federal lands in order to fulfill their
statutory mission, in federal wilderness areas the affirmative obligation to
preserve wilderness character-including fish and wildlife species within
wilderness areas-is mandated to the federal land-managing agencyi
Courts have pointed out, "the Wilderness Act is as close to an outcome-
oriented piece of environmental legislation as exists. Unlike NEPA, . . . the
Wilderness Act emphasizes outcome (wilderness preservation) over
procedure."m That outcome, as detailed above in Part lIE.B.7, is one where
an area's wilderness character is protected in full, meaning as far as
possible, without human manipulation; where otherwise-prohibited uses are
limited only to those necessary for the purpose of preserving that area's
wilderness character; where all commercial uses are prohibited, except
those commercial services necessary for realizing wilderness purposes; and
where each federal agency recognizes that whatever the original reason for
an area's designation, once it is also designated as wilderness, management
must conform to the Wilderness Act. Moreover, where subsequent
legislation mentions wildlife management, those provisions must be read in
tandem with the Wilderness Act, keeping in mind "the elementary rule" of
924 See id. at 1125, 1128 (requiring compliance with NEPA when a federal agency enters into
an MOU).
925 See, e.g., HIgh Country Cidzens'AI., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1249, 1252 ("This Court finds that
the effect of the [MOUs] was actually to remove the administration of the Black Canyon
resources from the National Park Service in direct contravention of [federal law]."); Greater
Yellowstone Coal., 572 F.3d at 1127 (explaining that FLPMA requires BLM to "ensure the uses
approved through cooperative agreements are in compliance with other statutes imposing
limitations on the uses of federal land and the activities of federal agencies").
926 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining
that "whether the federal agency must undertake 'affirmative conduct' before the non-federal
actor may act" is a factor in determining whether an action is a "major Federal action").
927 Wilderness Watch, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1181-82 (D. Idaho 2017) ("Congress made
preservation of wilderness values 'the primary duty of [USFS], and it must guide all decisions as
the first and foremost standard of review for any proposed action.'" (quoting Greater
Yellowstone Coal., CV-06--04-E-BLW, 2006 WL 3386731, at *6 (D. Idaho Nov. 21, 2006))),
amended byNo. 4:16-CV-012-BLW, 2017 WL 3749441 (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2017).
928 High Sierra HiketsAss'n, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
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statutory construction that exceptions to the Act's overarching preservation
mission are to be construed narrowly."-
We have reviewed dozens of agency-approved or state-proposed
wildlife management actions in wilderness areas, and where errors in
stewardship have been made we observed certain trends. It has long been
noticed that the most common flaw in making a minimum requirements
analysis or other evaluation document is that they are often "[w]ritten to
support a pre-determined decision" where preserving wilderness character
is not the default conclusion.m But beyond that, we have observed a
fundamental misunderstanding of many facets of the law and an apparent
willingness to skirt legal obligations so as to accommodate more political
desires. Two illustrative examples are analyzed below.
In 2007, FWS and the Arizona Game and Fish Department (AGFD)
proposed to build two new wildlife waters in the Kofa Wilderness in Arizona,
in addition to the sixty-five waters previously developed, to halt bighorn
sheep population decline.3' FWS authorized the construction as a project
categorically excluded from detailed environmental analysis under NEPAm2
It made a rudimentary minimum requirements analysism and approved the
construction. The Ninth Circuit found that FWS had not provided a
reasoned determination of necessity in employing the prohibited use of an
installation.m Its opinion created a litmus test for a minimum requirements
analysis:
[A] generic finding of necessity does not suffice; the Service must make a
finding that the structures are "necessary" to meet the "minimum requirements
for the administration of the area...." [T]he key question-whether water
structures were necessary at all-remains entirely unanswered .... [T]he
Service's own ... [Investigative Report] identified many different actions [FWS
could have taken].... Importantly, in contrast to the creation of new
structures within the wilderness, the Wilderness Act does not prohibit any of
929 Spokane & Inland Empire R.R Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350 (1916)
("[E]xceptions from a general policy which a law embodies should be strictly construed, that is,
should be so interpreted as not to destroy the remedial processes intended to be accomplished
by the enactment"); see Wilderness Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1206 (D.
Mont. 2000); see also discussion supra Part III.B.7.b (discussing subsequently enacted, site-
specific wilderness legislation).
930 WILDERNESS ADVISORY GRP., U.S. FOREST SERV., MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS: FAQs
AND COMMON ERRORS 16 (2015), https://perma.cc/Q5MG-JNTV.
931 KOFA NAT'L WILDLIFE REFUGE & ARIZ. GAME & FISH DEP'T, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE KOFA BIGHORN SHEEP HERD 8-10, 23 (2007), https://perma.cc/B362-
GJUZ [hereinafter KOFA INVESTIGATIVE REPORT]; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., KOFA NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE & WILDERNESS AND NEW WATER MOUNTAINS WILDERNESS INTERAGENCY
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 43-44 (1996).
932 KOFA NAT'L WILDLIFE REFUGE, U.S. FISH & WILDUFE SERV., CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION: YAQUI
AND MCPHERSON TANKS REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (2007), https://permacc/6P7L-EJ46
[hereinafter REDEVELOPMENT CX].
933 Id
93 See Kofa, 629 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing the minimal analysis and the
construction process).
935 Id. at 1037.
2017]1 921
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
those actions. ... Yet nowhere in the record does the Service explain why
those actions, alone or in combination, are insufficient to restore the
population of bighorn sheep.... The documents as a whole demonstrate that
the Service began with the assumption that water structures are necessary and
reasoned from that starting point.m
Subsequently, FWS released a formal determination that concluded it
was necessary to have built these two more wildlife waters in addition to the
sixty-five already developed because the installations need to be no more
than three miles apart for "[o]ptimal distribution of water, especially for
lactating ewes."
In the meantime, FWS authorized the killing of certain mountain lions
in the Kofa Wilderness to limit predation on bighorns.9 8 The rationale was
that "[a]lthough mountain lions are also a natural wildlife resource,...
mountain lion predation is likely additive to other sources of mortality and
sufficient to prevent [FWS] from attaining bighorn sheep population
objectives."9 " The explicit bighorn population objectives were "based on ...
the need to maintain a population large enough ... to support regional and
landscape level transplant programs," and to make it easier for hunters to
locate "trophy rams."9" The minimum requirements analysis correctly
identified the No Action alternative as the one that would best protect
wilderness character.4' However, the Preferred Alternative-the removal of
"offending" lions-was chosen."" This choice, as with others made in this
series of decisions, was based on supporting analyses that were
fundamentally flawed.
One of the new tanks (Yaqui) is itself outside the wilderness, and only
part of the catchment system is within the wilderness.9" The Yaqui could
have been constructed without a catchment system, with water supplied by
a tanker on the adjacent road outside the wilderness.9" As constructed, the
Yaqui tank cannot have been the minimum necessary under any
936 Id. at 1037-38 (citation omitted). The court listed the options that should have been
analyzed, including eliminating hunting, cancelling the transplant program, and killing
predators. Id. at 1037.
937 KOFA NAT'L WILDLIFE REFUGE, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NECEssITY DETERMINATION:
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MCPHERSON AND YAQUI WILDLIFE WATER CATCHMENTS 1, 4 (2014),
https://perma.cc/DR8D-G24N [hereinafter NECESSITY DETERMINATION].
938 See KOFA NAT'L WILDLIFE REFUGE, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: LIMITING MOUNTAIN LION PREDATION ON DESERT BIGHORN SHEEP ON THE KOFA
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 5 (2009), https://perma.cc/22WH-ZAFU [hereinafter LION EA]
(analyzing various alternatives for limiting mountain lion predation on desert bighorn sheep,
including the removal of certain mountain lions that have "killed two or more desert bighorn
sheep within a six-month period").
939 Id
940 Id at 7, 10.
941 Id at 112-13.
942 Id. at 104,114.
943 REDEVELOPMENT CX, supra note 932, at 3.
944 See id ("The Yaqui Tank Redevelopment Project is planned to take place immediately
adjacent to the designated road that follows Moonshine Wash and as a result, is nearly all within
the 200-foot-wide area that is outside of designated Wilderness.").
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circumstance. Yet, FWS claims these two particular installations are among
only twenty-four critical for bighorn survival in the Kofa National Wildlife
Refuge."" At the least, that would mean all the remaining wildlife water
developments in the Kofa Wilderness fail the test of "necessity" by FWS's
own analysis. Therefore, these developments cannot be maintained and
should be removed, since their presence manipulates the "community of
life," creates unnatural conditions in the desert environment, and violates
the wilderness definition as "undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval
character and influence.'"
In addition, killing predators, while not explicitly prohibited by the
Wilderness Act, is implicitly prohibited as an action that trammels "the earth
and its community of life."4 Perhaps in response to the vastly greater
number of pictures of predators and mule deer than of bighorn sheep
recorded at the guzzlers,m FWS wrote: "Desert bighorn sheep will likely use
the new water sources more frequently as they become familiar with the
location of the waters."" There is no discussion of how the predators and
mule deer became familiar with the locations so much faster than the sheep.
To decrease predation on sheep, it would be more consistent with the area's
wilderness character to stop providing supplemental water for bighorn
predators and their alternate prey that appear to be less well-adapted to the
harsh desert environment of the Kofa Wilderness than desert bighorn
sheep.on
In the end, these errors are dwarfed by the fundamental mistake of
skewing management of the Kofa Wilderness to meet a population goal of
800 bighorns-"considered the carrying capacity of the refuge"-with the
objective to re-establish them as a "transplant source herd."9n To do so,
AGFD and FWS determined that they needed to provide water in all areas of
suitable sheep habitat, including areas that were otherwise "unavailable" for
sheep due to the absence of water sources. Maximizing production is an
945 See KOFA INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 931, at 32 tbl.2 (listing twenty-four "[c]ritical
bighorn sheep waters on the Kofa [National Wildlife Refuge]," including Yaqui and McPherson
tanks).
946 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012).
947 See IW, supra note 636, at 7 (stating that the untrammeled quality of wilderness "is
degraded by modern human activities or actions that control or manipulate the components or
processes of ecological systems inside the wilderness"); see also supra notes 638-641 and
accompanying text (analyzing the untrammeled nature of wilderness).
948 Author Chris Barns, in analyzing the remote camera studies of the two new guzzlers,
found that in the first year bighorn were seen utilizing the guzzlers only twice. The three top
predators of bighorns (lions, bobcats, and coyotes) were documented at the installations over
500 times; mule deer were photographed over 800 times.
949 NECESSITY DETERMINATION, supra note 937, at 1.
950 See id. at 6 (describing how bighorn sheep can survive up to fifteen days without
drinking water during the hot summer months); Bill Broyles & Tricia L. Cutler, Effect ofSurface
Water on Desert Bighorn Sheep in the Cabeza Preta National Wildlife Refuge, Southwestern
Arzona, 27 WiLDFE Soc'Y BULL., 1082, 1085 (1999) (finding that the availability of perennial
surface water did not affect bighorn populations on another desert wilderness refuge).
951 KOFA INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 931, at 14, 19.
952 Id. at 9.
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agricultural model, not a wilderness model. In nature, not every nook and
cranny is filled with a "desirable" species and devoid of "offending" animals.
Although FWS claims that its objective is to "provid[e] the public with the
opportunity to view wild sheep in their native habitat,"m native habitat is not
one with artificial water provided every three miles in an area cleansed of
predators. Policy guidance from FWS is quite clear "On wilderness areas
within the Refuge System, we conserve. fish, wildlife, and plants by
preserving the wilderness environment."9s In the Kofa Wilderness, FWS has
failed to do so by taking actions that degrade its untrammeled quality and
that are not the minimum necessary, all for non-wilderness purposes.m
Sometimes federal agencies try to apply the law but are opposed not
only by state agencies but by wilderness-oriented advocacy groups. In 2011,
the Nevada Department of Wildlife (NDOW) requested a multi-year
authorization from BLM's Ely and Southern Nevada District Offices for using
helicopters to access wildlife water developments within designated
wilderness areas.m BLM failed to undertake any analysis to determine
whether any water installations were necessary in the first place. However,
in preparation for their draft Environmental Assessment (EA), BLM
conducted a minimum requirements analysis on methods of access,
concluding that helicopter access was necessary for fifteen of the twenty big
game water developments but that the others could be accessed on foot or
by horse.m' In the comment period following release of the draft EA,
comments from an advocacy group supported helicopter access to all of the
installations because it would be more economical for NDOW.9. In addition
953 NECESSITY DETERMINATION, supra note 937, at 2.
954 FWS WILDERNESS POLICY, supra note 437, § 2.16(A); see also id. § 2.16(B)(3) ("All
decisions and actions to modify ecosystems, species population levels, or natural processes
must be: (a) Required to respond to a human emergency, or (b) The minimum requirement for
administering the area as wilderness and necessary to accomplish the purposes of the refuge,
including WildernessActpurposes In addition, such decisions and actions must: (i) Maintain or
restore the biological integrity, diversity, or environmental health of the wilderness area; or (ii)
Be necessary for the recovery of threatened or endangered species." (emphasis added)).
955 Other agencies have engaged in similar actions based on similarly flawed analyses. See,
e.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR AUTHORIZATION OF
HELICOPTER LANDINGS IN WILDERNESS 8-9, 16 & tbl.3 (2014) (authorizing up to 450 helicopter
landings for capturing bighorn sheep despite almost half of the bighorn habitat being outside
wilderness); NAT'L PARK SERV., ISLE ROYALE NATIONAL PARK: DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT TO ADDRESS THE PRESENCE OF WOLVES, at iv, vii (2016), https://perma.cc/BD8G-CT4G
(identifying a Preferred Alternative that restocks the island with wolves, despite correctly
analyzing the No Action Alternative as the one that best preserves wilderness character).
956 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: ISSUANCE OF AUTHORIZATIONS
TO NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE FOR WILDLIFE WATER DEVELOPMENT INSPECTION,
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS WITHIN BLM WILDERNESS AREAS IN NEVADA 1-4 (2011),
https://permacc/NWH6-9S52.
957 Id. app. A. Access to one of the wildlife waters ras determined to be as little as 0.2 miles
from the boundary on a closed road. Id.
958 See Shaaron Netherton, Friends of Nevada Wilderness, Comment to Environmental
Assessment Issuance of Authorizations to Nevada Department of Eidlife for ildlife Water
Development Inspection, Maintenance and Repairs within BLM Wilderness Areas in Nevada
(Dec. 30, 2011) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Friends of Nevada Wilderness Comment]
("[I]n these times of extremely tight budgets ... we believe it is critical that this EA should help
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to prioritizing economics over preservation, the letter contained two other
fundamental errors. First, it asserted that NDOW "is responsible for the
maintenance of these large game guzzlers."'5 To the contrary, at some point
after wilderness designation, BLM needed to determine whether each of the
water installations is "necessary to meet minimum requirements for the
administration of the area" as wilderness.' If so, it is BLM's responsibility to
maintain them-though BLM may ask the state to undertake that
responsibility-because preserving wilderness character is solely a federal
responsibility."l If not, no maintenance can be allowed, and eventually the
installations should be removed to comply with the Wilderness Act.'
Second, the letter claimed: "It is clear in both the Clark and Lincoln
County legislation that Congress intended that helicopter use be allowed."m
However, Congress used the word "may" in the legislation, demonstrating its
intent that helicopter use be considered, not that it be automatically
approved.' Senator Harry Reid specifically noted that while helicopter
access may be needed for some monitoring and maintenance, "some
guzzlers can be easily accessed after a short hike from a road."'
In the end, BLM authorized NDOW helicopter access to all sites,
referring to "[a]dditional information... obtained during the comment
facilitate cooperation between the BLM and [NDOW] on the issue of inspection and
maintenance of wildlife water developments."). This instance is not the only time this
organization has urged BLM to prioritize nonconforming wildlife developments. See e-mail from
Shaaron Netherton, Exec. Dir., Friends of Nev. Wilderness, to Neil Kornze, Bureau of Land
Mgmt. (Apr. 1, 2014) (on file with authors) (asking that radio collars no longer be defined as an
installation so sportsmen could put them on wildlife in wilderness).
959 Friends of Nevada Wilderness Comment, supra note 958.
960 See Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012) (requiring BLM to do a minimum
requirements analysis).
961 See discussion supra Part III.B.7.
962 See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (permitting installations only where they are "necessary to meet
the minimum requirements for the administration of the area" as wilderness).
9 Friends of Nevada Wilderness Comment, supra note 958.
964 Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
424, § 209(c), 118 Stat. 2403, 2412 ("Consistent with section 4(d)(1) of the Wilderness Act ... the
State may continue to use aircraft, including helicopters, to survey, capture, transplant,
monitor, and provide water for wildlife populations ... ."); Clark County Conservation of Public
Land and Natural Resources Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-282, § 208(c), 116 Stat. 1994, 2005
(similar); see also Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 329(c), 120
Stat. 2922, 3036 (similar). Under the Wilderness Act, preexisting uses of aircraft are "subject to
such restrictions as the Secretary ... deems desirable." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1). Those
restrictions are set forth in agency policy: "BLM has discretion to either allow or prohibit the
continuation of aircraft use where it has already been legally established prior to the
designation of a wilderness area. Administrative use of aircraft is normally authorized under
section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act, only where it is necessary to meet minimum requirements
for the administration of the area for the purpose of the Wilderness Act." BLM MANUAL, supra
note 673, § 1.6(C)(2)(b).
965 Letter from Harry Reid, U.S. Senator, to Robert A. Abbey, Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt.
(May 27, 2010) (on file with authors).
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period" in disregard of the Wilderness Act aid BLM's own analysis.96 This
result degrades wilderness character by allowing prohibited uses that were
shown not to be the minimum necessary-due, in part, to a mistaken reading
of the extra special language in designating legislation.
As we have shown, the Wilderness Act unequivocally expresses the
federal obligation to assert authority over fish and wildlife to assure the
interests of all Americans in the preservation of wilderness character. We
are troubled by the cases discussed above, and others, that demonstrate a
problematic tendency on the part of some federal land agencies to
reflexively acquiesce to state interests when contrary to wilderness law. The
federal agencies must renew their dedication to preserving wilderness
character.
F Intergovernmental Cooperation
The states and AFWA have repeatedly asserted that there are not
enough opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation in wildlife
management and that more opportunities need to be created."' Wildlife
conservation absolutely requires intergovernmental cooperation and
transboundary thinking beyond political jurisdictions. One early example of
such cooperation can be found in the Lacey Act,9 u which, among other
things, provides federal penalties for transporting in interstate commerce
any wildlife taken in violation of state law." Another example is provided by
the Pittman-Robertson and Dingell-Johnson Acts, discussed in Part II.B, as
both provide significant sources of federal funding for state wildlife
management.
There is real value in constructive relationships between federal and
state agencies, and we strongly encourage their development. To that end,
there are three central points to be made:
1) Multiple opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation already
exist within federal decision-making processes, but they are not
always fully utilized. For instance, the Sikes Act, ESA, FLPMA,
NFMA, NWRSIA, and several others contain such opportunities.
2) Intergovernmental cooperation must be a mutual and reciprocal
obligation in order to live up to the name and to be as effective as
possible. Therefore, there ought to be equal opportunity for federal
entities to comment on and participate in state wildlife management
decision-making processes, and that is not always the case.
966 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DECISION RECORD FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AUTHORIZATIONS TO
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE FOR WILDLIFE WATER DEVELOPMENT INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIRS WITHIN BLM WILDERNESS AREAS IN NEVADA (2012), https://perma.cc/7TMU-HPFG.
967 See, e.g., AFWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note .56, at 22 (suggesting that the
cooperative language found in the Sikes Act could be strengthened and extended to all land
management agencies).
968 Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2012).
969 Id. § 3373(a).
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3) Intergovernmental cooperation cannot be a euphemism for the idea
that either entity always gets what it wants. It ought to be, and
generally is, an opportunity for informing agency decision making in
meaningful ways. The law determines which level of government has
the final decision-making authority.
1. Existing Opportunities for Intergovernmental Cooperation at the Federal
Level
In Part l1.B of this Article, it was noted that the authorizing statutes for
the various land units already provide multiple opportunities for
intergovernmental cooperation at the federal level. For instance, in the
NWRSIA and FLPMA's planning and land acquisition programs, substantive
opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation are prescribed by statute.o
In addition to these opportunities for cooperation are those opportunities
provided in other federal statutes and programs, such as NEPA, the
Landscape Conservation Cooperative (LCC) network coordinated by FWS,
the Joint Ventures program of FWS, and the State Wildlife Grants Program."'
NEPA presents what is probably the best-known opportunity for
intergovernmental cooperation. NEPA declares that it is the policy of the
U.S. government to work "in cooperation with State and local governments"
to pursue the "conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony."97 2 To carry out the policy of cooperation, NEPA
requires the federal agency conducting an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) to provide early notification to, and solicit the views of, any state
entity which may be significantly impacted.' Any disagreements about
970 See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C.
§ 668dd(e)(3) (directing FWS to consult with "adjoining Federal, State, local, and private
landowners and affected State conservation agencies" when preparing comprehensive
conservation plans); FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) (2012) ("[T]he national interest will be best
realized if the public lands and their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried
and their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process coordinated
with other Federal and State planning efforts.").
971 For a review of these and other programs, see Vicky J. Meretsky et al., A State-Based
National Network for Effective Wildlife Conservation, 62 BIOSCIENCE 970, 970-72 (2012)
(describing collaborative conservation programs, including the Joint Ventures program and LCC
network). See also NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012) ("[Ilt is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and
private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures ... in a manner calculated to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans."). See generally LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION
Coops., NETWORK STRATEGIC PLAN (2014), https://permacc/4NGE-VU6W (describing the
strategic plan for the LCC network); Joint Ventures Overview U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://perma.cc/NGY8-AADQ (last modified Nov. 12, 2015) (providing an overview of the Joint
Ventures program); State Wildlife Grant Program-Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://perna.ccLKZ9-4QAT (last updated July 20, 2016) (providing an overview of the State
Wildlife Grant Program).
972 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
973 Id. § 4332(D)(iv).
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impacts between federal and state agencies must be enumerated within the
EIS.'" States may also obtain official cooperating agency status, which
requires the lead NEPA agency to "[u]se the environmental analysis and
proposals of cooperating agencies with jurisdiction by law or special
expertise, to the maximum extent possible consistent with its responsibility
as lead agency.""' This provides state governments with much greater access
to the federal decision-making processes than the general public enjoys.
One example of successful cooperation wrought by NEPA is the EIS
process that was initiated following the Wyoming v. United States case
about the National Elk Refuge." In the aftermath of that decision FWS and
NPS (which manages neighboring Grand Teton National Park) embarked on
a joint-EIS process to develop a plan to guide the management of bison and
elk across that federal landscape.97 Because of the intergovernmental
integration and cooperation made possible by that process, the state chose
to incorporate some of the recommendations from the EIS in their own
Bison Brucellosis Management Action Plan in 2008.8
In an even more focused attempt to encourage integrated management,
the LCC program was developed in 2010 in an attempt to facilitate
collaboration between all levels of government, including federal, state,
local, and tribal governments, as well as interested nongovernmental
organizations, in order to "tackle large-scale and long-term conservation
challenges.""' There are twenty-two LCCs in the network.'" Each is self-
directed by a voluntary steering committee, though the whole enterprise is
coordinated through FWS.m The goals of the LCC program are to develop
"science-based information about the implications of climate change and
other stressors ... ; [dlevelop shared, landscape-level conservation
objectives and ... strategies ... ; [flacilitate [scientific exchange]; [m]onitor
and evaluate the effectiveness of LCC. .. strategies ... ; [and d]evelop ...
linkages" between LCCs.m A 2015 National Academy of Sciences review
concluded that the LCC program provided a framework for achieving
landscape-level cooperation and "recognized the LCCs' ability to create
opportunities for identifying common conservation goals and leveraging
974 Id
975 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(2) (2016).
976 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
977 U.S. FISH & WILDFE SERV. & NAT'L PARK SERV., FINAL BISON AND ELK MANAGEMENT PLAN
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (2007), https://perma.cc/7VUM-BETP.
978 WYo. GAME & FISH DEP'T, JACKSON BISON HERD (B101) BRUCELLOSIS MANAGEMENT ACTION
PLAN 8 (2008), https://perma-cc/293Y-WM6F.
979 Beyond Boundaries, LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE NETWORK,
https://perma.cc/RT6U-R5QN (last visited Nov. 11, 2017); see Order No. 3289, Ken Salazar, Sec'y
of the Interior, Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change on America's Water, Land, and Other
Natural and Cultural Resources 3 (Feb. 22, 2010), https://perma.cc/T4WQ-LKGL.
980 LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPS., supra note 971, at 20.
981 Id; Organizational Structure, LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE NETWORK,
https://permacc/C49A-TNXU (last visited Nov. 11, 2017); Landscape Conservation Cooperative
Staff, LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE NETWORK, https://perma.cc/E3PU-ZAGA (last
visited Nov. 11, 2017).
982 LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPS., supranote 971, at 3.
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efforts of diverse partners at a much greater scale than any one entity could
achieve alone."8
Unfortunately, simply because cooperative processes are in place-
through NEPA and many other statutes-does not always ensure that the
federal agencies apply them in a way designed to elicit true state and local
government cooperation. Bryan and others document several instances
where federal processes are merely used as hoops to jump through rather
than opportunities for true collaboration.9 8 Federal agencies will need to
improve internal culture and education to ensure existing opportunities for
collaboration are as successful as possible.
Furthermore, even when state and local governments take advantage of
opportunities to participate in federal processes, their intention is not
always true cooperation. Bryan and others write:
From the local government perspective, a guarantee of early and
meaningful involvement in the federal land planning process is an important
factor in determining whether to participate at all.... On the federal side,
agencies desire local government participants who are well-informed about the
federal planning process, do not use the process for political grand-standing,
and reciprocate by including federal planners in local land use planning.8'
For instance, there has been a movement recently among local governments
to try to use the coordination clauses in FLPMA and NFMA to force federal
agencies to conform their actions to the wishes of local interests..8
However, this is not a reasonable interpretation of the statutes, as was
demonstrated in Part I.B of this Article. Both laws temper the coordination
clauses with additional language that emphasizes that even though
coordination is a worthy goal, it cannot come at the expense of federal
agencies meeting their statutory obligations97 Local and state governments
983 Press Release, Landscape Conservation Coop. Network, National Academy of Sciences
Releases Its Review of the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://perma~cc/PQV9-UYYJ.
984 See Michelle Bryan et al., Cause for Rebellion? Examining How Federal Land
Management Agencies & Local Governments Collaborate on Land Use Planning, GEO. WASH. J.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L., Spring 2015, at 1, 14-16. ("[Clollaboration must be genuine and not
perfunctory to truly be successful in the long term. . .
985 Id. at 2.
986 Joshua Zaffos, Counties Use a 'Coordination' Clause to Flght the Feds, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (May 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/G7TP-62FR.
987 See NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (2012) (requiring land and resource management plans to
comply with the agency's multiple use and sustained yield mandate); FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1712(c)(9) (2012) ("The Secretary shall ... [coordinate] to the extent consistent with the laws
governing the administration of the public lands... ."). Even the Public Lands Council, an
interest group which represents cattle and sheep producers who hold public grazing permits,
has recognized that this is a disingenuous reading:
Unfortunately, some local governments have taken the BLM consistency requirement
to mean that by simply handing the BLM their land use plan, the BLM will be forced to
comply with it. Not only is this incorrect, it undermines the ongoing negotiation and
information sharing process that is at the core of coordination. Experienced
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must work to improve their own use of federal processes and to get involved
knowledgably with the intention of being good partners.
2. Opportunities to Cooperate at the State Level
If states are truly looking for meaningful cooperation between federal
and. state entities regarding wildlife management, then significant
opportunities for federal input in state decision making must exist as well.
State and local governments regulate the uses of private and state lands that
are adjacent to federal lands, and that may cause spill-over effects onto
federal lands.? For example, the National Parks Conservation Association
(NPCA) recently complained that the proposed Greater Yellowstone grizzly
bear delisting plan "[f]ails to provide [NPS] a formal seat at the table to work
with state agencies on the management of park bears that occasionally move
beyond park borders."as Without formal mechanisms to promote and
institutionalize intergovernmental cooperation, those issues will rarely be
considered. Federal law, regulation, and policy encourage intergovernmental
cooperation, but there does not appear to be a similar emphasis found in
state law and regulation. Again, cooperation, to be effective, must be a two-
way street.
For example, when it comes to local land use decisions that have
obvious impacts on wildlife, there is rarely an opportunity for federal
involvement in the decision making. One exception is Oregon, where "local
governments are specifically instructed to collaborate with federal agencies
in areas such as natural resources, estuaries, and coastal shorelands."a
Oregon might serve as an example of how other states could modify laws,
and regulations to encourage such cooperation. "[W]estern states could do
much to advance the issue of local-federal land use planning by simply
noting, in nonadversarial language, the importance of that issue in their
enabling legislation.""" For true cooperation to be successful, local, state,
and federal governments must work as partners. To that end, states should
create similar opportunities for federal agencies to engage in state and local
decision making.
coordinators recognize that the BLM has no obligation to adhere to any local plan or
policy that is inconsistent with federal laws and regulations.
PUB. LANDs CouNciL, A BEGINNER's GUIDE TO COORDINATION 10 (2012), https://perma.ccYW3C-
B3CE; see About PLC, PUB. LANDS COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/manage/create (last visited Nov.
11, 2017).
988 See Bryan et al., supra note 984, at 1-5 (providing an overview of local and state land use
planning).
989 Stephanie Adams, Iconic Grizzlies Deserve a More Thoughtful Plan, BOZEMAN DAILY
CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2016), https://perma-ce/W6MN-6NGP.
990 Bryan et al., supra note 984, at 4.
991 Id. at 5.
992 Id. at 2.
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3. Cooperation Does Not Equal FederalAcquiescence
In none of the cooperation sections reviewed in Part I11.B does the
statute in question require the federal government to follow state
preferences. And in all cases, the statutes do not permit the federal agency
to relinquish its statutory obligations, even in the face of state dissent.
Cooperation under these federal statutes is an opportunity for other levels of
government to have privileged access to the decision-making process, to
ensure that concerns are considered, and available data is exchanged.
Agencies should absolutely determine if it is possible to meet the needs
of other governmental entities, but they cannot be expected to jettison their
own statutory or constitutional obligations to reach that goal. For instance,
in Alaska, where the state determined that the requirements of ANILCA
conflicted with the state constitution, the resolution was that the state could
not be forced to implement that statute.n Likewise, if a federal agency
determines that a state's request conflicts with its own legal mandates, it too
must refuse to acquiesce to them."4 However, in the absence of legal
conflicts, we encourage state and federal entities to seriously consider, and
if possible accommodate, the interests of other governmental entities.
"[W]ildlife move across eco-regions ... but management approaches
change across arbitrary boundaries.""5 It is crucial, therefore, that all levels
of government cooperate and coordinate their efforts as much as is possible
given the legal framework in which they operate. As the court in Wyoming
stated: "Wildlife management policies affecting the interests of multiple
sovereigns demand a high degree of intergovernmental cooperation.""6 A
structure for such cooperation is still largely absent from state processes,
and while such a structure is already embedded in federal programs, federal
agencies could still improve its implementation in order to better fulfill its
intent.
V. CONCLUSION
This is a tumultuous time to be writing about public lands, federalism,
and wildlife. Each has been impacted by the deep ideological fissures,
polarization, and partisanship characterizing modern American politics. Of
course, there has always been a tension between federal and state interests
in the management of federal lands and resources. Some of the earliest and
most precedential disputes in the field initially revolved around wildlife
management and the respective powers of federal and state governments.
Slowly, over time, the courts answered these questions and made clear the
extensive powers of the federal government to manage public lands and the
wildlife thereon. These include Missouri v. Holland (1920), Hunt v United
States (1928), Eleppe v. New Mexico (1976), Hughes v Oklahoma (1979),
993 McDowell, 785 P.2d 1, 3, 9 (Alaska 1989).
994 See discussion supra Part m.A.4.
995 Bryan et al., supra note 984, at 2 (omission in original).
996 Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002).
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and dozens of other cases at all levels of the judicial system. A consistent
pattern of primary federal authority emerges from these cases, but even
where the Supreme Court corrected itself in overturning Geer v.
Connecticut it did so carefully and constructively, finding in favor of the
federal government and interstate commerce but also recognizing the
"legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild
animals."97
A tension between federal and state interests is embedded in federal
land and resources law. In each of the statutes reviewed in Part lI.B,
Congress required these lands and resources to be managed in the national
interest and recognized that federal authority is superior to that of the states.
At the same time, Congress appreciated the historical and important position
of the states in managing wildlife, and these statutes accordingly provide
them a meaningful role to play in federal lands planning and management.
While the law is clear, the politics of wildlife management is not. In
1981, George Coggins and MVichael Ward reviewed the law of wildlife
management on federal lands and concluded that the "jurisdictional
imbroglio is more political than legal."m Nothing has changed in this regard.
As discussed in Part H, some state interests continue to insist on their
"sovereign rights" to manage wildlife on federal lands, notwithstanding the
decisions made by the courts and Congress over the years. On the other
hand are federal land agencies that are often in self-denial about their
responsibilities for wildlife management and conservation. Too often
adopting an overly narrow view of their responsibilities, we found federal
land agencies applying their authorities in an inconsistent fashion, to the
dismay of the states and those outside interests willing to challenge them.
The most unfortunate consequence of the federal-state conflicts
reviewed here is that they draw attention away from the practice of wildlife
conservation. A more productive way to proceed in the future is by working
more constructively within the carefully crafted legal framework provided
by the U.S. Constitution and federal land law rather than against it, and by
embracing the conservation obligations that are inherent in federal lands
and wildlife trust management.
997 Hughes, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979), overruling Geer, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
998 George Cameron Coggins & Michael E. Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the
Federal PubBc Lands, 60 OR. L. REv. 59, 60, 84 (1981). Coggins and Ward note that, in creating
the "delicate allocation of management jurisdiction" in federal land law, "Congress has been
extremely solicitous of state sensibilities" and that "[slome members of Congress applaud...
the federal self-denial." Id. at 75, 83-84. They conclude that "[t]he main legislative theory seems
to be on the order of 'let's just muddle through as best we can and let the courts handle the hard
cases.'" Id. at 84-85.
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